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The history of the law of free expression is one of vindication in cases 
involving speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even 
ugly.   
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (2000)1 
 
Justice Robert H. Jackson posited in 1943 that “[i]f there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens 
to confess by word or act their faith therein.”2  In the same opinion, 
which ended compulsory flag salutes in public schools, Justice 
      †  Professor of Law and William L. Dwyer Chair in Law, University of 
Washington.  This article is dedicated to the memory of the best boss I ever had, 
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States 1969–1986.  © 2008 Stewart 
Jay. 
 1. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000). 
 2. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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Jackson premised his reasoning on what he called a “trite but 
necessary” lesson about the relationship between the First 
Amendment and democratic rule in America: “Compulsory 
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the 
graveyard. . . . Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, 
not public opinion by authority.”3  Nearly a half century later, 
Justice William J. Brennan proclaimed while upholding the right to 
burn the American flag in protest, that “[i]f there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”4 
Repudiation of governmentally-mandated orthodoxy and 
tolerance for unpopular speech are two sides of the guiding 
principle in modern free speech law.  “The essence of that rule,” 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the Supreme Court, is that 
“regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or 
hostility for the point of view being expressed by the 
communicator.”5  Government neutrality is the norm in regulating 
speech. 
These concepts are indispensable components of the 
libertarian vision of the First Amendment that was only beginning 
to be recognized by the Supreme Court when Justice Jackson 
spotted the fixed star in 1943.6  For well over 100 years after the Bill 
of Rights was passed, the Court had not once acted to protect First 
Amendment rights.  In large measure, this was because the Justices 
did not recognize that the states were bound by the amendment 
until 1925.7  Even when they did, a majority of the Court 
demonstrated almost unrelenting hostility toward the speech and 
press rights of political dissidents.8  A similar wave of repression 
appeared in the Cold War period of the 1950s, countenanced again 
by most of the Court.9  But notwithstanding the setback for free 
expression that the 1950s witnessed, the Court had decidedly 
turned a corner toward the modern libertarian approach to free 
expression.10  Decisions handed down over a decade starting with 
 3. Id. at 641. 
 4. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 5. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976). 
 6. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 7. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654 (1925). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 78–79 (1961). 
 10. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646. 
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the late 1930s provided the theoretical foundation for today’s more 
fully realized First Amendment.  Fundamental tenets of free speech 
were overturned in short order and the Court reinforced the 
traditional hostility to prior restraints.11  Justice Jackson’s decision 
in the 1943 case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
overruled a case only three years old reaching the opposite result.12 
It is fitting, then, to start this study with a rude reminder: 
Justice Jackson’s and Justice Brennan’s defense of autonomous 
individualism against statist conformity represents the modern First 
Amendment, not its past incarnations.  Today, in contrast to the 
first three decades of the last century, the Court—including its 
most conservative members, who at times lead the charge—has 
time and again shielded speakers and writers from suppression of 
their opinions.  How this seismic shift in the Court’s attitude took 
place is the story that will be told in these pages.  The thesis is that 
by the end of the 1960s the Court had enunciated the essential 
principles of the modern First Amendment, albeit with some 
significant exceptions.  Those exceptions involved commercial 
speech and sexually-explicit expression, holdovers from a more 
repressive era.  Even in those areas, however, the seeds of current 
doctrines were sowed well before the Court recognized that these 
forms of speech were entitled to substantial protection from 
government interference. 
As with other constitutional subjects, there are two basic ways 
to inform an understanding of free expression as a fundamental 
value to Americans.  One avenue is to research the origins of the 
First Amendment in an attempt to discover why it was included in 
the Bill of Rights.  Another approach seeks to elucidate the theory 
of free expression as it has been revealed through decades of 
experience in a myriad of settings.  Neither is entirely satisfactory.  
The first, relying on the expectations of those who created the First 
Amendment, runs into the reality that legal protections for speech 
and press at the time the First Amendment was written were vastly 
less libertarian than modern judicial interpretations.  Looking to 
developments in the interim reveals a mottled pattern of 
suppression and protection. 
In taking the second path, one must study not just legal 
doctrines, but also social and political history, to discern the 
 11. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 589 (1976). 
 12. 319 U.S. at 642. 
3
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
776 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
principles behind the epoch’s attitude toward free expression.  
Legal history is not just an assembly of seriatim decisions.  Rulings 
are based on theories from which the governing principles of the 
subject in question are deduced.  Free expression is no different.  
Along the way toward the more libertarian outlook of modern 
American free expression doctrines, the Court, the academy, and 
the public have attempted to develop grand theories to define the 
purposes of the First Amendment (or some portion of it).  Few 
subjects of constitutional law have been accompanied by such a 
cacophony of competing justificatory theories as freedom of speech 
and press. 
Here is a brief and incomplete sample of proposed as well as 
judicially-adopted theories for protecting free expression: 
unbridled speech allows the truth to prevail in the marketplace of 
ideas;13 it oils the wheels of democracy by providing citizens the 
knowledge with which to govern themselves;14 free expression thus 
checks against government abuse and provides a mechanism that 
fosters “rational judgment” instead of social upheaval;15 free speech 
serves the indispensable end of developing self-restraint in 
society⎯to which can be appended the idea that allowing dissent 
releases pressure that otherwise would explode into antisocial 
behavior.16  Still others see speech as part of a larger system of 
natural rights, which regards free expression as being vital to 
fostering personal autonomy and self-determination.17  Facilitating 
the formation of political opinions may be fundamental to the 
democratic process, this view goes, but by itself it presents a 
crabbed conception of what justifies freedom to expression.  
Among other types of expression protected by the First 
Amendment, they would include artistic endeavors, such as literary 
works and art pieces, which at best have an attenuated connection 
to politics.  Another perspective holds that freedom of expression 
exists to give voice to the dissenter, whose views may ultimately win 
 13. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 14. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH (1993). 
 15. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). 
 16. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
 17. Id. 
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majority acceptance.18  Allowing free rein to critics of the status quo 
thus provides a counterweight to political and social petrifaction.  
The right to dissent also has roots in the constitutional values of 
individualism and self-autonomy.  Dissenters are exercising a 
fundamental right, so what they say need not improve the general 
society.  Indeed, it may be socially worthless in the minds of almost 
everyone except the speaker.  From these premises, it is a short 
stretch for some to posit that the First Amendment, taken in all its 
parts, stands as a manifesto for individual distinctiveness, creativity 
and nonconformity with mainstream values.19 
Not everyone is so inclusive in elaborating the values served by 
the First Amendment.  Many agree with the sentiments of Robert 
Bork, who famously wrote that “the first amendment must be cut 
off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech.”20  One need 
not go as far as Bork to agree that the Court in the modern era has 
shown special solicitude toward political advocacy.  Speaking of 
limitations on political financing, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in 
dissent, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy: 
“Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment 
protection.”21 
None of these theories provides a complete account of what 
the First Amendment has represented to the American people over 
the course of the nation’s history, or even in today’s world.  None is 
adequate to explain all of the currently recognized doctrines of 
free speech that have emanated from the Court.  The justifications 
overlap, reinforce one another, and sometimes clash.  Without a 
unified theory, a typical recourse has been to acknowledge that the 
philosophy of free expression is nourished by multiple springs, the 
better “to protect a rich variety of expressional modes.”22  That is 
fine as rhetorical flourish, and fits nicely with post-modernist 
attitudes, but it leaves open the decisive question of why a 
 18. See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA (1999); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND 
ROMANCE (1990). 
 19. See generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF 
IDENTITY (1999); David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral 
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). 
 20. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1971). 
 21. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 
U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 411 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (2d ed. 1988). 
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particular “expressional mode” should be entitled to protection.23  
Without a theory, how is one to tell?  As we shall see, historical 
practices at the time the First Amendment was formulated are a 
poor guide to explaining the present, much less the intervening 
years.  Certainly the values prevalent in late eighteenth century 
American society about free expression do not track current 
conceptions either on or off the Court.24  Within the last hundred 
years, the Court’s decisions on speech and press have—broadly 
speaking—swung from tolerance of state repression toward a more 
libertarian conception that protects an enormous range of 
communications.  There are sharply opposing views as to whether 
the Court has gone far enough in guarding expression or, on the 
contrary, too far. 
All applications of free expression involve tradeoffs between 
the social utility of restricting expression and the corresponding 
burdens on the individual and society from allowing it.  As with any 
question of weighing societal values versus individual autonomy, an 
assessment depends on one’s philosophical starting premise about 
the goals served (or preferred) by freedom of expression.  A person 
who is a utilitarian by outlook, for example, might find the 
abridgment of speech for some to be an acceptable tradeoff for the 
benefit of all.  One who favors maximum individual autonomy may 
accept an immediate social harm from free discourse as worth the 
price in order to maximize personal freedom in the long run.  On 
the other hand, if one thinks that the state has been assigned the 
constitutional role of closely overseeing the lives of citizens to 
assure obedience to social norms, state impositions on expression 
may seem normal and even welcome.  Some contend that the 
supreme value of the First Amendment is to expose the truth, on 
the ground that the truth alone will set us free.  The “marketplace 
of ideas,” alluded to above, is often the accompanying metaphor to 
capture this theory: by the clash of ideas, we ultimately find what is 
true (or at least approximates the truth better than in a closed 
society).  Others reject this entire line of reasoning as beside the 
point even if correct.  Neither discovering “truth” nor securing the 
greatest good for the greatest number should guide the inquiry 
into First Amendment protections, according to this conception.  
 23. Id. 
 24. See Edward J. Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the 
Political Values Served by Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 372, 381–85 
(1981). 
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Instead, our eyes should be focused on the premise of personal 
autonomy that they see as underpinning the First Amendment.  On 
this view, free speech is the norm and restrictions on it by 
government need the most persuasive of justifications. 
A new wave of critics emerging in recent decades has turned 
these arguments on their head.  According to various theories, 
mostly propounded by self-identified leftists, governmental 
neutrality toward the content of speech is in fact not neutral in 
result.25  The “marketplace of ideas” is not a free market, they posit, 
because the exchange is biased toward the wealthy and powerful, as 
well as sexists, bigots and perverts.26  A select minority of society 
enjoys privileged access to the arenas in which opinions matter.27  
Leftist proponents of free expression may agree with conservatives 
on the Court that safeguarding political speech is the preeminent 
mission of the First Amendment.28  They disagree when it comes to 
such issues as controls on election campaign contributions and 
expenditures.29  The conservative version of this proposition usually 
opposes restraints on campaign financing.30  Their critics are 
typically “liberals” in the modern sense of leftist, Senator John 
McCain notwithstanding.  Liberals commonly argue that limitations 
on campaign contributions and spending are necessary to correct 
the imbalance of power created by inequalities of wealth, especially 
corporate wealth.31  Libertarians reply that spending money on a 
campaign is the equivalent of personal expression.32  Another side 
of this critique highlights the negative ramifications of official 
neutrality: it permits attitudes or encourages actions that should 
have no place in a society committed to equality and safeguarding 
the welfare of the populace.  Pornography, one line of argument 
goes, must be available as part of the “marketplace,” notwith-
standing that it may reinforce sexism and lead to subjugation and 
rape of women by men.  Racist or sexist speech does directly injure 
victims within earshot and indirectly creates a climate of 
 25. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 26. See generally Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Market Place of Ideas Fails, 31 
VAL. U. L. REV. 951 (1997). 
 27. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 160–62 (2003). 
 28. Id. at 161. 
 29. Id. at 161–62. 
 30. Id. at 162. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 162–63. 
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discrimination.  Cigarette ads promote a deadly product.  And so 
on, as it is easy to list the downsides of unbridled expression.  
Perhaps paradoxically, while these types of arguments usually have 
come from the political left, on occasion (as with pornography) 
there is an overlap with proponents of traditional values. 
One might study this subject by exploring every major theory 
(and their corresponding philosophical roots) that has been put 
forth to justify resolution of First Amendment disputes.  Even if one 
does so systematically, a sobering realization will emerge from the 
inquiry: every theory that has been proposed is inadequate, either as an 
organizing principle for a coherent conception of free expression 
or as a prescription for rethinking the field.  Obviously, much the 
same can be said about most areas of constitutional law.  Taking 
that point, there is something acutely unsettling about the 
indeterminacy of the First Amendment.  Among all the stars in the 
constitutional constellation, none is more luminescent than 
freedom of expression.33  It is the foundation of democratic 
government, the very essence of what it means to be free in the 
political sense.  A sure gauge of authoritarian governments is their 
suppression of expression, and not just that which is political in 
nature.  So it is disconcerting to lay all of the Supreme Court’s 
many decisions on speech and press end to end, only to find that a 
coherent, unifying rationale for them always seems beyond grasp. 
For purposes of this study, the light will shine on the values 
historically served by protecting various kinds of speech.  From that 
inquiry, one can at least understand why the chips fell where they 
did in First Amendment cases.  There is a heuristic and normative 
purpose to this exercise as well.  The knowledge will show why 
governmental controls on speech deserve everlasting scrutiny.  
Giving government power over the content of what may be said 
grants censorial power to officials, and historically that authority 
has been abused in ways intolerable to the American people.  
Dissidents, who may be saintly or despicable, are the unintended 
beneficiaries of tolerance for all ideas.  Courts protect dissenters of 
all stripes under an official regime of neutrality toward content in 
order to avoid giving arbitrary power to government officials.  “We 
have above all else feared the political censor,” Justice Douglas 
wrote.34  American courts, in other words, have not protected 
 33. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
 34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1951) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
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speech rights because there is necessarily some intrinsic 
importance in the ideas espoused by Wobblies, Nazis, or 
Communists, none of whom could be accused of moderation.  This 
does not mean that dissenters never contribute ideas that have 
mainstream influence or induce other people to reconsider their 
own thoughts.  They may—and have in abundance—but the point 
of protecting them is to safeguard everyone from the common 
enemy: ourselves.35 
Another way to explain the values behind the First 
Amendment is to connect the principles of governmental neutrality 
to those underpinning equal protection.  Since speech is a 
fundamental right, government regulation of content must treat 
speakers equally.  There must be a legitimate reason for the 
content distinction drawn by the regulation, one weighty enough to 
outweigh the strong presumption against content controls.  
Inevitably this requires a value judgment on the part of judges as to 
which interests are legitimate and how much weight they should be 
given.  Consider the opening quotations from Justices Jackson and 
Brennan: the Court has made the key value judgment that official 
disagreement with or dislike of⎯or revulsion against⎯the 
speaker’s message is not a legitimate reason to restrain or punish a 
person.  Not only was this principle not recognized in the 
eighteenth century, it had changed little by the beginning of the 
last century.  Heaps of laws were on the books, and enforced, 
against an assortment of messages that legislatures disfavored.  
Pornography is an obvious case, but there were countless others, 
from bans on speech impugning a woman’s reputation to laws that 
essentially made vigorous criticism of a war the basis for serious 
criminal sanctions.36 
Over time, American courts have steadily reduced the number 
of legitimate reasons for limiting the content of speech or 
association.  At the federal level, this process did not get underway 
until the 1930s and 1940s.37  By the end of the 1940s, the 
interpretation of the First Amendment bore little resemblance to 
that of the start of the century, and less so to when the amendment 
was written.38  Since that time there have been numerous 
 35. The “enemy is ourselves” notion comes from the renowned philosopher, 
Pogo, the comic-strip character created by Walt Kelly. 
 36. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508. 
 37. Id. at 508–16. 
 38. Id. at 577. 
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developments in First Amendment law.  Nevertheless, by the end of 
1950s the essential transformation in the judiciary’s attitude toward 
free expression was complete in that the courts had declared the 
right to speak and write at will to be indispensable elements of 
American society.39  All important subsequent developments in the 
First Amendment have flowed from these principles. 
Condoning the public airing of disparate beliefs does 
encourage change, but in a democratic society the change is likely 
to be rather more moderate than precipitous and far-reaching.  
Moderation, at least in governmental policies, is the natural 
consequence of critics publicly nipping away at the state’s actions, 
usually from several political outlooks that temper resorting to 
extremes.  That may not seem apparent when the focus is on the 
differing ideologies of America’s political parties, which seem 
radically different until compared to closed societies such as the 
former Soviet Union or any number of contemporary nations, 
including many of our so-called allies.  The relevant picture is not 
the present, then, but the perspective of long spans of history and 
international practice.  Charles A. Kupchan, an international affairs 
specialist at Georgetown University, provides a globalist perspective 
about the linkage between free speech and moderate, stable 
governments.  The pragmatic function of the First Amendment in 
modern American society, he has written, derives from “the 
tendency for democratic debate to produce centrist and moderate 
policies.”40  This may not be a glamorous aspiration, but consider 
some of the alternatives that history has served up.  Unbridled 
speech, however moderating to society it may be, is neither a 
panacea that guarantees democracy nor a cost-free libertarian 
lunch.  People get hurt by speech, sometimes very badly.  Justice 
John Marshall Harlan acknowledged this downside of the Court’s 
insistence on neutrality when he wrote in 1971: “The constitutional 
right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse 
and populous as ours.”41  Moderation and political stability may 
have been the healthful results of the tonic, but along with them 
came neo-Nazis parading through towns populated by Holocaust 
survivors, militantly pro-Jihad websites, ultra-violent movies, and a 
multi-billion dollar porn market. Add your own tirade here—and 
prepare for a long story. 
 39. Id. at 531. 
 40. CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA 113 (2002). 
 41. Cohen v. California, 405 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
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I. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
Comparing the current body of First Amendment law, there is 
a radical difference in outlook regarding freedom of expression 
between the eighteenth and the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.  America’s legal tradition, derived from English practice, 
was not generous toward the rights of speakers and printers, 
especially not if their words were critical of the government or its 
officials.42  Blackstone summarized the prevailing dogma in English 
law about the freedom to publish: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of 
a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints 
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for 
criminal matter when published.  Every freeman has an 
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the 
press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, 
or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own 
temerity.43 
Among the varieties of speech that were liable to subsequent 
punishment, Blackstone included speech that was “blasphemous, 
immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous 
libels.”44  His delineation of “no previous restraints” referred to the 
demise in 1694 of Great Britain’s notorious licensing system for the 
press.45  Under English law prevailing at the time Blackstone wrote, 
disparagement of government or officials could be prosecuted as 
sedition.46  Truth could not be offered as a defense to a charge of 
sedition or criminal libel—a factually accurate rebuke of authority 
was considered worse than a false accusation because it was even 
more likely to erode the confidence of the people in their 
government.47  Juries in seditious libel cases were instructed by 
English judges to determine only whether the defendant in fact 
published the writing—whether the printing amounted to sedition 
 42. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *150-
52 (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. at 151–52. 
 44. Id. at 151. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 194 
(1716) (“[T]he greater Appearance there is of Truth in any malicious Invective, so 
much the more provoking it is.”). 
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was a judicial question to be ascertained only by judges.48  Libel was 
a criminal offense in almost all the founding states, and seditious 
utterances were regarded as a form of libel.49  Every state at the time 
the First Amendment was adopted outlawed either blasphemy or 
profanity.50  Publishing the sort of sexually-explicit depictions that 
are now routine in films and magazines would have been criminal 
acts in 1791 had photography been invented.  More generally, 
speech that had “a bad tendency” to cause crime, disorders or 
immoral acts could be punished.51  Blackstone explained that libels 
were punishable because they had “an immoral or illegal 
tendency.”52  Penalizing publications “of a pernicious tendency,” he 
declared, was “necessary for the preservation of peace and good 
order, of government and religion, the only solid foundation of 
civil liberty.”53  As one legal scholar summarized, “[t]he colonial 
press had no legal protection in 1774 other than the common law 
prohibition against prior restraints.”54 
This description represents the law of free speech in the late 
eighteenth century as authoritatively represented in opinions and 
treatises.  But the actual practice of the American people reveals a 
society in which people certainly valued—and took for granted—
the ability to read the news and opinion of others, as well as speak 
their minds on most subjects.  This was particularly true in the 
American colonies, where the people were far removed from the 
distant center of imperial power.  A declaration by the Continental 
Congress in 1774 extolled the free press not only for its 
 48. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (2000) 
[hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]; RICHARD LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE IN PRINT AND BROADCASTING 34 (1987); 
CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS: THE EVOLVING LAW OF 
LIBEL 266 (1971). 
 49. David J. Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious 
Libel into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 154, 171 (2001). 
 50. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 n.12 (1957) (listing state 
statutes prohibiting blasphemy or profanity circa 1792); 3 Pa. Laws 177, 178 
(1791–1802); LEONARD W. LEVY, TREASON AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE 
OF BLASPHEMY (1981); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, 
Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 305–319 (1988) (explaining 
that in 1988 blasphemy was a capital offense in three states: New York, 
Connecticut. and Massachusetts). 
 51. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 10. 
 52. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *150. 
 53. Id. at *152. 
 54. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 
464 (1983). 
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“advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general,” but 
more importantly for “its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the 
administration of Government.”55  A free press, Congress asserted, 
facilitated the “ready communication of thoughts between subjects, 
and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby 
oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more 
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.”56  When the Rev-
olution was over, the habit of rebuking the establishment did not 
perish.  By the early 1790s, opponents of the Federalist 
administrations of Washington and Adams lambasted officialdom 
in print with all manner of invectives.57 
What existed in the eighteenth century, then, was a 
disconnection between the existing legal order, which could be 
highly repressive, and the impassioned and oftentimes irreverent 
outpouring of revolutionary and opposition literature, much of 
which went way over the line of what the law counted as seditious 
libel.  As legal history goes, this is not so unusual: often there is a 
chasm between law as officially stated and as actually applied.  At 
least in the arena of political speech, American popular attitudes 
regarding speech freedoms dovetailed with the larger development 
of disenchantment toward English rule.  Once there was consensus 
that government ruled in the interest of and at the sufferance of 
the people, it followed that the people must be heard, and thus 
free speech was “the great Bulwark of liberty; they prosper and die 
together.”58  So stated Cato’s Letters, by the English opposition 
writers John Trenchard and William Gordon, whose essays were 
widely reprinted and admired among Americans.59  Colonial and 
revolutionary legislatures copied the term “Bulwark of Liberty” to 
describe freedom of press and speech.60  When, in 1768, the Massa-
chusetts assembly was asked by the governor to refer a newspaper 
publisher to a grand jury for seditious libel, the House refused, 
 55. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF QUEBEC (1774), 
reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 222 (Bernard Schwartz 
ed., 1971) [hereinafter DOC. HIST. BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally DONALD H. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD (1969). 
 58. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & WILLIAM GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS 99 (1724), quoted in JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND 
PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM 25 (1988) 
[hereinafter SMITH, PRESS]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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declaring:  “The Liberty of the Press is a great Bulwark of the 
Liberty of the People: It is therefore the incumbent Duty of those 
who are constituted the Guardians of the People’s Rights to defend 
and maintain it.”61  In a further insult to the governor, who had 
been the object of the newspaper story, the grand jury refused to 
issue an indictment.62 
By the dawn of the revolutionary upheaval in America, even 
Lord North’s administration mouthed the idea of the press as a 
“bulwark” of freedom, though he drew the line at “licentiousness.”63  
But it was one thing to countenance the scores of newspapers in 
London alone, but quite another for him to tolerate the “black 
gall” flowing from pens that “poisoned the minds of the people.”64  
Americans of the revolutionary period delighted in the writings of 
such anti-Crown writers as John Wilkes and the anonymous writer 
“Junius.”65  Wilkes was a passionate essayist, provocateur of mobs, as 
well as a sometimes Member of Parliament (he was repeatedly 
expelled or refused a seat for his writings).66  His fame in both 
England and America were assured by a 1764 conviction on charges 
of seditious libel and blasphemy.67  One of his crimes stemmed 
from publishing an essay that accused George III of sanctioning the 
government’s “most odious measures.”68  Junius, whose real name 
was the subject of much speculation, captured widespread attention 
and admiration for his brazen denunciations of the Crown 
government, which he labeled “universally odious.”69  On the eve of 
the Revolution, James Burgh, an English opposition writer highly 
popular among disaffected Americans, echoed Cato in defending 
the people’s right to criticize their rulers: “No man ought to be 
hindered saying or writing what he pleases on the conduct of those 
 61. Letter from Massachusetts House of Representatives to Gov. Francis 
Bernard (March 3, 1768), reprinted in REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 
BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 275 (Josiah Quincy ed., 1865). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See SMITH, PRESS, supra note 58, at 29, 62. 
 64. Id. (quoting Lord North). 
 65. JOHN BREWER, PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF 
GEORGE III 154–55 (1976). 
 66. See generally ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES: THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF 
CIVIL LIBERTY (2006). 
 67. See id. at 22. 
 68. John Wilkes, The North Briton, No. 45 (April 23, 1763), quoted in CURTIS, 
FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 42. 
 69. To the Right Honourable Lord Mansfield (Letter XLI, Nov. 14, 1770), 
reprinted in THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS 184 (C. W. Everett ed., 1927). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 787 
 
who undertake the management of national affairs, in which all are 
concerned, and therefore have a right to inquire, and to publish 
their suspicions concerning them.”70 
Nine of the new state constitutions enacted during the 
Revolution included clauses protecting freedom of expression.71  
Eight of these charters mentioned only liberty of press; 
Pennsylvania was the sole state to memorialize “[t]hat the people 
have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, and publishing 
their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to 
be restrained.”72  Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, by contrast, pro-
nounced ‘[t]hat the freedom of the press is one of the greatest 
bulwarks of liberty and can never be restrained but by despotic 
governments.”73 
It is impossible, then, to separate early American development 
of speech principles from the course of republican advocacy of 
democracy that matured into revolutionary ideology.  
Revolutionaries, by definition, act outside the law.  Americans for 
generations had refused to be bound by the literal constraints of 
English law regarding political expression.  An indelible cultural 
memory was associated with the case of John Peter Zenger.74  A New 
York printer, Zenger spent eight months in jail before being tried 
in 1735 for seditious libel.75  His offense consisted of publishing a 
stinging rebuke of the royal governor’s conduct.76  Zenger’s defense 
at trial in part was based on the contention that his allegations were 
true, an argument that was rejected by the judge (who served at the 
pleasure of the governor).77  The jury acquitted Zenger, blatantly 
ignoring the judge’s instruction that the truthfulness of a seditious 
libel was irrelevant and that the jurors were limited only to finding 
whether Zenger was the publisher (a fact that he admitted).78  
Zenger’s acquittal did not change the law of seditious libel in the 
formal sense—Blackstone’s summary of the law, which was 
 70. 3 JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 254 (1775), quoted in CURTIS, 
FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 46. 
 71. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 48. 
 72. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 12 (1776). 
 73. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 12 (1776).  On early state constitutional 
provisions relating to speech and press, see Anderson, supra note 54, at 464–66. 
 74. See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN 
PETER ZENGER 19 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1963). 
 75. Id. at 18. 
 76. Id. at 16–17. 
 77. Id. at 23. 
 78. See id. at 25–26. 
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inconsistent with Zenger’s defense, would not be published for 
another generation.79  Practically speaking, however, colonial 
authorities were foiled in bringing seditious libel charges before 
courts.  As legal historian Michael Kent Curtis has recounted, no 
one was convicted in the American colonies of seditious libel after 
the Zenger trial.80  “Grand juries refused to indict; and petit juries 
refused to convict.”81  Colonial legislatures, following the example 
of Parliament, called publishers and writers to account for writings 
they deemed breaches of their “privilege” on at least twenty 
occasions, imprisoning some.82  Yet the press overall was not cowed 
by these legislative actions, and the practice of legislative 
investigations for breach of privilege largely ended with the 
Revolution.83  The number of newspapers published in America 
rose from one in the early 1700s to 100 in 1790.84  Philadelphia 
alone had seven papers in 1784.85  Many of these newspapers were 
aggressively opinionated, often rancorous and sometimes scurrilous 
in their rebuke of public officials.86 
Notwithstanding the history of contentious relations between 
the press and government, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
failed to include any specific provision for free expression.87  It was 
not an oversight.  About a month before the Convention ended, 
Charles Pinkney proposed a provision stating: “The liberty of the 
Press shall be inviolably preserved.”88  No action having been taken 
on this suggestion, Mr. Pinkney and Mr. Gerry moved in the 
waning days of the proceedings to include such a declaration.89  
According to James Madison’s notes, the only objection came from 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who dismissed the proposal as 
“unnecessary,” because “[t]he power of Congress does not extend 
to the Press.”90  A vote was taken, and the motion failed 7-4.91  This 
 79. Id. at 29–30. 
 80. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 46. 
 81. Id. 
 82. SMITH, PRESS, supra note 58, at 7–8. 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. Id. at 12. 
 85. Id. at 37. 
 86. See id. at 46–47. 
 87. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
 88. Id. at 341 (quoting Pinkney's proposals of Aug. 20, 1787). 
 89. Id. at 617. 
 90. Id. at 618. 
 91. Id. 
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occurred one day after the Convention unanimously rejected 
Gerry’s broader motion to preface the Constitution with a bill of 
rights. 92 
Despite the absence of a press clause in the Constitution, the 
Framers did hamstring one potent means used by English 
authorities to deter and punish dissenters: treason prosecutions.93  
England had a long history of imprisoning and putting people to 
death for treason on account of writings that in some way criticized 
the government or the King.94  Under the Constitution, treason was 
limited only to “levying [w]ar” against the United States, “or in 
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”95  While 
not airtight, this definition made it exceptionally difficult to base a 
treason charge on mere criticism of the government or its 
officials.96  “Complaining, therefore, or writing, cannot be treason,” 
Richard Spaight assured the North Carolina ratifying convention.97  
Spaight had been a delegate at the Philadelphia Convention.98 
A separate provision conferred immunity on members of 
Congress “for any [s]peech or [d]ebate in either [h]ouse”, but 
even this immunity did not extend to treasonous speech.99  Justice 
Byron R. White explained that the clause “was designed to assure a 
co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, 
debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the 
Executive Branch.”100  Read literally, this provision appears to 
extend immunity against civil or criminal actions only to speeches 
made on the floor of Congress.101  However, the Supreme Court has 
construed it more expansively, to encompass legislative activities by 
members and their aides in committees and in issuing official 
committee reports.102 
 92. Id. at 588. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 94. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 99–102 (1984).  See also 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 307–18 (1966); 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 303 (1883). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 96. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, The LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES 
126–66 (1971); Mayton, supra note 94, at 115–17, 135–38. 
 97. Richard D. Spaight, North Carolina Ratifying Convention of 1788, 
reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 209 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 1937). 
 98. 3 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 87, at 590. 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 100. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972). 
 101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 102. Id. at 617–18.  Senator Mike Gravel was protected by this privilege when, 
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Roger Sherman’s argument against including a broad 
protection for the press in the Constitution, became the standard 
Federalist line for why the Constitution afforded no protection to 
the press.  Alexander Hamilton asked in the Federalist Papers, “why 
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to 
do?”103  Constitutional structure would protect personal liberties, he 
assured.104  “If the Congress should exercise any other power over 
the press than this,” James Iredell wrote, “they will do it without any 
warrant from this constitution, and must answer for it as for any 
other act of tyranny.”105  In retrospect, this idea seems absurd or 
even disingenuous, since Congress would only a decade later enact 
precisely such a limitation on the press in the Sedition Act of 
1798.106  Antifederalists pounced on the omission during 
ratification, prompting James Wilson to concede that the absence 
of a press clause was “a copious subject of declamation and 
opposition.”107  Of all the concerns expressed over the missing bill 
of rights in ratifying conventions, the most apprehension was raised 
over the failure to protect the press from federal abuse.108  Three 
states—New York, North Carolina and Virginia⎯accompanied 
their ratifications with demands that the Constitution be amended 
to include a bill of rights with a clause protecting the press.109 
Responding to this state pressure, the bill of rights that 
Madison proposed to the first Congress included protections for 
speech, press, assembly, and petition.110  One of his proposals 
closely followed a recommendation by Virginia’s ratifying 
in 1971, he placed forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon Papers on the record of 
the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works 
Committee, which he chaired.  Id. at 609–11.  Gravel exceeded the privilege only 
when he arranged to have the papers printed by a private press, as opposed to a 
congressional report, which would have been immunized.  Id. at 649. 
 103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961).  
 104. See id. 
 105. JAMES IREDELL, ANSWERS TO MR. MASON’S OBJECTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTIT-
UTION (1788), reprinted in 1 DOC. HIST. BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 454. 
 106. See infra Parts I and II. 
 107. James Wilson, An Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia 
(1787), reprinted in 1 DOC. HIST. BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 55, at 528. 
 108. See, e.g., id. 
 109. See Anderson, supra note 54, at 471 (indicating that several states also 
wanted safeguards for speech and press). 
 110. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 12 (Helen E. Veit, et al. 
eds., 1991). 
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convention (which in turn tracked Pennsylvania’s constitution): 
“The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to 
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of 
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be 
inviolable.”111  Another of Madison’s amendments encompassed the 
rights of assembly and petition: “[t]he people shall not be 
restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their 
common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or 
remonstrances for redress of their grievances.”112  These 
recommendations were combined by the House and then further 
modified in the Senate, where the clause “consult for their 
common good” was eliminated and provisions for religious liberties 
were added.113  A third proposal from Madison, which he 
characterized as “the most valuable” of all the Bill of Rights 
provisions, was approved in the House but rejected by the Senate;114 
it would have provided:  “[N]o State shall infringe the equal rights 
of conscience, nor the freedom of speech or of the press, nor of 
the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.”115  With some additional 
tinkering it was sent to the states for ratification and has not been 
modified since: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”116 
If there was extended debate on the First Amendment in 
Congress, it went largely unrecorded.  The introductory clause, 
“Congress shall make no law,” which originated in the Senate, 
exactly paralleled the Federalist position on the press clause; that 
there was no affirmative power in the Constitution that granted 
Congress the ability to regulate the press.  That, together with the 
rejection of Madison’s proposal to guard the people against state 
incursions on press rights, proves that the amendment only applied 
to federal legislation.  Still, this leaves us with no definitive answer 
to critical questions about how to interpret the substance of the 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (1789) [hereinafter 
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE].  
 114. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 784 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); JOURNAL OF THE 
SENATE, supra note 113, at 72. 
 115. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 783.  
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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amendment.  Did the original framers and ratifiers of the First 
Amendment intend to preserve the legal order as it then existed on 
paper?  Or did they mean to build upon the revolutionary 
experience to alter fundamentally the relation between citizen and 
the state when it came to expression?  Intriguingly, the Senate 
defeated a substitute motion that would have guaranteed freedom 
of the press “in as ample a manner as hath at any time been 
secured by the common law.”117  No notes were taken of the debate 
surrounding this defeated proposal.  It could have meant either 
that the Senators wished to insure greater liberties than at common 
law, thereby rejecting Blackstone, or that it was unnecessary 
because the amendment would be interpreted in accordance with 
the existing legal order.  Another possibility is that the Senators 
wished to allow room for growth of press rights beyond the 
common law.  Finally, it would be highly informative to know what 
was said about the amendment in state ratifying conventions.  
Unfortunately, none of those debates were recorded.118 
What was the existing order regarding speech and press?  
Some eight years after the First Amendment was approved, 
Madison wrote that “[i]n every state, probably, in the Union, the 
press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures 
of public men, of every description, which has not been confined to 
the strict limits of the common law.”119  His impression has been 
verified by modern studies of press activities at the end of the 
eighteenth century.  Leonard Levy, on the other hand, disagreed 
after reviewing the history of Madison’s time: “To assume the 
existence of a general, latitudinarian understanding that veered 
substantially from the common-law definition is incredible, given 
the total absence of argumentative analysis of the meaning of the 
clause on speech and press.”120  Levy was rightly criticized by 
scholars for his initial assessment of the period, which neglected 
the vigorous press alluded to by Madison, and for overemphasizing 
 117. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, supra note 113, at 70. 
 118. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1171 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 2 DOC. HIST. RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION]. 
 119. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 4 
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 570. 
 120. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 225 (1960) [hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY]. 
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official suppression of the press.121  Levy, however, responded to 
critics by publishing a thoroughly detailed study of speech and 
press rights and expressive practices in early America, which 
reaffirmed his original conclusion that America of the late 
eighteenth century was far from a bastion of unbridled expression.  
Freedom of the press was widely understood by jurists to be no 
more than what Blackstone described, and the right of speech was 
not even recognized by the common law.122  James Wilson, Levy 
noted, said at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that “what is 
meant by liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent 
restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible when he 
attacks the security or welfare of the government or the safety, 
character, and property of the individual.”123 
Unfortunately, statements such as Wilson’s provide us with 
little specific evidence from the drafting and ratification process as 
to whether the First Amendment was intended to surpass the 
common law in shielding speakers and writers.  It is especially hard 
to reconstruct the meaning of “freedom of speech,” as opposed to 
the press.  Historians of the First Amendment have pointed out 
that “freedom of speech, unlike freedom of the press, had little 
history as an independent concept when the first amendment was 
framed.”124  In any event, assuming that the amendment was meant 
to be more libertarian than the existing law, this says nothing 
specifically useful for resolving the countless disputes about speech 
and press freedoms that erupted in the twentieth century.125 
The ambiguities of the early experience with these questions 
can be appreciated by a study of the first major test of the First 
Amendment in the courts: the Sedition Act of 1798.  If for no other 
reason, the Act is important to examine because the Court 
posthumously condemned it as inimical to First Amendment 
ideals⎯more than 150 years after the fact, which is more than a tad 
bit anachronistic.  Writing in 1964, Justice Brennan, like Justice 
 121. See Dwight L. Teeter Jr., From Revisionism to Orthodoxy, 13 REV. AMER. HIST. 
518, 520 (1985); James L. Crouthamel, Book Review, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 549, 549 
(1985).  
    122.     LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 5, at 185–219 (1985) 
[hereinafter LEVY, EMERGENCE]. 
 123. The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 DOC. HIST. 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 118, at 455. 
 124. Anderson, supra note 54, at 487. 
 125. See Mayton, supra note 94, at 96 (“the press was a trenchant and persistent 
critic of government and government officials.”). 
21
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
794 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
Holmes before him, asserted that “although the Sedition Act was 
never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried 
the day in the court of history.  Fines levied in its prosecution were 
repaid by Act of Congress on the ground that it was 
unconstitutional.”126  But history is not a court, and congressional 
repayment of fines (as well as President Jefferson’s pardoning of 
those convicted) does not establish the intention of the First 
Amendment’s proponents and ratifiers.  Those acts of contrition 
came from Republicans whose presses had been the object of 
attack by the Sedition Act.127  In any event, a brief probe of the 
Sedition Act reveals more ambiguity than certainty in the intended 
meaning of the First Amendment. 
Passed by a Federalist-controlled Congress and approved by 
President Adams, the Sedition Act criminalized criticism of the 
federal government or the president.128  Under the Act, it was a 
federal offense to: 
write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and 
malicious writing or writings against the government of 
the United States, or either House of the Congress . . . or 
the President . . . with intent to defame . . . or to bring 
them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to 
excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred 
of the good people of the United States.129 
Violators could be fined up to $5000 (a huge sum then) and 
imprisoned for any time from six months to five years.130  President 
Adams, whose prickly sensibilities revolted at the stinging and at 
times utterly insulting digs of the opposition press, was thus 
protected from rebuke.  Notably, and suspiciously, the law did not 
shield the Vice-President from criticism—in others words, Adams’ 
arch-rival Thomas Jefferson was fair game for the Federalist press.131  
Another nice feature was a sunset provision terminating the Act on 
the last day of Adams’ administration.132  In some fourteen 
prosecutions for violating the Act, Supreme Court judges presiding 
 126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
 127. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 128. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 129. Id. § 2. 
 130. Id. § 1. 
 131. See id. § 2. 
 132. JAMES M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 144 (1956). 
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at circuit courts upheld the constitutionality of the Act.133  Every 
Justice on the Court was a Federalist; every defendant a 
Republican.134  Federal marshals, who owed their jobs to the 
President, selected the jurors.135  Convictions were obtained for 
what today would be considered ordinary political exuberance.  For 
example, Justice Samuel Chase sentenced a man in Boston to 
eighteen months’ imprisonment for erecting a liberty pole with the 
motto, “Downfall to the Tyrants of America.”136  Several Republican 
newspapers were forced to close due to enforcement of the Act.137 
The motivation for the Federalist-controlled Congress to pass 
the Sedition Act is a bit mysterious inasmuch as common-law 
prosecutions could accomplish the same end.  Federalists had been 
bringing sedition prosecutions under common law for several years 
against well-known Republican editors, both in federal and state 
courts, causing the demise of a number of publications.138  Only 
days before the Act became effective, the Republican editor 
Benjamin Franklin Bache was arrested for criminal libel against 
President Adams.139  Republicans, in and out of Congress, attacked 
the Act with a mixture of free speech and states’ rights 
arguments.140  A Virginia Congressman, John Nicholas, contended 
during floor debates in Congress that the press was “the heart and 
the life of a free government”; that “the people have no other 
means of examining their conduct but by means of the press, and 
an unrestrained investigation through them of the conduct of the 
Government.”141  Other Republicans lodged similar complaints, 
often predicting that the Act would be abused for partisan ends.142  
They pointed to the ways in which the Act could be so twisted: 
defendants would not be tried in their vicinity; Federalist marshals 
would hand-pick juries; prosecutors and judges would be 
 133. See LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 122, at 297–300. 
 134. See JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA: 1789–1801, at 235 (1960) 
(stating that the Federalist administration indicted four leading Republican 
newspapers). 
 135. STEWART, supra note 57, at 468. 
 136. SMITH, supra note 132, at 260, 267 (referring to United States v. David 
Brown). 
 137. See MILLER, supra note 134, at 235. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 233 n.15; SMITH, supra note 132, at 189. 
 140. See LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 55 
(1963). 
 141. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2144 (1798). 
 142. See id. at 2164 (statements of Rep. Gallatin). 
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appointees of the same Administration that the defendants were 
said to have opposed.143  These arguments turned out to be exactly 
on target, yet when the Act was debated in Congress Republican 
legislators and their sympathizers in the press persistently 
emphasized invasion of states’ rights as its most fatal flaw.144 
During the congressional debates on the Act, Republicans 
taunted the Federalists on the necessity for its passage.  It was 
common knowledge that many states had statutes affirming the 
common-law doctrine of seditious and malicious libels⎯and this in 
spite of the strict injunction written into their constitutions 
providing for the freedom of the press.  Republican representative 
and onetime Anti-Federalist Nathaniel Macon asked from the floor: 
“He knew persons might be prosecuted for a libel under the State 
Governments; but if this power exist in full force at present, what 
necessity can there be for this bill?”145  And there was something to 
this: the Sedition Act “did not propose to do more than the states 
had already done; nor did it alter in any way the time-honored 
common-law definition of sedition.”146  In attacking the Act, 
Madison conceded that, “[i]t is vicious in the extreme to 
calumniate meritorious public servants.”147  The remedy, he urged, 
could be obtained in the “common judicatures” of the states: 
“Every libelous writing or expression might receive its punishment 
in the State courts, from juries summoned by an officer, who does 
not receive his appointment from the President, and is under no 
influence to court the pleasure of Government, whether it injured 
public officers or private citizens.”148  For Madison and other 
Republicans, the Act was a product of “the doctrine of implication 
and expediency,” the same principles they thought had been used 
unconstitutionally to enlarge congressional powers on other 
occasions, as in the creation of the national bank.149  There was “a 
similar and decisive answer,” he retorted: Congress’ powers were 
specifically defined in the Constitution, and no authority had been 
 143. SMITH, supra note 132, at 140–41 (summarizing concerns of Rep. Gallatin 
and Rep. Nicholas). 
 144. See id. at 148–49. 
 145. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2106 (1798) (referring to Rep. Otis' comment that the 
bill was conformable to common law). 
 146. JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 80 
(1951). 
 147. Madison, supra note 119. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 6 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 333–37 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1906-1910) (1799) [hereinafter MADISON WRITINGS]. 
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given to pass the Sedition Act.150  Employing the old Federalist line, 
Madison argued that Congress received “no power whatever over 
the press” under the original Constitution, and “the first 
amendment was intended as a positive and absolute reservation of 
it.”151  Claims that powers are “inherent, implied, or expedient,” he 
contended, were  
obviously the creatures of ambition; because the care 
expended in defining powers would otherwise have been 
superfluous.  Powers extracted from such sources will be 
indefinitely multiplied by the aid of armies and patronage 
which, with the impossibility of controlling them by any 
demarcation, would presently terminate reasoning, and 
ultimately swallow up the State sovereignties.152 
Answering these charges, Federalists reminded their 
opponents that the First Amendment was not a total prohibition on 
legislation touching the press, but rather guaranteed “freedom of 
speech.”  That term was defined by the common law, explained 
Rep. Harrison Gray Otis.153  He supported this assertion by quoting 
Blackstone’s distinction between prohibited prior restraints and 
allowable prosecutions by injured parties, “whether it be the 
Government or an individual,” for speech or writing that was “false, 
malicious, and seditious.”154  Like Otis, his colleague Rep. Robert 
Goodloe Harper drew the familiar line between protected speech 
and expressions that encompassed “sedition and licentiousness.”155  
Numerous precedents were cited by Federalists to prove that this 
was the law.  Rep. Otis reminded Republicans that even in those 
states with constitutions guaranteeing “the liberty of speech and of 
the press . . . by the most express and unequivocal language, the 
Legislatures and Judicial departments of those States had adopted 
the definitions of the English law, and provided for the 
punishment of defamatory and seditious libels.”156  Federal courts, it 
was noted, already had jurisdiction over common-law sedition.  
Punishing sedition was an exercise of a government’s inherent 
right of self-defense, and the crime was spelled out under the 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2147 (1798). 
 154. Id. at 2148. 
 155. Id. at 2167. 
 156. Id. at 2148. 
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common law.157  What the Act accomplished, Federalists insisted, 
was a liberalization of the harsh common law rule of seditious libel.158  
To convict under the statute, intent must be proved, whereas at 
common law the mere act of publication was enough to find 
guilt.159  At common law, punishment was discretionary with the 
court, whereas the Act set a definite term.160  Unlike the common 
law, truth could be offered in defense.161  Juries would decide both 
law and fact, again a departure from common law.162 
In practice, the reforms touted by Federalists proved anemic, 
exactly as Republicans had predicted.  Judges were hostile to 
defendants, juries were packed with Federalist partisans, and the 
defense of truth was gutted by Justice Chase’s ruling that the 
defendant had the burden of showing truth beyond a “marrow.”163  
During the floor debates on the Act, Rep. Nicholas foresaw that the 
judges in trials under the Act “would be so far interested in the issue, 
that the trial of the truth or falsehood of a matter would not be safe 
in their hands.”164  He was not impressed by the Federalist distinction 
between liberty and licentiousness:  “he wished to know where the one 
commenced and the other ended?  Will they say the one is truth and 
the other falsehood!”165  Truth was one thing in theory, proving it in 
court another, Nicholas contended, using reasoning that anticipated 
modern Supreme Court decisions on the press.166  Printers “would not 
only refrain from publishing anything of the least questionable 
nature, but they would be afraid of publishing the truth, as, though 
true, it might not always be in their power to establish the truth to the 
satisfaction of a court of justice.”167  It was precisely because of the risk 
of abuse and the consequent muzzling of the press, he exclaimed, 
 157. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 122, at 3–15; MILLER, supra note 146, at 232–
33. 
 158. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 921, 940, 950 (1801).  See also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 
2989 (1798) (noting from the Report of House Select Committee that Sedition 
Act had “enlarged instead of abridging the freedom of the press.”). 
 159. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 122, at 11; MILLER, supra note 146, at 81–82. 
 160. LEVY, LEGACY, supra note 120, 50–51. 
 161. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 122, at 12, 297. 
 162. Id. 
 163. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 642–43 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800). 
 164. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140 (1798). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2141. 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 799 
 
that “the General Government has been forbidden to touch the 
press.”168 
Most of the Federalists’ arguments that appeared in the 
congressional debates are also replicated in the judicial writings of 
this period.  Justice James Iredell, for example, quoted extensively 
from Blackstone during a grand jury charge to justify his 
conclusion that the First Amendment only prohibited prior 
restraints.  It was necessary to “censure the licentiousness,” Iredell 
stated, in order “to maintain the liberty of the press.”169  If anything, 
the Justices were more aggressive in their support of the Act than 
many congressional Federalists.  In the same address, Iredell urged 
that the opposition press was “by arts of sophistry . . . inflaming the 
passions of weak minds, delud[ing] many into opinions the most 
dangerous, and conduct[ing] them to actions the most criminal.”170  
These sentiments reflected the Federalist worldview that ordinary 
people were easily misled by demagogues to the detriment of social 
order.  Consider this grand jury charge by Justice William Paterson: 
Seditious persons are common disturbers of public 
repose, and pests to society; they are bad men and worse 
citizens.  The apostolic rule to mind our own business, 
and study to be quiet is an excellent guide in social life.  
Let us seek peace and be obedient to the laws; let us fear 
God, respect our government, and honor the constituted 
authorities of our country.171 
Justice Chase took an especially hard line in his conduct of 
Sedition Act trials,172 earning a well-deserved reputation for abusive 
behavior that became the basis for his impeachment in 1804 and 
near conviction in 1805.173  Chase went out of his way to encourage 
indictments by recommending that grand juries look carefully at 
certain publications or by suggesting that there were seditious 
 168. Id. at 2140. 
 169. J. Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Pennsylvania (Apr. 
11, 1799), reprinted in CLAYPOOLE’S AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER (Philadelphia), 
May 17, 1799, quoting 4 Blackstone, supra note 42, at 151. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Grand Jury Charge, (Paterson, J.), in Paterson Papers (n.p., n.d.), 
(original in Rutgers University Library). 
 172. See United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. 631, 642–43 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) 
(No. 14,865) (stating defendant bears the burden of proving "truth" beyond a 
marrow). 
 173. See JANE S. ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE 1 (1980); CHARLES G. HAINES, 
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789–
1835 261–64 (1944). 
27
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
800 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
writings circulating in the community.174  Though it was common for 
judges to advise juries of their views on the merits, Chase vituperated 
against defendants, as when he announced to a jury that the 
defendant’s publication constituted “the boldest attempt I have 
known to poison the minds of the people.”175  Referring to one of 
Chase’s trials, an article of impeachment complained of his “unusual, 
rude, and contemptuous expressions towards the prisoner’s counsel,” 
which “manifested . . . an indecent solitude . . . for the conviction of 
the accused.”176  The Senate voted eighteen to sixteen to convict on 
this count, short of the required two-thirds majority.177  Disgusted with 
this outcome, Jefferson lamented that “impeachment is a farce which 
will not be tried again.”178 
No Republican was fooled into missing what the Federalists 
had in mind by statutorily securing the option of sedition 
prosecutions in federal courts.179  State prosecutions for criticism of 
the national government were highly improbable in Republican-
dominated areas.180  Moreover, enormous controversy had erupted 
over whether any federal non-statutory crimes were constitutional—
Republicans maintained that the Constitution only authorized 
statutory crimes.181  Given that climate, Federalists had a rationale 
for erecting a federal statutory barrier against what they considered 
seditious libel.182  In the short run, they were successful at the 
endeavor since the Federalist judiciary played an active role in 
vigorously enforcing of the Act.183  But, on the whole, the experience 
with the Sedition Act deeply alienated the populace from the 
Federalist Party and galvanized Republicans in their resistance. 184 
It may be, as Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in 1964, that 
the Sedition Act controversy “first crystallized a national awareness 
 174. HAINES, supra note 173, at 160. 
 175. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. at 642. 
 176. 2 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE (S. Smith & T. Lloyd eds., 1805), reprinted in 
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 230, 247 (S. Presser & J. Zainaldin 
eds., 2000). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Branch Giles Monticello (Apr. 
20, 1807), reprinted in 10 JEFFERSON WORKS 387. 
 179. See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY 
IDEOLOGY 257–58 (1978). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 801 
 
of the central meaning of the First Amendment.”185  Awareness is 
not the same thing as concordance on what the episode meant for 
the constitutional law of free expression.  Brennan’s opinion 
quoted the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 (written by Madison), 
which lambasted the Act as “leveled against the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been 
justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.”186  
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99 (authored by Jefferson) 
struck a similar chord.187  But, as already noted, Madison had 
allowed that state prosecutions were available to punish those who 
libeled public officials.  When Republicans themselves controlled 
the government, they were not above using libel actions to punish 
political enemies.  Jefferson was a case in point.  On a number of 
occasions he publicly extolled the free press.  His Kentucky 
Resolutions declared the Sedition Act “does abridge the freedom of 
the press, is not law, but is altogether void, and of no force.”188  In 
his first inaugural address, the Sage of Monticello counseled the 
country to treat speech that espoused a breakup of the country with 
the medicine of the marketplace: “If there be any among us who 
would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, 
let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which 
error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to 
combat it.”189  Yet Jefferson was firmly of the view that a publisher 
could be punished for false statements and injuries to personal 
reputation.  In a letter to Madison concerning the proposed Bill of 
Rights, Jefferson asserted that individuals should be permitted “to 
publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life, 
liberty, property, or reputation of others or affecting the peace of 
the confederacy with foreign nations.”190  Upon becoming 
President, and finding himself the object of an onslaught of 
criticism, however, he urged the governor of Pennsylvania to 
 185. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). 
 186. Id. at 274. 
 187. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 97, at 540–45. 
 188. Id. at 541. 
 189. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801). 
 190. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas McKean (Feb. 19, 1803), 
reprinted in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451–52 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904-
1905). 
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prosecute Federalist editors for personal attacks.191  Remarking that 
“a few prosecutions” would have a “wholesome effect in restoring 
the integrity of the presses,” Jefferson cautioned against “a general 
prosecution,” which “would look like persecution.”192  Federalists 
were ruining the press, he contended, “by pushing its 
licentiousness & its lying to such a degree of prostitution as to 
deprive it of all credit.”193 
Jefferson’s philosophy of free expression was similar to that of 
America’s first great journalist, Benjamin Franklin.  Writing in 
1789, Franklin allowed that it was proper for laws to safeguard a 
person’s reputation, while at the same time the press must have 
complete freedom for “discussing the propriety of public measures 
and political opinions.”194  As sensible as this may seem at first 
glance, distinguishing between discussion of public affairs and 
criticism of individual officials often is meaningless.  An attack on a 
government policy as misguided could be (and has been) 
translated into the basis for a libel action by the official responsible 
for the policy.  For this reason, Justice Brennan’s 1964 opinion in 
New York Times v. Sullivan refused to allow an official to claim libel 
for false statements directed at government actions.195  Brennan 
observed that the proposition would “transmut[e] criticism of 
government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into 
personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of 
whom the government is composed.”196 
Reviewing the events concerning free expression from the 
period before the Revolution through the First Amendment and 
then in the crucible of the Sedition Act, it is best not to expect 
much enlightenment that is pertinent to modern controversies.197  
However much weight may properly be assigned to the repudiation 
of the Sedition Act, the reality is that America’s founding 
generation did not write on the same page as the modern Court.  
Exponents of one view or another about the Act were not 
 191. SMITH, PRESS, supra note 58, at 89 (quoting Jefferson’s letter to Governor 
Thomas McKean in 1803). 
 192. JEFFERSON, supra note 190, at 451–52. 
 193. Id. 
 194. SMITH, PRESS, supra note 58, at 11 (quoting Benjamin Franklin's 1789 
newspaper essay). 
 195. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See 2 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 354–63 (1997) (discussing freedom of expression and 
association). 
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disinterested scholars or dispassionate jurists.  Their legal world re-
mained one in which it was taken for granted that the state had the 
prerogative to punish speech with a “bad tendency” to cause social 
harms.  Federal sedition prosecutions disappeared with the 
expiration of the Sedition Act in 1801, and a few years later the 
Court held that federal courts had no constitutional authority to 
punish individuals for common law crimes, including sedition.  
State sedition actions gradually fell into desuetude before the Civil 
War.  Yet the theoretical foundations for state repression remained.  
Although the Court would hear no seditious libel cases for the 
remainder of the nineteenth century, when it next encountered 
such a provision—the Espionage Act of 1917—it felt unconstrained 
by the eighteenth century record.  That story remains to be 
explored; meanwhile, we need to see how free expression fared 
during the more than hundred years that elapsed after the First 
Amendment was adopted. 
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 
WORLD WAR I 
Until fairly recently, the nineteenth century was regarded as a 
sterile sea when it came to constitutional rulings on free 
expression.198  For most of the twentieth century, both the Supreme 
Court, as well as the academy, largely ignored the period from the 
Sedition Act until World War I, when Congress enacted measures 
to curb speech believed to interfere with the war effort.199  
Historians have begun to fill in the gap by combing the period for 
evidence of judicial and popular attitudes about speech and press.  
One scholar uncovered some sixty cases from the Court that 
related to the subject.200  On close examination, however, almost 
none of these decisions dealt directly with the First Amendment.201  
 198. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 
514, 522 (1981). 
 199. See Espionage Act, ch. 30, title I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (1917) (current version 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2000)); Sedition Act, ch. 75, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat. 553–54 (1918) 
(repealed 1921). 
 200. See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 
1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266 n.15 (1986). 
 201. See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897); Ex 
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); United 
States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868); United States v. Bromley, 53 U.S. 88 (1851); 
White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266 (1845); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821); 
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
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To a large extent, the lack of case law was a consequence of 
circumstances.  Inasmuch as the Court resolutely denied that the 
amendment applied to the states, this left only federal actions 
subject to review.202  Here again, there was not much to concern the 
Court until the second half of the nineteenth century, when federal 
regulatory legislation was passed raising potential First Amendment 
issues.203  Even then the Court issued only a handful of noteworthy 
rulings, and most of those occurred at the end of the century and 
early in the next.204  This absence of judicial activity, however, does 
not signify a void in societal disputes relating to government and 
expression.  Nor does it mean the press had become so tame that 
officialdom was unprovoked by journalistic attacks, or that the 
experience of the Sedition Act had frozen the ink in pens.  To the 
contrary, newspapers and magazines showed few restraints.  De 
Tocqueville observed during his travels in 1831-32, that “[i]n 
America there is scarcely a hamlet that has not its newspaper.”205  
He found the American press duller than that of France, and more 
space was consumed in U.S. papers by advertisements, but he 
conceded that its influence in America is “immense.”206  It caused 
political life to circulate through all the parts of that vast territory.207  
Its eye was constantly open to detect the secret springs of political 
designs and to summon the leaders of all parties in turn to the bar 
of public opinion.208  During the closing years of the century, 
muckrakers launched the new style of yellow journalism that 
relentlessly exposed corruption and business abuses.209  On the 
other hand, the occasions in which the Court did make 
pronouncements about the First Amendment generally were not 
auspicious ones.  After a thorough study of period from the Civil 
War through World War I, David M. Rabban concluded that “no 
group of Americans was more hostile to free speech claims before 
 202. See Rabban, supra note 198, at 525. 
 203. Federal obscenity laws are one example; see infra notes 311-315 and 
accompanying text. 
 204. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 321-328, infra. 
 205. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 80 (Tom Griffin ed., 
1998). 
 206. Id. at 81. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48 (discussing history of free 
expression in the nineteenth century). 
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World War I than the judiciary, and no judges were more hostile 
than the justices on the United States Supreme Court.”210 
Despite their notoriety, most of the important disputes over 
free expression in the nineteenth century never reached the 
courts.211  No better example of this can be found than the federal 
government’s reaction to efforts by antebellum Southern states to 
extinguish the abolitionist press.212  Pursuing the cause of ending 
slavery, abolitionists produced a torrent of speeches, pamphlets, 
books and newspapers to champion their cause.213  Almost all of this 
activity occurred in the North, but publications were sent from 
there by the postal service throughout the country, including to 
slave states.214  The federal government controlled the nation’s 
postal service by monopolizing the use of postal roads.215  More so 
than today, mailings were an essential medium of free expression.216  
Newspapers constituted the bulk of the mail, which enabled 
abolitionists to spread information throughout the country.217  In 
1835, a mass mailing campaign of anti-slavery literature to 
prominent Southerners provoked a furious outcry in both the 
South and the North.218  Anti-abolitionists warned that the 
provocations they saw in these writings would foment slave 
rebellions (notwithstanding that almost every slave was illiterate) 
and lead to civil war and dissolution of the union.219  In the North, 
mobs attacked abolitionist assemblies.220  Public meetings 
denounced agitation against slavery.221  Southern states passed (or 
already had) laws banning abolitionist writings, and they demanded 
an end to the postal assault.222  President Andrew Jackson directed 
his Postmaster General to deliver “those inflammatory papers . . . to 
none but who will demand them as subscribers; and in every 
 210. DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 15 (Arthur 
McEvoy & Christopher Tomlins eds., 1997). 
 211. See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 416. 
 212. See generally id. at 155–81, 407 (discussing the postal campaign presented 
by Andrew Jackson's administration and Congress' response). 
 213. Id. at 155. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Gibson, supra note 200, at 293–94. 
 216. Id. at 293. 
 217. Id. at 294. 
 218. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 155. 
 219. Id. at 135–36. 
 220. Id. at 140. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 158. 
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instance the postmaster ought to take the names down, and have 
them exposed thro [sic] the publik [sic] journals as subscribers to 
this wicked plan of exciting the negroes . . . to massacre.”223  Jackson 
added that this would surely put an end to Southern readership, as 
being exposed as a subscriber would bring the person into such 
disrepute within the entire South that they would be compelled to 
desist “or move from the country.”224  Amos Kendall, the Postmaster 
General receiving this directive, endorsed the New York 
postmaster’s decision to deny mailing privileges to the American 
Anti-Slavery Society.225  Southern postmasters, with Kendall’s 
approval, likewise would not knowingly deliver abolitionist 
literature on pain of prosecution by their states.226  But no judicial 
challenges were brought against the federal government for its 
complicity with the South’s censorship, so no formal precedent was 
set.227 
President Jackson urged Congress to take even stronger 
measures, by making it a federal offense, “under severe penalties,” 
to circulate “in the Southern States, through the mail, of incendiary 
publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.”228  
Despite the fervent efforts of South Carolina Senator John C. 
Calhoun,229 the Senate declined the President’s invitation, in part 
because the proposal was thought to violate the First Amendment’s 
stricture230 that “Congress shall make no law”231 limiting speech or 
press.  A compromise measure, to make it illegal for postmasters to 
deliver mail contrary to state law, also failed in the Senate, 
notwithstanding that this was already the policy of the post office.232  
In the House, the issue of abolitionist mailings died in 
 223. Id. at 156 (quoting Andrew Jackson's letter to Amos Kendall on Aug. 9, 
1835); see also 5 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 360–61 (John S. Bassett 
ed., 1931). 
 224. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 156. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. at 157. 
 227. See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 131–93 (discussing the 
reaction against abolitionists and the successful effort to block abolitionist 
mailings).  See also Gibson, supra note 200, at 293–94 (discussing the importance of 
the mails to dissemination of information). 
 228. A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–
1897, at 175–76 (James Richardson ed., 1896) (quoting Andrew Jackson, Seventh 
Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1835)). 
 229. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 163–64. 
 230. See id. at 170–73. 
 231. Id. at 176 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). 
 232. Id. at 174. 
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committee.233  At about the same time, the House took up a related 
question: what to do about the deluge of petitions—some two 
million⎯it was receiving urging abolition.234  Discussion of the 
petitions in the House was anathema to Southern representatives, 
who knew that the debates would be reported in newspapers 
everywhere and would be impossible to censor.235  On this score, 
they were successful for a considerable time.  In 1836, and for seven 
years thereafter, the House passed a series of resolutions to table 
without further action “all petitions, memorials, resolutions, 
propositions, or papers, relating in any way” to slavery.236  That 
action was taken in spite of the First Amendment’s protection of 
the right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”237  
Representative John Quincy Adams, formerly the President and 
now an outspoken anti-slavery congressman, protested in vain that 
the resolution was unconstitutional for precisely this reason.238  
Using a version of the “marketplace of ideas” philosophy that 
Jefferson had invoked against the Sedition Act, Adams advocated 
toleration for error, “to grant freedom of speech, and freedom of 
the press, and apply reason to put it down.”239  Adams persisted in 
objecting until 1844, when the House lifted the restriction on 
petitions.240  Again, no court became involved in the matter.241 
Until the late 1830s, abolitionists were effectively shut out of 
the regular press, sometimes denied access to public and private 
halls to hold meetings, often condemned and at times violently 
attacked by mobs.242  And that was in the North.243  Their activities 
were illegal in the South, though only a few intrepid souls would 
brave the real threat of violence should they argue for 
emancipation.244 
 233. Id. at 164–65. 
 234. See id. at 175. 
 235. Id. at 175–76. 
 236. 12 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS 4052 (1836), quoted in CURTIS, FREE 
SPEECH, supra note 48, at 177. 
 237. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 176–78 (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amend. I). 
 238. Id. at 177–80. 
 239. Rep. John Quincy Adams, Congressional Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 
(1836), quoted in CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 177. 
 240. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 180. 
 241. See generally id. 
 242. See id. at 140. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Some 500 accounts of mob violence appeared during a single week in 
1835, according to Hezekia Niles, the editor of the Niles Register.  See RUSSELL B. 
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In the North, however, the tide of intolerance for abolitionist 
speech began to turn in the late 1830s.  A pivotal event occurred 
during the evening of November 7, 1837.245  A mob in Alton, 
Illinois (a free state) murdered Elijah P. Lovejoy, an abolitionist 
newspaper publisher and Presbyterian minister who was attempting 
to defend his printing press against destruction by vigilantes.246  
Lovejoy already had been driven from St. Louis (across the 
Mississippi River), in the slave state of Missouri, on account of his 
advocacy against slavery.247  Having lost three presses to rampaging 
mobs, Lovejoy gave his life defending a fourth, thereby becoming a 
martyr for both abolitionism and the free press.248  Michael Kent 
Curtis writes that Lovejoy’s killing “produced an immense public 
reaction,” as the brazen murder “crystallized the fear that slavery 
would destroy free speech and civil liberty in the North as well as 
the South.”249  Resolutions denouncing the killing were passed in 
public meetings throughout the North and large numbers of 
newspapers began to speak out against the denial of speech rights 
to abolitionists.250  Mobs did not desist in their attacks but popular 
attitudes began to change.  By 1856, the Republican Party (not to 
be confused with Jeffersonian Republicans, whose heirs now 
comprised the Democratic Party) campaigned on the theme, “Free 
Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory and 
Frémont,” the last being a reference to its unsuccessful presidential 
candidate, John C. Frémont.251  Republicans would prevail with 
Lincoln’s election in 1860, a result that blew the nation apart.252 
From these events, Professor Curtis draws two important 
lessons.  First, the reality of free speech is not solely a matter of 
judicial interpretation, as no courts were responsible for the 
evolution of attitudes about expression before the Civil War.253  As 
Curtis shows, “crucial free speech decisions [were] made by the 
NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860, 
at 177 n.9 (1963). 
 245. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 216. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 216–17. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 227. 
 250. Id. at 250–55. 
 251. RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1837-1860, at 284 (1976). 
 252. See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 216–70 (discussing 
Lovejoy’s death and its effect on attitudes towards free expression). 
 253. Id. 
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citizens, by the press, by legislators, and by public officials who 
[were] not judges.”254  Second, during the 1830s and particularly 
after Lovejoy’s murder, politicians, the press, and the public made 
widespread use of the terms “rights” and “privileges” in connection 
with speech and printing by citizens.255  Senator Daniel Webster, 
who had opposed Jackson’s effort to constrain mailing of 
abolitionist literature in 1834, declaimed twenty years earlier in an 
address to the House of Representatives that that the “freedom of 
inquiry, discussion, and debate” constituted a “high constitutional 
privilege.”256  Frederick Douglass quoted Webster’s words at a 
meeting in 1852, when he criticized efforts to suppress abolitionist 
speech.257  Webster, Douglass related, had declaimed that it was “the 
ancient and the undoubted prerogative of the people to canvas 
public measures, and the merits of public men . . . . It is as 
undoubted as the right of breathing the air, or walking on the 
earth.”258 
Understanding that the term “privilege” included speech 
offers an insight into the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that 
states not “abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States.”259  “During the campaign of 1866,” Curtis writes, 
“many people praised the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting all 
rights enumerated in the Constitution, particularly freedom of 
both speech and press.”260 
An additional lesson can also be found in these episodes.  The 
intolerance directed against abolitionists by public officials and the 
acceptance of such by the populace offers an important insight 
about the conception of free expression in the early republic.  
States that had once condemned the Sedition Act as injurious to 
public discussion of current events, and enshrined the rights of 
speech and press in their constitutions, thereafter violated those 
rights in gross to preserve the prevailing conception of social order.  
 254. Id. at 257. 
 255. Id. at 257–58. 
 256. Id. at 230 (tying together the popular use of “rights” and “privileges” and 
Fourteenth Amendment) and 944.  See also 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 945 (1814) 
(statement of Rep. Daniel Webster). 
 257. 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 415–16 (John W. Blassingame ed., 
1982) (quoting Daniel Webster's speech on enlistments delivered in the House of 
Representatives on Jan. 14, 1814). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. (interpreting the language the U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 260. Michael Kent Curtis, Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey 
Rosen’s Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. LAW REV. 1269, 1280 (1998). 
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Virginia, the home of Madison’s 1798 Virginia Resolution, enacted 
a comprehensive criminal statute in 1836 that punished the 
publication of any writing encouraging slave rebellions or “denying 
the master the right of property in their slaves, and inculcating the 
duty of resistance to such right.”261  Although the Virginia Supreme 
Court interpreted the statute in technical ways to overturn two 
convictions under it, the measure remained on the books and was 
enforced, as were those in other Southern states.262  No authority in 
the South was willing to heed Jefferson’s admonition to tolerate 
errors by leaving reason free to refute it.263  Considering the larger 
history of free expression, this is unremarkable.  A government’s 
toleration for dissent varies directly with its perception of the threat 
to public welfare from the speech.  Just as the South saw the very 
integrity of its social order endangered by abolitionist speech, the 
federal government during the Civil War would attempt to stifle the 
opposition press in the North. 
President Lincoln left an ambiguous civil liberties record.  His 
administration or the military he commanded arrested a variety of 
speakers and publishers, including newspaper editors.264  Both 
military and civilian tribunals were used in these proceedings, 
themselves a small part of the thousands of cases involving offenses 
relating to the war.265  Lincoln personally ordered the arrest and 
seizure of the offices of two New York newspapers, for printing a 
“false and spurious proclamation purporting to be signed by the 
President . . . which publication is of a treasonable nature.”266  
Confusing the constitutional record, however, is the fact that many 
of these incidents occurred in areas of the country where the writ 
of habeas corpus had been suspended by Lincoln or one of his 
 261. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 261 (quoting An Act to Suppress 
Incendiary Publication, ch. 66, 1836 Va. Acts 44–45). 
 262. See Michael Kent Curtis, St. George Tucker and the Legacy of Slavery, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1157, 1194–97 (2006). 
 263. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious Attempt to Suppress Antislavery Speech, 
Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 805 (1995).  “As many 
contemporaries saw it, disseminating abolition literature in the South was simply a 
crime.”  Id. 
 264. Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties And Civil War: The Great Emancipator As Civil 
Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1357–58 (1993). 
 265. Id. at 1358–59. 
 266. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John A. Dix, (May 18, 1864), in 7 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 347–48 (Roy P. 
Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter LINCOLN].  See also FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM 
HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 232–47 (Harold L. Nelson ed., 1967). 
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generals.267  By presidential proclamation in 1862, anyone held 
under military authority was barred from seeking judicial relief by 
habeas corpus. 
Accordingly, there are few judicial rulings relating to possible 
violations of the First Amendment by Lincoln’s government.268  This 
does not mean that there were no First Amendment violations 
during the war; the truth is quite the contrary.  Rather, the denial 
of habeas corpus—the Great Writ—meant that there was no 
judicial review of the federal government’s actions. 
Of the hundreds of military tribunals held for civilians, a 
significant number heard charges of disloyalty against copperhead 
Democrats or their newspapers for verbal attacks on the war or 
Lincoln himself.269  In the same 1862 proclamation, Lincoln 
ordered that “all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, 
resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording 
aid and comfort to the Rebels . . . shall be subject to martial law 
and liable to trial and punishment by Courts Martial or Military 
Commission.”270  Generals in the army issued parallel commands.  
General Ambrose Burnside, in charge of the Department of Ohio, 
proclaimed in a standing order to the populace that “[t]he habit of 
declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this 
Department.  Persons committing such offenses will at once be 
arrested.”271  Another general commanding in Indiana banned any 
speech or writing tending “to bring the war policy of the 
Administration into disrepute.”272 
Among all the military prosecutions that took place during the 
conflict, the case of Clement L. Vallandigham had one of the 
highest profiles.  As a Democratic member of Congress from Ohio 
and an overt racist, Vallandigham supported the Southern position 
on slavery and castigated Lincoln’s war efforts.273  Having lost his 
seat in Congress due to Republican redistricting, Vallandigham 
planned to run for governor of Illinois on a peace platform.274  
 267. See generally  Finkelman, supra note 264. 
 268. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863). 
 269. Finkelman, supra note 264, at 1357–58, 1363. 
 270. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 306. 
 271. Id. at 307. 
 272. Id. at 308. 
 273. See id.  at 302–05 (discussing Vallandigham’s politics). 
 274. Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, The Constitution of Necessity, and the Necessity of 
Constitutions: A Reply to Professor Paulsen, 59 ME. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2007) [hereinafter 
Curtis, Necessity]. 
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General Burnside ordered his arrest in 1863 a few days after 
Vallandigham delivered a harsh anti-war speech at an Ohio 
Democratic Party meeting in which he decried the conflict as 
“wicked, cruel and unnecessary,” and denounced Burnside’s gag 
order “as a base usurpation of arbitrary authority.”275  Despite his 
vitriol, Vallandigham counseled obedience to the laws and urged 
political solutions to the conflict.276  Tried by a military commission 
two days after his arrest, Vallandigham was found guilty under 
military law and ordered imprisoned for the duration of the war.277  
Lincoln thereafter lifted the prison sentence, but banished him 
from the Union beyond Confederate lines.  After his conviction, 
Vallandigham sought direct review from the Supreme Court, which 
declined to reach the merits, reasoning that it had no jurisdiction 
over military commissions.278  This provoked a huge outcry, both 
over Vallandigham’s military trial and because his speech fell short 
of actually instigating disloyal acts.279  More fuel was poured on the 
fire the following month after the trial when General Burnside, 
ignoring a federal court’s order, stopped distribution of the Chicago 
Times, a vehemently anti-war newspaper.280  Claiming to be 
“embarrassed” by Burnside’s action, Lincoln overturned the 
suppression order.281 
Assessing the constitutional impact of the Lincoln 
administration’s actions requires considering two separate issues—
the use of military commissions and the arrests themselves.  
Whatever transgressions of the First Amendment occurred, they 
were compounded by martial law under which the executive both 
defined the offense and tried suspects under procedures contrary 
to the Bill of Rights.  The best that can be said about Lincoln’s 
handling of dissent was that it occurred in an extraordinary time; it 
could have been much worse had Lincoln’s government not been 
restrained by an appreciation for free expression, or at least an 
 275. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 244–45 (1863). 
 276. Id. at 247. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 251–52. 
 279. See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 320 (discussing the response to 
Vallandigham’s arrest and noting that Vallandigham was not accused of violating 
any specific statute). 
 280. See id. at 314–17 (discussing General Burnside’s order and subsequent 
public outcry). 
 281. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isaac N. Arnold, (May 25, 1864), in 
LINCOLN, supra note 266, at 361. 
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awareness of the public’s expectations.  Historian Paul Finkelman 
writes: 
[W]hat is most surprising is how few actual deprivations of 
civil liberties took place during the war.  For a civil war, 
when spies and enemy agents were often indistinguishable 
from the general population, the record of the Lincoln 
administration seems surprisingly good.  Lincoln and 
those under him were far more sensitive to civil liberties 
than Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt.282 
Most of the arrests for speech activities during the Civil War 
took place either in the South or in border states where active 
resistance was present.283  Some newspaper editors and other 
speakers, however, were arrested well away from the scene of 
revolt.284  Of greatest importance, is that there was a vigorous 
opposition press in the North that dogged Lincoln throughout the 
war.285  Correspondents observed battles and newspapers reported 
the horrors.286 
The comparison of Lincoln’s actions to those of Wilson and 
Roosevelt during the wars of the twentieth century reveals a 
recurring pattern.  To anticipate those episodes, the bottom line is 
that during times of national crisis, speech and press rights decline 
as the stakes to public safety rise.  When the country is embroiled in 
total war, as it was under Lincoln, its very existence or at least 
territorial integrity is at stake.  Heavy sacrifices, including the loss of 
civil liberties, will be demanded by the government.  At these times, 
criticism of government policy is easily linked to harming the war 
effort.  Lincoln perceived hostility to the war as encouraging 
desertion and draft resistance.287  Lincoln’s conscription program 
had already produced riots when Vallandigham was arrested.288  
About two months later, serious riots broke out in New York City, 
where at least a hundred people died as troops put down the 
 282. Finkelman, supra note 264, at 1380. 
 283. Id. at 1377–78. 
 284. See generally MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991) (arguing that arrests under Lincoln were not primarily 
political nor did they usually involve mere opposition speech). 
 285. Finkelman, supra note 264, at 1376. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the 
Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 160–61 (1998). 
 288. Curtis, Necessity, supra note 274, at 15; CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 
48, at 301, 320–28. 
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uprising.289  Lincoln justified his actions with a simple analogy:  
“Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I 
must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to 
desert?”290  Versions of this defense for suppressing speech have 
appeared periodically in history.291  It is premised on the 
assumption that government may protect the “simple-minded” 
from the persuasion of demagogues, whose messages have 
maximum destructive impact in times of grave societal crisis.  And 
it assumes that a line can be drawn between condemnation of 
government policy and inducement to disloyal acts.  Lincoln 
claimed that Vallandigham had been “laboring, with some effect,” 
to frustrate recruitment and encourage desertions.292  One could 
certainly imagine that a man listening to Vallandigham’s speech 
would be less likely to enlist and more likely to desert.  But any 
sharp political criticism of the government’s policies could have 
that effect.  “Eloquence may set fire to reason,” Justice Holmes 
would later write in a famous 1925 dissent.293 
After the Civil War, the issue of seditious libel did not result in 
a ruling from the Court based on the First Amendment until it 
decided a series of cases during World War I arising out of 
prosecutions for violations of the Espionage Act of 1917.294  In the 
interim, on the occasions when cases presented potential First 
Amendment issues, the Court was inclined to ignore the arguments 
or dismiss them summarily.295  Much the same was true of lower 
federal courts and state judiciaries.296  Considerable weight was 
given by judges to society’s legitimate interest in upholding a state’s 
 289. See generally IVER BERNSTEIN, THE NEW YORK CITY DRAFT RIOTS: THEIR 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR AMERICAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 
(1990); ADRIAN COOK, THE ARMIES OF THE STREETS; THE NEW YORK CITY DRAFT RIOTS 
OF 1863 (1974). 
 290. Abraham Lincoln, To Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in 
LINCOLN, supra note 266, at 454, 460.  
 291. See Curtis, Necessity, supra note 274, at 29. 
 292. Id. at 16. 
 293. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 294. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 295. See RABBAN, supra note 210, at 131 (“No court was more unsympathetic to 
freedom of expression than the Supreme Court, which rarely produced even a 
dissenting opinion in a First Amendment case.”). 
 296. See id. at 131 (“Throughout the period from the Civil War to World War I, 
the overwhelming majority of decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech 
claims, often by ignoring their existence . . . .  Most decisions by lower federal 
courts and state courts were also restrictive.”). 
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police powers against speech that threatened public order or 
harmed others.297  Summarizing the era, David M. Rabban 
concludes: 
The overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in all 
jurisdictions before World War I offered little recognition 
and even less protection of free speech interests. . . . A 
general hostility to the value of free expression permeated 
the judicial system. . . . Judges often emphasized the 
sanctity of free speech in the very process of reaching 
adverse decisions in concrete cases.298 
Blackstone’s “bad tendency test” formed the heart of the 
judicial approach to free speech in the nineteenth century and well 
into the twentieth.299  Justice Holmes’ opinion for the Court in a 
1907 case, Patterson v. Colorado,300 paraphrased Blackstone to hold 
that “the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is ‘to 
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been 
practised by other governments,’ and they do not prevent the 
subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the 
public welfare.”301  Holmes took the typical path of judges deciding 
free expression cases prior to the twentieth century, equating 
constitutional protections for free speech with the liberties allowed 
by the common law, such as they were.302  A scholar of press history, 
Timothy W. Gleason, writes that “judges recognized constitutional 
protections, but looked to English common law to determine the 
meaning and extent of the protection provided under the 
Constitution.”303  Using the common law, the courts categorized the 
forms of expression that received no legal protection.304  Those 
categories in turn were translated into rules for constitutional 
decisions.305  Accordingly, speech would not be constitutionally 
 297. See id. at 132 (“judges gave great deference to the ‘police power’ of 
legislators and administrators to determine the tendency of speech.”). 
 298. Id. at 175.  There are several examples of the Court ignoring or dismissing 
free speech issues.  See id. at 131–32, 173–75. 
 299. See id. at 132; Gibson, supra note 200, at 307–08. 
 300. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
 301. Id. at 462 (1907) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 
304, 313–14 (1825)). 
 302. See TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE 
COURTS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 42 (1990) (discussing the common law 
influence on constitutional interpretation). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 41–42. 
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protected if it amounted to conspiracy, obscenity, indecency, 
incitement to crime, libel (of various types), commercial speech, 
and so on, none of which received the common law’s favor.306  At 
common law, regulating these subjects was an exercise of the state’s 
police powers, which set the boundary between allowable 
communal authority and individual rights.307  “The [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment to the [C]onstitution of the United States does not 
destroy the power of the states to enact police regulations as to the 
subjects within their control,” Justice Edward Douglass White wrote 
in an 1897 decision upholding a permit requirement for speaking 
in the Boston Common.308  These distinctions reveal the judiciary’s 
attitude, as well as that of society generally, toward the balance 
between conformity to community norms and individual 
autonomy.  In nineteenth-century American rulings, when free 
expression was at stake, the balance was tipped heavily on the side 
of state controls.309 
Obscenity cases illustrate the common law’s influence.  At 
common law, obscene publications were illegal.310  Between 1842 
and 1873, Congress enacted a series of statutes aimed at curbing 
sexual expression, principally by banning its importation as 
pictures and drawings, forbidding obscene books, pictures and 
letters from the mails, and outlawing the creation, possession or 
sale of obscene literature in a federal territory.311  These statutes 
allowed for seizure of the offending materials and serious criminal 
punishment.312  One of these, the Comstock Act of 1873, was 
enthusiastically applied by the federal government to forbid the 
mailing of “every obscene, lewd or lascivious book, pamphlet, 
picture, paper, writing, or other publication of an indecent 
character.”313  Another provision suppressed mailing of unsolicited 
birth control advertisements.314  A person could be sent to prison 
for up to ten years “at hard labor” for these offenses, and many did 
receive substantial sentences.315  Despite the hundreds of cases 
 306. Id. at 42. 
 307. See generally Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
 308. Id. at 47. 
 309. See id. 
 310. GLEASON, supra note 302, at 42. 
 311. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 598 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000)). 
 312. See id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
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brought under these federal statutes and corresponding state laws, 
the Court did not formulate a definition of obscenity for purposes 
of setting a constitutional boundary until 1957, in Roth v. United 
States (which in turn was refined by Miller v. California in 1973).  
State prosecutions were untouchable by the Court due to its refusal 
to apply the First Amendment to the states prior to 1925.316  As for 
the Comstock Act, the Court regarded it as a simple exercise of 
Congress’ postal power, similar to prohibiting lottery ads from the 
mail.317  No personal liberties were affected by closing the mails to 
obscenity or lotteries, the Court concluded, since in either case 
Congress was merely declining to offer “its facilities for the 
distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals.”318 
In one 1896 case, the Court interpreted the Comstock Act to 
overturn a newspaper editor’s conviction.319  The offending article 
attacked by name an individual who had opposed certain Populists; 
here is an excerpt that captures its flavor: 
This black hearted coward is known to every decent man, 
woman, and child in the community as a liar, perjurer, 
and slanderer, who would sell a mother’s honor with less 
hesitancy and for much less silver than Judas betrayed the 
Saviour, and who would pimp and fatten on a sister’s 
shame with as much unction as a buzzard gluts in 
carrion.320 
Not especially flattering words, but were they “obscene,” “lewd, 
and or “lascivious” as used in the statute?321  No, the Court held, 
because these statutory prohibitions “signify that form of 
immorality which has relation to sexual impurity, and have the 
same meaning as is given them at common law in prosecutions for 
obscene libel.”322  Admittedly, the Court acknowledged, the article 
was “exceedingly coarse and vulgar, and, as applied to an individual 
person, plainly libelous,” yet it was not “calculated to corrupt and 
 316. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 317. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977) (“[The 
Comstock Act] was one enacted under Congress' postal power, granted in Art. I,§ 
8, cl. 7, of the Constitution, and the Postal Power Clause does not distinguish 
between interstate and intrastate matters. This Court consistently has upheld 
Congress' exercise of that power to exclude from the mails materials that are 
judged to be obscene.”). 
 318. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1878). 
 319. Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446, 450–51 (1896). 
 320. Id. at n.1. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 451. 
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debauch the minds and morals of those into whose hands it might 
fall.”323  “Calculated” at that time could simply mean “likely to,” 
rather than “devised with forethought,” and this appears to be the 
meaning here.324  The Court in 1896 had held it irrelevant that the 
defendant did not believe the publication was obscene, and thus 
did not knowingly act: “[e]very one who uses the mails of the 
United States for carrying papers or publications must take notice 
of what, in this enlightened age, is meant by decency, purity, and 
chastity in social life, and what must be deemed obscene, lewd, and 
lascivious.”325 
By referencing the common law to define obscenity, the Court 
was following the direction taken by most American judges, federal 
and state.326  Specifically, judges relied on a famous 1868 English 
case, Regina v. Hicklin,327 which invoked the “bad tendency” 
approach to decide whether a publication was obscene under the 
common law.328  According to Hicklin, the decisive question to ask 
was, “whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to 
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral 
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may 
fall.”329  (Notice that the Supreme Court’s 1896 case used language 
parallel to that in Hicklin without citing it.)  As might be expected, 
it proved to be a highly subjective standard in practice.  Jurors 
could be instructed, the Court held, that obscenity was “largely a 
question of your own conscience and your own opinion.”330  
Furthermore, by focusing on “those whose minds are open to such 
immoral influences,” Hicklin determined obscenity according to 
the probable effect the material would have on those most likely to 
be corrupted.331  (And how would average jurors know that?)  
Moreover, even if the work as a whole might be considered 
“serious” literature, isolated passages could condemn it as obscene.  
A long list of titles suppressed by American courts using the Hicklin 
 323. Id. 
 324. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (discussing nineteenth-
century word uses for “calculated”). 
 325. See Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 41–42 (1896) (illustrating the 
irrelevancy of defendant’s views about the obscenity of a publication). 
 326. See id. at 46. 
 327. 3 L.R-Q.B. 360 (1868). 
 328. Id. at 366, 369. 
 329. Id. at 371. 
 330. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500 (1897) (quoting the jury 
instructions given at trial). 
 331. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. at 371. 
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standard included Margaret Sanger’s birth control pamphlet, 
Family Limitations, D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, James 
Joyce’s Ulysses, Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy, 
Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, Boccaccio’s 
Decameron, William Defoe’s Moll Flanders, Tolstoi’s Kreutzer Sonata 
and various editions of The Arabian Nights.332  Literally tons of 
pornography was also suppressed.333  The Hicklin standard slowly 
lost favor with courts during the twentieth century, but the Court 
did not formally repudiate it until 1957.  The Comstock Act itself 
was not repealed until 1971.334 
No sooner than commercial motion pictures were introduced, 
states and cities began to license their exhibition.335  Censorship 
systems were enacted in states and cities across the country, 
mandating that films be reviewed and approved by authorities 
before being shown to the public.336  The Court evinced not the 
slightest awareness that this might involve a free expression 
problem.  With more conviction than explanation, Justice Joseph 
McKenna wrote for the Court in 1915 to deny that there was any 
association between “moving pictures” and free speech: “[w]e 
immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained which 
extends the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the 
 332. See H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, A HISTORY OF PORNOGRAPHY 41 (1964) 
(suppression of Lysistrata); Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 223, 236 (2007) (suppression of Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Ulysses, and An 
American Tragedy); Daniel M. Cohen, Unhappy Anniversary: Thirty Years Since Miller v. 
California: The Legacy of the Supreme Court’s Misjudgment on Obscenity, 15 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. 545, 571 n.99 (2003); (suppression of Canterbury Tales, Decameron, and Moll 
Flanders); David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, The ACLU, and Changing 
Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 57 (1992) 
(Sanger’s Family Limitations suppressed); Judith Waxman, Privacy and Reproductive 
Rights: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, 68 MONT. L. REV. 299, 300 (2007); 
Aaron Zarkowsky, Comment, The Rico Threat to Artistic Freedoms: An Indirect 
Consequence of the Anti-Pornography Crusade?, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 81, 89 
(1995).  See generally Stephen Gillers, A Tendency to Deprave and Corrupt: The 
Transformation of American Obscenity Law from Hicklin to Ulysses II, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 
215 (2007) (discussing the application of the Hicklin standard to works such as the 
foregoing). 
 333. See Rabban, supra note 332, at 57 (“Comstock bragged in 1913 that he had 
destroyed 160 tons of obscene literature over the prior forty-one years.”). 
 334. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 488–89 (rejecting Hicklin standard 
for obscenity); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 78–80 (1992) (history of 
Comstock Act). 
 335. See John Wertheimer, Mutual Film Revisited: The Movies, Censorship, and Free 
Speech in Progressive America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 158, 183–66 (1993). 
 336. See id. at 163–66 (detailing the legislative responses in various state to 
control the content of theatre production). 
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multitudinous shows which are advertised on the billboards of our 
cities and towns . . . .”337  Among its “familiarly exercised” police 
powers, the state traditionally was entrusted with “granting or 
withholding licenses for theatrical performances as a means of 
their regulation.”338  In brief, this was wholly a question of 
regulating a commercial practice: “the exhibition of moving 
pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted 
for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded . . . as part of 
the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion.”339  
Furthermore, it was a business with a peculiar potential for harm, 
McKenna warned, because “a prurient interest may be excited and 
appealed to.  Besides, there are some things which should not have 
pictorial representation in public places and to all audiences.”340  
Technically, McKenna was interpreting the free speech clause of 
the Ohio constitution, but he wrote in generalities that would be 
applicable if the First Amendment were at issue.341  Censorship 
systems for movies remained untouched by the Court until 1952, 
when it brought movies “within the ambit” of the First Amendment 
by holding New York’s licensing program to be an illegal prior 
restraint.342 
Obscenity was merely one subject relating to free expression in 
which the courts used common law rules to decide cases with 
constitutional overtones.343  Although the Court occasionally 
acknowledged the right of the people to comment on public 
affairs, it emphasized that the expression could be limited by the 
state if it was inimical to community values.344  The exceptions to 
 337. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915). 
 338. Id. at 244. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 242. 
 341. “We would have to shut our eyes to the facts of the world to regard the 
precaution unreasonable or the legislation to effect it a mere wanton interference 
with personal liberty.” Id.  “We need not pause to dilate upon the freedom of 
opinion and its expression and whether by speech, writing, or printing.” Id. at 243.  
“[T]he police power is familiarly exercised in granting or withholding licenses for 
theatrical performances as a means of their regulation.”  Id. at 244. 
 342. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).  New York’s board of 
censors examined films to see if they were “obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, 
sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt 
morals or incite to crime.”  Id. at 497. 
 343. See RABBAN, supra note 210, at 175 (”[F]ilm censorship, political speech by 
government employees, public sermons by ministers, and newspaper reports of 
crime also produced decisions that rejected First Amendment claims). 
 344. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 n.14 (1927) (“That the 
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freedom of expression found in common law rules in turn created 
categories of disfavored speech—expression that could be abridged 
essentially without restraint by the state.345  In an 1897 ruling 
unrelated to free expression, the Court explained that: 
[The Bill of Rights] were not intended to lay down any 
novel principles of government, but simply to embody 
certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited 
from our English ancestors, and which had, from time 
immemorial, been subject to certain well-recognized 
exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case. . . .  
Thus, the [First Amendment] does not permit the 
publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or 
other publications injurious to public morals or private 
reputation.346 
Common law understandings also applied to place certain 
contexts entirely outside the First Amendment.  If the state acted as 
an employer, a property owner or the provider of a service like the 
mails, then it could control speech that occurred in these settings 
because at common law the government possessed the same rights 
as a private owner or proprietor.347  As for the mails, the Court held 
that the government had no obligation to carry what it considered 
immoral literature.348  Several cases limited the post office’s 
authority to censor mail, but these were statutory rulings not 
directly implicating the First Amendment.349 
freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an 
absolute right to speak . . . is not open to question”), overruled by Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (“It is a fundamental principle . . . that the freedom of speech and of the 
press . . . does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without 
responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license 
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the 
punishment of those who abuse this freedom.”). 
 345. See supra text accompanying notes 302–10 for a delineation of these 
categories. 
 346. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897). 
 347. See infra notes 348–58, 361–65 for examples of the Court upholding the 
government’s ability to control speech in these private areas. 
 348. See, e.g., Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393–94 (1916) (“The 
overt act of putting a letter into the post office of the United States is a matter that 
Congress may regulate.”); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877) (“The right [of 
Congress] to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to 
determine what shall be excluded.”). 
 349. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890) (holding that the 
statutory definition of “writing” did not apply to private, sealed letters). 
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Similarly, a city acting in pursuit of its traditional police powers 
could impose any conditions it wished on users of municipal 
property.350  In the 1897 case previously mentioned as upholding a 
permit system to speak in the Boston Commons, Justice White 
affirmed Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes’ conclusion for the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that as the park’s owner 
the city could impose whatever conditions it wished on the use of 
its property.351  “The right to absolutely exclude all right to use 
necessarily includes the authority to determine under what 
circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power 
contains the lesser.”352  It made no difference that the mayor had 
complete discretion over who received a permit, effectively allowing 
the city to practice viewpoint discrimination.353 
On a related front, public employees’ First Amendment rights 
were nonexistent, and would remain so for many decades.  Again, 
Judge Holmes articulated the theory for this result, writing in a 
much-emulated 1892 Massachusetts opinion that upheld the firing 
of a police officer for engaging in political activities, such as fund-
raising for political causes and serving on a political committee.354  
Granting that the officer had “a constitutional right to talk politics,” 
Holmes nevertheless held that he could not claim a “constitutional 
right to be a policeman. . . . The servant cannot complain, as he 
takes the employment on the terms that are offered him.  On the 
same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon 
holding offices within its control.”355  Holmes’s view was widely 
shared among courts at the time.356  Whatever else might be a 
 350. See supra notes 337–39 and accompanying text. 
 351. David v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897). 
 352. Id. at 48. 
 353. Id.  Justice Holmes wrote in the state opinion: 
       For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking 
in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a 
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it 
in his house. . . .  So it may take the less step of limiting the public use to 
certain purposes. 
Massachusetts v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895). 
 354. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 355. Id. at 517–18. 
 356. See, e.g., Gitlow v. Kieley, 44 F.2d 227, 229–30 (D.C.N.Y. 1930) (citing 
Justice Holmes’ opinion to support denying the plaintiffs a constitutional right to 
send revolutionary materials through the mail); In re Cohen, 159 N.E. 495 (Mass. 
1928) (citing Justice Holmes for support in upholding suspension of advertising by 
members of the bar); Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) 
(Holmes, J.). 
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“reasonable” condition to the Court, controlling employees’ speech 
counted as one of them: “There are few employments for hire in 
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional 
rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of 
his contract.”357 
Holmes’s underlying theory was that government had the 
same rights as a private employer at common law.358  For employees, 
the one advantage of this holding was that government could 
protect their political independence from the notorious abuses of 
patronage systems in the nineteenth century.359  By a law passed in 
1876, most federal government employees were “prohibited from 
requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer or 
employee of the government any money or property or other thing 
of value for political purposes.”360  Upholding this enactment, Chief 
Justice Morrison R. Waite wrote for the Court in the 1882 case, Ex 
parte Curtis, rejecting the contention that this restraint curbed the 
political independence of a government worker: “[c]ontributions 
secured under such circumstances will quite as likely be made to 
avoid the consequences of the personal displeasure of a superior, 
as to promote the political views of the contributor . . . .”361  Besides, 
Waite added, the law was so full of loopholes that it did nothing to 
prevent employees from contributing directly to political 
campaigns.362  That may have been true, but future civil service laws 
would impose still tighter restrictions on employee political 
activity.363  These laws would be upheld on the theory presented by 
Waite’s opinion, that the spoils system in government undermined 
efficiency and led to padding of payrolls and contracts that in turn 
were used to finance the political party in power.364  Employees 
 357. McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517–18. 
 358. See id. at 518 (“[T]he city may impose any reasonable conditions upon 
holding offices within its control.  The condition to us seems reasonable, if that be 
a question open to revision here.”). 
 359. See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Courts, A Protected Bureaucracy, 
and Reinventing Government, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 795–96 (1995) (detailing the 
patronage system and its abuses during this time period). 
 360. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, § 6, 19 Stat. 143, 169. 
 361. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 374 (1882). 
 362. Id. at 375. 
 363. See supra note 356 (citing several cases that give examples of these laws). 
 364. Ex parte Curtis was relied on by later cases upholding restrictions on 
political activities by government workers.  See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 555 (1973); United Pub. Workers 
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96–98 (1947); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 
399 (1930). 
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should not object, Waite reasoned, because the scheme was for 
their own good.365 
Labor disputes in the private sector were widespread and often 
violent in pre-World War I America, as unions fought—physically 
on numerous occasions—to organize and collectively bargain.366  
With strength in numbers, unions could withhold services in order 
to improve contracts or to obtain them in the first place.  
Employers had no common law obligation to bargain with unions, 
and typically refused to do so.367  To squeeze employers who refused 
to recognize them, unions engaged in strikes and organized 
secondary boycotts against suppliers and customers of the targeted 
companies, at times with the cooperation of other unions.368  
Employers in turn fought back by firing union organizers and 
members, hiring replacement workers, obliging workers to sign 
yellow-dog contracts in which they promised not to join a union, 
and obtaining injunctions against boycotts and strikes.369  In many 
instances they hired armed guards to prevent or quell labor 
disturbances.370 
Absent protective legislation, organizers had no legal recourse 
against dismissal for union activity.  When legislation favorable to 
union activities was passed, it risked invalidation as infringing the 
employers’ rights in violation of the Due Process Clause.371  This 
 365. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 374 (“No one can for a moment doubt that in 
both these statutes the object was to protect the classes of officials and employees 
provided for from being compelled to make contributions for such purposes 
through fear of dismissal if they refused.”). 
 366. See, e.g., Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s 
“First Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 563–71 (1999) (detailing 
the Industrial Worker’s of the World movements in Missouri and San Francisco, 
the latter of which was the most violent of the IWW campaign). 
 367. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (“The right of a 
person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the 
same right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he 
will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it.”). 
 368. See generally William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor 
Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1989) (outlining the history of the labor 
movement, including the tactics used by labor unions to achieve desired results). 
 369. See RABBAN, supra note 210, at 169–73 (detailing labor injunctions during 
this time); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 
1905). 
 370. See Forbath, supra note 368, at 1190. 
 371. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1915) (“[T]he liberty of making 
contracts does not include a liberty to procure employment from an unwilling 
employer, or without a fair understanding.  Nor may the employer be foreclosed 
by legislation from exercising the same freedom of choice that is the right of the 
employee.”). 
52
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 825 
 
period was high noon for freedom of contract under the regime of 
Lochner v. New York.372  Among other things, the Court declared laws 
banning yellow-dog contracts to be offensive to the rights of both 
employers and employees to bargain for whatever terms they 
could.373 
Further adding strength to the employers’ side of the scale, 
the Court had as early as 1895 endorsed the use of labor 
injunctions to stop strikes and boycotts, a move that greatly favored 
employers as well.374  Some of the labor actions restrained by these 
injunctions were criminal, as when strikers engaged in violence.375  
The Court also found some labor strikes to be illegal efforts to 
interfere with interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.376  Other forms of union activity stopped by judicial 
orders, however, involved traditional types of lawful speech: pickets, 
parades, posters, newspaper articles, and word of mouth.377  Courts 
invoked various justifications to rationalize these orders, such as 
dealing with threats of violence, stopping union “intimidation” of 
strikebreakers, and preventing unlawful interference with the 
employer’s business.378  Some lower courts blocked picketing 
altogether and others forbade demonstrators from using 
“opprobrious epithets,” such as the words “scab, traitor and 
unfair.”379  Inasmuch as a labor injunction stopped speech before it 
occurred, these rulings seemingly violated Blackstone’s dictate 
against prior restraints.380  Nevertheless, in several cases decided by 
the Court about labor injunctions, the Justices showed little 
patience with First Amendment arguments.381 
 372. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 373. See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 25 (giving examples of cases striking laws against 
yellow-dog contracts); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1908). 
 374. See generally In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
 375. See Bobertz, supra note 366. 
 376. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 
(1922) (recognizing the ability to sue unions under the Anti-Trust Act for 
disrupting interstate commerce). 
 377. See RABBAN, supra note 210, at 170 (discussing the limitations on 
picketing). 
 378. See id. at 170 (“Courts issued injunctions to forbid various activities of 
union leaders and their supporters . . . .”). 
 379. See id. (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR 
INJUNCTION 52, 81, 89–106 (1930)). 
 380. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at *150–52; see also supra notes 47–48 and 
accompanying text. 
 381. See supra notes 385–90 and accompanying text. 
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To place labor activities outside the First Amendment—and 
Blackstone’s admonition—the Court characterized them as “verbal 
acts,” which were “as much subject to injunction as the use of any 
other force whereby property is unlawfully damaged.”382  An 
injunction stopping a union-instigated boycott of a company’s 
products, for example, “raises no question as to an abridgment of 
free speech, but involves the power of a court of equity to enjoin 
the defendants from continuing a boycott which, by words and 
signals, printed or spoken, caused or threatened irreparable 
damage.”383  Injunctions were approved by the Court not only to 
deal with secondary boycotts and union-sponsored violence, but 
also peaceful efforts to organize non-union companies.384 
A 1917 case upheld an injunction requested by a coal mine 
operator against officials of the United Mine Workers.385  The order 
forbade the UMW from organizing nonunion miners who had 
signed yellow-dog contracts.386 
[A]lthough having full notice of the terms of employment 
existing between plaintiff and its miners, [union 
representatives] were engaged in an earnest effort to 
subvert those relations without plaintiff’s consent, and to 
alienate a sufficient number of the men to shut down the 
mine, to the end that the fear of losses through stoppage 
of operations might coerce plaintiff into “recognizing the 
union” at the cost of its own independence.387 
That the union’s activities consisted only of speech was beside 
the point.  Persuading workers to leave their employment was 
“universally recognized” as a tort, Justice Mahlon Pitney declared.388  
And, he could not help but add, the men who were the subject of 
these union entreaties were “ignorant foreign-born miners.”389 
Labor injunctions provide a characteristic example of how the 
common law predilection for property rights and sanctity of 
contract influenced the Court’s entire approach to free expression.  
Starting from the premise that it was illegal to entice workers to 
 382. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). 
 383. Id. at 437. 
 384. See infra notes 385, 388 and accompanying text. 
 385. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1911). 
 386. Id. at 261–62. 
 387. Id. at 248. 
 388. Hitchman Coal & Coke, 245 U.S. at 252. 
 389. Id. at 246.  See also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (citing examples 
of early cases sustaining injunctions against secondary boycotts); In re Debs, 158 
U.S. 564 (1895). 
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strike—because that would interfere with property rights—the 
speech question evaporated: the speech was the illegal action.  
Calling it a “verbal act” only confuses the issue⎯all verbalizations 
are actions.  Some crimes can be carried out largely or entirely by 
speech and writing, yet no First Amendment issues are provoked by 
their punishment.  Among these crimes are a variety of property 
offenses, including interfering with others’ businesses by falsely 
disparaging their products.  Speech rights then vary with the extent 
of property rights involved, and in the nineteenth century business 
owners enjoyed substantial leeway in using their possessions. 
Reviewing the period from the Sedition Act until World War I, 
as far as speech and press are concerned, one fact stands out.  Of 
the many cases presenting potential free expression issues during 
this period, in only a few did the courts acknowledge a free 
expression argument, and they were almost invariably denied.  The 
Court’s attitude on this issue persisted despite more than a 125 
years of tumultuous national events that had nurtured an 
aggressive press and accustomed people to thinking of free speech 
as a basic right.  At first glance, it is remarkable that the Court 
remained so wedded to the common law approach enunciated by 
Blackstone.  Partly the explanation may be that the Justices 
received so few cases squarely presenting First Amendment issues, 
leaving them without the material to work out their own 
constitutional take on free expression.390  That assumes, needless to 
say, that the Court would have taken a different direction had it 
been given the opportunity.  There is reason to doubt this 
assumption.  On the occasions when the Court did confront a free 
speech issue, its analysis usually was superficial and deferential 
toward elected officials in their exercise of police powers.391  Much 
like the Court’s decisions on property regulation in that era, the 
Justices tended to fixate on what they considered the public 
interest served by restricting speech.392  For the Court, speech 
seemed to occupy no more exalted position in the scheme of 
personal liberties than the ownership of property.393  Like property, 
speech could be limited to serve an overarching societal interest in 
 390. See Bobertz, supra note 366, at 637–38 (discussing Brandeis and Holmes’s 
evolution of judicial thought). 
 391. See, e.g., Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 475–78 (1920) (collecting 
cases). 
 392. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919). 
 393. See id. 
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public order and the protection of personal reputations (including 
the reputations of public officials).394  Aside from occasionally 
voicing platitudes about the virtues of free expression, the Court 
never articulated the distinctive value of speech as a counterweight 
to majoritarian politics.395  Consequently, when it faced a series of 
cases during World War I and thereafter in which defendants were 
charged with seditious advocacy, the Court did not perceive any 
significant virtue in permitting dissidents to urge resistance to 
decisions made by elected officials.396  To the contrary, the public 
interest was winning a war, one of the highest purposes imaginable.  
Accordingly, the state’s justification for suppressing speech reached 
its apex. 
III. SPEECH RIGHTS DURING WORLD WAR I AND THE “RED SCARE” 
On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany.  
Prior to entering the conflict, lawyers at the Department of Justice 
began work on legislation that would enable the federal 
government to stifle “political agitation” that could affect “the 
safety of the state.”397  The centerpiece of this effort became the 
Espionage Act of 1917.398  Under this law, it was illegal during 
wartime for anyone to make “false reports or false statements” with 
the intent to hamper the military effort.399  More potently, the act 
made it a crime to “willfully cause or attempt to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or . . . willfully obstruct 
the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States. . . .”  
Violators were subject to imprisonment for up to 20 years and fines 
of $10,000.400 
 394. See id. 
 395. At least not until Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (“Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing 
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly 
should be guaranteed.”). 
 396. See generally Bobertz, supra note 366. 
 397. John Lord O’Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, N.Y. State Bar Assoc., 
Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Meeting 275, 277 (1919).  O’Brian was 
the chief of the War Emergency Division of the Department of Justice during 
World War I. 
 398. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917). 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
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In the following year, Congress toughened the Act 
considerably by adding provisions against seditious advocacy.401  In 
addition to making it a crime to attempt obstruction of recruiting 
or interfere with selling war bonds, the amendment outlawed a 
wide range of disloyal speech.402  Using far-reaching language, , 
Congress banned 
any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language 
about the form of government of the United States, or the 
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or the flag of the United 
States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United 
States . . . .403 
The statute went on to proscribe “any language intended to 
bring” these protected objects “into contempt, scorn, contumely, or 
disrepute . . . .”404  Further, it became illegal to use “any language 
intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United 
States, or to promote the cause of its enemies . . . .”405  Turning to 
interference with the production of war matériel, Congress made it 
a crime to “urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production 
in this country of any thing or things, product or products, 
necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war . . . .” 406  
Leaving no bases uncovered, it became a crime to “willfully 
advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or 
things” already mentioned, or “by word or act support or favor the 
cause of any country with which the United States is at war or by 
word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein . . . .”407  
Finally, the mails could not carry any publication that violated these 
proscriptions.408  Postal authorities were given wide discretion to 
refuse material they considered in violation.409 
President Woodrow Wilson’s administration applied these laws 
with a vigor that made the enforcers of the Sedition Act of 1798 
look like pikers.  Attorney General Charles Gregory referred 
 401. See Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
 402. See id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. 
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 416 (1921). 
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derisively to war opponents in a 1917 speech: “Our message will be 
delivered to them through the criminal courts all over the land. . . . 
And, may God have mercy on them, for they need expect none 
from an outraged people and an avenging government.”410  More 
than 2000 persons were prosecuted under the Espionage Act, and 
about half convicted.411  Lengthy prison sentences were the norm, 
although most defendants had their sentences commuted after a 
few years, often on condition that they leave the country.412  Among 
those most pursued by the Department of Justice were German-
Americans, Socialists, and conscientious objectors.  Members of the 
International Workers of the World (IWW, or Wobblies)) were 
favorite targets, with more than 180 of them prosecuted in 1918 
and 1919.413  Wobblies were notorious not only because of their 
participation in violent strikes, but for their repeated street 
protests, which typically produced mass arrests of IWW members.  
Following a nationwide raid of IWW offices around the country in 
1917, 101 of the union’s officials were charged with obstructing the 
war effort.414  After a five-month trial in Chicago, the longest in 
American history at that point, all were convicted.415  The jury 
completed its deliberations on all 101 cases in under an hour.  
William D. (Big Bill) Haywood, the IWW national leader, and 14 
others were sentenced to twenty years; 68 received five to ten years, 
and the remainder lighter terms.416  Trials in Wichita and 
Sacramento convicted another eighty Wobblie leaders. (Big Bill 
avoided prison by jumping bond and decamping to Russia, where 
he died in 1928.)417 
 410. All Disloyal Men Warned by Gregory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1917, at 3. 
 411. See HENRY SCHEIBER, THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 
1917-1921, at 46–47 (1960) (reporting that 2168 individuals were prosecuted and 
1055 were convicted). 
 412. Id. 
 413. Paul L. Murphy, Sources and Nature of Intolerance in the 1920s, 51 J. AM. 
HIST. 60, 63 (1964). 
 414. See David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Fights and Popular Conceptions of 
Free Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1062-64 (1994) (detailing 
IWW street demonstrations and arrests).  Rabban notes that these arrests 
produced no appellate precedents.  See id. at 1061.  See also Patrick Renshaw, The 
IWW and the Red Scare 1917-1924: From War to Peace, 3 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 63, 66–68 
(1968) (describing government actions to suppress IWW). 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id.   
 417. Id.  See also JOSEPH R. CONLIN, BIG BILL HAYWOOD AND THE RADICAL UNION 
MOVEMENT 196–99, 208 (1969). 
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Notwithstanding considerable opposition to the war among 
portions of the populace, the period from 1917 to 1920 was marked 
by “[a] wave of xenophobia and super-patriotism . . . . Reds, 
radicals, foreigners, and dissenters of all kinds were harried, 
persecuted, prosecuted, and deported . . . .”418  Juries showed scant 
regard for those who spoke out against the war at a time when 
troops were in the trenches.  Judge Charles Fremont Amidon, a 
federal district judge in North Dakota, described the temper of 
juries in these prosecutions: 
Only those who have administered the Espionage Act can 
understand the danger of such legislation.  When crimes 
are defined by such generic terms . . . the jury becomes 
the sole judge, whether men shall or shall not be 
punished.  Most of the jurymen have sons in the war.  
They are all under the power of the passions which war 
engenders.  [Typically] sober, intelligent business men . . . 
looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild 
animals, saying by their manner, “Away with this 
twiddling, let us get at him.”  Men believed during that 
period that the only verdict in a war case, which could 
show loyalty, was a verdict of guilty.419 
These prosecutions, keep in mind, were for speaking or 
writing against American involvement in the war, not espionage or 
sabotage.  In no case did the government prove that a defendant 
actually had impaired the country’s military agenda.  It did not 
have to do so in order to convict under the Espionage Act.420  
Virtually all of the prosecutions accused dissidents of attempting to 
interfere with the war effort by speaking or writing against it or the 
military draft.  Federal judges almost uniformly interpreted the act 
to punish anti-war speech that had a “bad tendency” to incite 
others to violate the Act.  The question to ask, one federal circuit 
court held in a typical opinion, was “whether the natural and 
probable tendency and effect of the words . . . are such as are 
calculated to produce the result condemned by the statute.”421  
Juries were given wide latitude by judges to determine if the 
defendant’s words had such a tendency, and to decide the related 
issue of whether the defendant intended that the words would lead 
 418. Renshaw, supra note 414, at 65–66. 
 419. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 76–77 (1920) (quoting Judge 
Amidon, who had much experience in Espionage Act cases). 
 420. Sedition Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
 421. Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1919). 
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to an illegal action.422  On the latter question, courts greatly aided 
the prosecution by holding that the defendant “must be presumed 
to have intended the natural and probable consequences of what 
he knowingly did.”423  This presumption left juries to speculate on, 
say, whether an inflammatory leaflet might diminish enthusiasm for 
enlistment or cause troops to desert.424  If jurors thought it might, 
then the defendant presumably had that intent, making the test 
meaningless as a check on zealous prosecutions of unpopular 
opinions.425  Few verdicts were overturned on appeal.426 
There is a striking similarity between some of these 
prosecutions and the suppression of Civil War copperheads by 
executive and military action.  As then, the main targets of 
prosecutions were those who sharply criticized the country’s 
continued involvement in the conflict.  It was easy for judges and 
juries to connect the dots between criticism and impeding the war 
struggle, just as Lincoln’s administration had done.  Explaining 
why critical words could be proscribed, one trial judge in World 
War I opined that “[t]he service may be obstructed by attacking the 
justice of the cause for which the war is waged, and by undermining 
the spirit of loyalty which inspires men to enlist or to register for 
conscription in the service of their country.”427  In the case that gave 
rise to this remark, the defendant had been convicted of mailing a 
book that cast doubt on the wisdom of the war, using combustive 
rhetoric such as this: “There is not a question raised, an issue 
involved, a cause at stake, which is worth the life of one blue-jacket 
on the sea or one khakicoat in the trenches.”428  Many other cases of 
similar dimension could be mentioned.429  Geoffrey Stone, a First 
Amendment scholar, gives a few more examples of Espionage Act 
convictions: 
Rose Pastor Stokes, the editor of the socialist Jewish Daily 
News, was sentenced to ten years in prison for saying “I am 
for the people, while the government is for the profiteers” 
 422. RABBAN, supra note 210, at 257–60. 
 423. Shaffer, 255 F. at 889. 
 424. RABBAN, supra note 210, at 257–60. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a 
Constitutional Model that Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of 
Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 488 n.50 (2007). 
 427. Shaffer, 255 F. at 888. 
 428. Id. at 886. 
 429. See RABBAN, supra note 210, at 257–60. 
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during an antiwar statement to the Women’s Dining Club 
of Kansas City.  D. T. Blodgett was sentenced to twenty 
years in prison for circulating a leaflet urging voters in 
Iowa not to reelect a congressman who had voted for 
conscription and arguing that the draft was 
unconstitutional.  The Reverend Clarence H. Waldron was 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison for distributing a 
pamphlet stating that “if Christians [are] forbidden to 
fight to preserve the Person of their Lord and Master, they 
may not fight to preserve themselves, or any city they 
should happen to dwell in.”430 
In March 1919, several months after the fighting had ended in 
Europe, and while the terms of peace were being negotiated in 
Paris, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes included a confidential aside 
in a letter to his friend Harold Laski: “The federal judges seem to 
me . . . to have got hysterical about the war.”431  Holmes appeared 
genuinely unaware that he had contributed to the frenzy by his 
actions in the prior two weeks, during which the Court decided its 
first three Espionage Act cases.432  Holmes wrote for unanimous 
Courts upholding the convictions in all of them.433  Actually this was 
not the Court’s first encounter with speech issues related to the 
war.  Already in the previous year it had affirmed convictions under 
the Selective Draft Act for speaking against conscription, on the 
theory that the speeches could encourage draft evasion.434  One of 
those involved the famed anarchist Emma Goldman, a Russian 
immigrant to America who had lambasted the government and 
bourgeois society for 30 years.435  She would spend 20 months in 
federal prison before exchanging her liberty for permanent 
deportation.436  Goldman’s biographer, Alice Wexler, gives this 
 430. United States v. Waldron (unreported) (D. Vt. 1918), quoted in GEOFFREY 
R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 421 (2004) (citing several Espionage Act examples).  
 431. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (March 16, 1919), 
in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 142 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
 432. See id. at 142 n.2. 
 433. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919).  A 
fourth case, decided March 3, 1919, upheld an Espionage Act conviction for 
speaking against the draft, but Justice Brandeis’ opinion did not decide a 
constitutional issue.   See Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182, 185 (1919);  
 434. See Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); Kramer v. United 
States, 245 U.S. 478 (1918). 
 435. See generally ALICE WEXLER, EMMA GOLDMAN: AN INTIMATE LIFE (1984). 
 436. Id. 
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précis of a woman who “enjoyed a notoriety unequalled by any 
other woman in American public life.”437 
On her freewheeling coast-to-coast lecture tours she 
defended everything from free speech to free love, from 
the rights of striking workers to the rights of homosexuals.  
Her name became a household word, synonymous with 
everything subversive and demonic, but also symbolic of 
the “new woman” and of the radical labor movement that 
blossomed in the years before World War I.  To the public 
she was America’s arch revolutionary, both frightening 
and fascinating.  She flaunted her lovers, talked back to 
the police, smoked in public, and marched off to prison 
carrying James Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist under her arm.438 
Neither Goldman nor her co-defendants pressed First 
Amendment issues, however, and the Court treated the other 
arguments almost summarily.439  They mainly attacked the 
constitutionality of the draft, which the Court had already upheld 
in 1917, when it declared that notwithstanding the ban on 
involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment, “the very 
conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes 
the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in 
case of need, and the right to compel it.”440  If one could be drafted 
without violating his liberties, then perforce it should be 
constitutional to punish someone for merely interfering with 
conscription.  After all, the draft was justified as an exercise of 
Congress’ war powers.441 
The first in the triptych of 1919 cases involved Charles T. 
Schenck, the general secretary of the Socialist Party at the outset of 
World War I.442  He and Elizabeth Baer, a member of the party’s 
executive committee, were convicted of violating the Espionage Act 
for arranging to mail or distribute several thousand leaflets to men 
who were eligible to be drafted.443  Using language that Holmes 
would describe as “impassioned,” their two-sided circular mainly 
constituted a diatribe against the war and the draft.444  Attributing 
 437. Id. at xv. 
 438. ALICE WEXLER, EMMA GOLDMAN IN EXILE: FROM THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 
TO THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 1 (1989). 
 439. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). 
 440. Id. at 378. 
 441. Id. at 377. 
 442. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919). 
 443. Id. at 49–50. 
 444. Id. at 51. 
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the “the horrors of the present war in Europe” to the work of “Wall 
Street’s chosen few,” it vigorously railed against “forc[ing] the 
youth of our land into the shambles and bloody trenches of war-
crazy nations . . . .”445  After charging that conscription violated the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the only specific action that it 
recommended was for recipients of the message to “join the 
Socialist Party in its campaign for the repeal of the conscription 
act.”446  More vaguely, it admonished readers to “Assert Your 
Rights.”447  Holmes acknowledged that this plea had not ventured 
beyond urging a change in the law, but nonetheless the defendants 
were guilty of attempting to interfere with recruiting and 
enlistment: “Of course the document would not have been sent 
unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not see 
what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to 
the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out. 
The defendants do not deny that the jury might find against them 
on this point.”448 
Turning to the First Amendment, Holmes began by retreating 
from his previous declaration in Patterson v. Colorado, that freedom 
of expression was co-extensive with Blackstone’s formulation: “It 
well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of 
speech is not confined to previous restraints . . . ,” Holmes now 
conceded.449  Having taken that tentative step, he went on to “admit 
that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying 
all that was said in the circular would have been within their 
constitutional rights.  But the character of every act depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is done.”450  Context was critical: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.  
It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is 
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not 
 445. 1919 WL 20713 at *5–6 (brief for the United States), cited in Schenck, 249 
U.S. at 53. 
 446. Id. at *5. 
 447. Id. 
 448. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. at 52. 
63
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
836 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could 
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.451 
The phrase “clear and present danger” was new for the Court, 
as was the analogy Holmes drew to elucidate its import: “The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”452  Both were 
destined to become among the most-remembered statements from 
the Court, and both would prove to be overly simplistic in analyzing 
free speech controversies. 
One week after Schenck, the Court upheld Espionage Act 
convictions in Frohwerk v. United States453 and Debs v. United States.454  
Jacob Frohwerk received a ten-year sentence for a series of 
insistently anti-war articles he had published in a Missouri-based 
German-language newspaper.455  Unlike the leftist leaflet in Schenck, 
these writings had a distinctly pro-German point of view, the 
readership coming from the sizeable population of German 
immigrants and their descendants in the Midwest.456  Although not 
directed specifically at draftees or potential recruits, as in Schenck, 
the writings could be interpreted as urging civil disobedience.457  
According to Holmes’ description, the articles “said that the 
previous talk about legal remedies is all very well for those who are 
past the draft age and have no boys to be drafted.”458  Considering 
the dreadfulness of the war and the awful fate awaiting soldiers, 
Frohwerk posed a rhetorical question: “Who then, it is asked, will 
pronounce a verdict of guilty upon him if he stops reasoning and 
follows the first impulse of nature: self-preservation.”459  (Answer: 
more than a few juries.)  Holmes parsed these words from the 
perspective established in Schenck, that while Frohwerk’s 
publications might have been protected in more tranquil times, 
given the ongoing conflict it was “impossible to say that it might not 
have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters 
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that 
 451. Id. (emphasis added). 
 452. Id. 
 453. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
 454. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
 455. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205–08. 
 456. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49–50 (noting that Schenck was the general 
secretary of the Socialist Party and the leaflets at issue were for promotion of 
Socialist ideas); Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 210. 
 457. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–49; see also Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205–06. 
 458. Id. at 207. 
 459. Id. at 208. 
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the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper 
out.”460 
Eugene Debs had more than a little breath, and a rousing 
speech he gave in Canton, Ohio during 1918 earned him two 
concurrent ten-year prison sentences for violating the Espionage 
Act.461  A figure of considerable notoriety, Debs already had run for 
President four times as the Socialist Party candidate.462  In the 1920 
election, in which he campaigned from federal prison, Debs 
finished third, receiving over 900,000 votes out of about 27 million 
cast.463  Holmes himself referred to Debs in private as “a noted 
agitator.”464  A picture of Debs delivering the Canton address shows 
a mostly bald man in a three-piece suit with a bow tie on a stage 
festooned with American flag bunting.465  He is leaning forward and 
speaking with full throat, pumping his left arm vigorously.466  Debs’ 
Canton speech was primarily about “Socialism, its growth, and a 
prophecy of its ultimate success.”467  As to that, “we have nothing to 
do,” Holmes maintained, true to his view that the Constitution did 
not establish a preferred economic system.468  Debs violated the 
Espionage Act’s for what he said about the war and the draft.469  
Depicting the war as part of the class struggle between workers and 
plutocrats, Debs exhorted, “you need to know that you are fit for 
something better than slavery and cannon fodder. . . .  Don’t worry 
about the charge of treason to your masters; but be concerned 
about the treason that involves yourselves.”470  Praising three 
individuals by name who had been convicted of obstructing the 
draft or recruitment, Debs cautioned that “he had to be prudent 
and might not be able to say all that he thought.”471  Holmes 
thought Deb’s coyness suspicious⎯“intimating to his hearers that 
 460. Id. at 209. 
 461. Debs, 249 U.S. at 212. 
 462. See Eugene V. Debs, TIME, Nov. 1, 1926. 
 463. ANN HAGEDORN, SAVAGE PEACE 427 (2007). 
 464. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5, 1919), 
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
 465. See the cover of NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 
(1982). 
 466. Id. 
 467. Debs, 249 U.S. at 212. 
 468. Id. at 212–13. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. at 214. 
 471. Id. at 213. 
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they might infer that he meant more.”472  Sealing his fate, Debs had 
added proudly: “I have been accused of obstructing the war.  I 
admit it.  Gentlemen, I abhor war.  I would oppose the war if I 
stood alone.”473  From all this, Holmes concluded, the jury could 
reasonably find “that the opposition was so expressed that its 
natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting.”474  
That Debs intended to obstruct the draft could be inferred by the 
jury from the words in the speech.475 
There was no evidence that the defendants’ actions in these 
three cases had any effect whatsoever on the draft, recruiting or 
military discipline.  That was irrelevant, Holmes explained in 
Schenck, because the crime charged was a conspiracy to attempt to 
obstruct the draft, and therefore “we perceive no ground for saying 
that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”476  About a 
month after the case was decided, Holmes acknowledged to the 
noted English legal historian Sir Frederick Pollock, that there had 
been “a lot of jaw about free speech” in Schenck, “which I dealt with 
somewhat summarily.”477  To Holmes, the question in the case 
involved a straightforward problem of criminal attempt, an issue 
that he had encountered repeatedly during 20 years as a state court 
judge.478  Attempts to commit crimes were punishable, Holmes had 
written in his 1881 book, The Common Law, because of the danger 
they presented to the community.479  Determining whether an 
attempted crime had been committed involved weighing “nearness 
of the danger, the greatness of the harm, and the degree of 
apprehension felt.”480  That formula was developed for ordinary 
criminal cases⎯for example, a person could be found guilty of 
attempted murder by firing a gun at another and missing the 
intended target.  Applied to a speech case, however, it assigned no 
special weight to the value of speech, and in wartime there was 
 472. Id. 
 473. Id. at 214. 
 474. Id. at 215. 
 475. Id. at 214–15. 
 476. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 477. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (April 5, 1919), 
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 464, at 7. 
 478. Id. 
 479. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 67–69 (1881). 
 480. Id. 
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plenty of heft on the other side of the scale.481  Two months after 
the three decisions, Holmes wrote in a letter: “When people are 
putting out all their energies in battle I don’t think it unreasonable 
to say we won’t have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising 
troops⎯by persuasion any more than by force.”482  That came from 
a former soldier who had been seriously wounded three times 
during the Civil War⎯at Antietam, Ball’s Bluff, and 
Chancellorsville.483 
A strange case in 1915 produced an opinion from Justice 
Holmes in which he articulated his view that speech could be 
punished as an attempt to incite others to illegal acts.484  The 
decision was Fox v. Washington, and it arose from the travails of a 
nudist colony that enjoyed communing with nature in the 
Northwest forests.485  After some strait-laced local citizens objected, 
which led to the arrest of four members of the group for public 
indecency, a small county newspaper named the Agitator published 
an article titled the “The Nude and the Prudes.”486  Its author, Jay 
Fox, not only praised the benefits of nudism, but threatened a 
boycott against the “prudes” who had caused the arrests.487  Fox was 
convicted under a statute making it a crime to willfully encourage 
another person to violate the law; he received two months in jail.488  
According to the Washington Supreme Court, Fox “concedes that 
the article does tend to encourage disobedience and disrespect for 
law,” and then added, “it clearly does so.”489  (What author would 
concede otherwise?  Confess that his or her work had no impact 
whatsoever?)  Evidence was introduced at trial to show that nudism 
had increased after the publication, which the Washington court 
thought probative of the article’s effect.490  Fox argued that the law 
 481. Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy 
of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 217 (1994); David S. Bogen, The Free 
Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 154–58 (1982).  
 482. Letter from Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS, supra note 431, at 153. 
 483.  See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING 
YEARS 1841-1870, at 99–100 (1957) (explaining Holmes' wartime injuries at Ball’s 
Bluff), 126–129 (explaining his injuries at Antietam), 154–55 (explaining his 
injuries at Chancellorsville).  
 484. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277–78 (1915). 
 485. Id. at 276. 
 486. Id.  See also State v. Fox, 71 Wn. 185, 186, 127 P. 1111, 1112 (Wash. 1912). 
 487. Fox, 236 U.S. at 276–77. 
 488. Fox, 71 Wn. at 186, 127 P. at 1112. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. at 1113. 
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was unconstitutional because it “it abridges the right of free speech 
and of the press.”491  His efforts found no favor with Justice Holmes 
or the eight others on the Court.492  It is unclear from the reported 
opinions what Fox admitted to instigating.  Nudism?  An illegal 
boycott?  Whatever the crime, or its seriousness, it made no 
difference to Holmes.  “In this present case,” Holmes wrote, “the 
disrespect for law that was encouraged was disregard of it,—an 
overt breach and technically criminal act.”493  Holmes took the 
extra step, unnecessary to the decision, of saying that “it does not 
appear and is not likely that the statute will be construed to prevent 
publications merely because they tend to produce unfavorable 
opinions of a particular statute or of law in general.”494  Applied to 
the Espionage Act cases, speech could be punished because it had a 
tendency to incite disobedience of the law.495 
At the time Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk were decided, a 
momentous year already was underway.  While the terms of peace 
were being negotiated in Paris, the United States was in the midst 
of a year or more of widespread labor strikes.  Thousands of strikes 
occurred in 1919, involving over four million workers, about one 
out of five of the workforce.496  Seattle underwent a general strike 
for five days in February, idling tens of thousands of workers.497  A 
police strike in Boston during September, occasioned by a refusal 
of the city to recognize a police union, produced two days of 
looting, rioting and killing.498  J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the 
Department of Justice’s General Intelligence Division, asserted that 
at least half of the nation’s strikes were attributed to the 
Communist organizations.499  Bolshevism, which had triumphed in 
Russia in the fall of 1917, appeared to be spreading throughout 
eastern and central Europe.500  Communist and anarchist groups 
were active in the United States, publishing dozens of new 
periodicals, and they were blamed by leading officials as the source 
 491. Id. at 1112. 
 492. See Fox, 236 U.S. at 278. 
 493. Id. at 277. 
 494. Id. 
 495. See id. 
 496. See William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: 
The Background of Dennis v United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 388 (2001). 
 497. ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1910-1920, 
at 57–64 (1955). 
 498. Id. at 122–28. 
 499. Palmer Denies Use of Provocateurs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1920, at 23. 
 500. Wiecek, supra note 496, at 387. 
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of labor unrest.501  Economically, the country was in a severe post-
war slump caused by an end to military-related production, yet 
prices for basic goods continued to rise.  Prominent officials in the 
national government warned that the country stood on the 
precipice of revolution.  Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer 
asserted in 1920 that “[l]ike a prairie fire, the blaze of revolution 
was sweeping over every American institution of law and order a 
year ago.”502 
A wave of nativism simultaneously hit the nation, as Americans 
blamed the some ten million immigrants who had landed from 
southern and eastern Europe during the prior 15 years for the 
social and economic unrest.503  “One hundred percent 
Americanism” was the official catchphrase of the day.504  As Palmer 
explained, “I am myself an American and I love to preach my 
doctrine before undiluted one hundred percent Americans, 
because my platform is, in a word, undiluted Americanism and 
undying loyalty to the republic.”505  Press releases emphasized that 
the memberships of radical organizations were heavily weighted 
with aliens.506  Editorial cartoons appearing in papers across the 
land depicted the stereotypical anarchist as an unkempt, swarthy-
looking character with wild whiskers on a deranged face, often with 
a bomb in hand.507 
Tensions rose even higher when it was discovered in May 1919 
that thirty-six package bombs had been mailed to prominent 
Americans, including the likes of John D. Rockefeller, Attorney 
General Palmer, and Justice Holmes.508  Many of the explosives 
were intercepted in the mail, but one severely injured the 
housekeeper of a U.S. Senator.509  Then, on June 2, bombs 
 501. Id. at 384–92. 
 502. A. Mitchell Palmer, The Case Against the Reds, Forum, Feb. 1920, at 173–76, 
reprinted in THE FEAR OF CONSPIRACY 226 (David Brion Davis ed., 1971). 
 503. Murphy, supra note 413, at 60.  See also Stanley Coben, A Study in Nativism: 
The American Red Scare of 1919-20, 79 POL. SCI. Q. 52 (1964) (expounding on the 
radicalism of 1919-1920 and the rise of anti-immigrant feelings); Renshaw, supra 
note 414. 
 504. Wiecek, supra note 496, at 385–86. 
 505. A. Mitchell Palmer, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 7, 1920, reprinted in Coben, 
supra note 503, at 73. 
 506. Coben, supra note 503, at 68–69. 
 507. See A. Mitchell Out for a Stroll, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 4, 1929, reprinted in 
STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL PALMER, POLITICIAN 237 (1963). 
 508. MURRAY, supra 497, at 71. 
 509. Id. at 70–71. 
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exploded in eight U.S. cities, killing two.510  A bomb destroyed the 
front of Attorney General Palmer’s house, blowing at least one 
bomber to bits in the process.511  A pamphlet was found in Palmer’s 
yard connecting the attack to “The Anarchist Fighters,” and 
containing the chilling message: “There will have to be bloodshed; 
we will not dodge; there will have to be murder; we will kill . . . 
there will have to be destruction; we will destroy . . . . We are ready 
to do anything and everything to suppress the capitalist class.”512  
William J. Flynn, the director of the Justice Department’s Bureau of 
Investigation, stated soon afterwards that the bombings were 
“connected with Russian Bolshevism, aided by Hun money,” and 
that the “anarchists [were] operating and spreading their 
propaganda under the guise of labor agitation.”513  At noon on 
September 16, 1920, a powerful bomb exploded in a horse cart 
parked outside the J.P. Morgan & Company on Wall Street in the 
heart of the New York financial district⎯“the precise center, 
geographical as well as metaphorical, of financial America and even 
the financial world.”514  Thirty persons died on the scene and ten 
more succumbed later; hundreds were injured.515  Visitors to Wall 
Street can to this day see the exterior of the J.P. Morgan building 
pockmarked with holes from the blast.516  Until the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995, the Wall Street attack was the worst terrorist 
bombing in American history.517  No one was ever convicted, but as 
the New York Times reported a day later, “Federal, State and city 
authorities were agreed that the devastating blast signaled the long-
threatened Red outrages.”518  Minutes before the blast, circulars 
were placed in the mail a block away, reading: “Remember / We 
will not tolerate / any longer / Free the political / prisoners or it 
will be / sure death for all of you / American Anarchist Fighters.”519  
Nine days later, on September 25, Woodrow Wilson suffered a 
 510. Id. at 78. 
 511. Id. at 78–79. 
 512. Id. at 79 (omission in reprint). 
 513. Coben, supra note 503, at 60; REGIN SCHMIDT, RED SCARE: FBI AND THE 
ORIGINS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1919-1943, at 150 (2000). 
 514. JOHN BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA: A TRUE DRAMA OF WALL STREET 1920-
1938, at 1 (1969). 
 515. Id. at 2. 
 516. See generally Nathan Ward, The Fire Last Time: When Terrorists First Struck New 
York’s Financial District, 52 AM. HERITAGE 46 (Nov.-Dec. 2001). 
 517. Id. 
 518. Red Plot Seen in Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1920, at A–1. 
 519. BROOKS, supra note 514, at 11. 
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catastrophic stroke while traveling the country on his futile tour to 
urge ratification of the League of Nations.520 
America was in the throes of what became known as the Red 
Scare.521  In hindsight, it was a period of untempered panic.  No 
evidence emerged to prove that the violence was anything more 
than the exertions of a tiny number of extremists.  Understandably, 
however, the government at the time could not assume the attacks 
were isolated incidents, or the work of a few.  President McKinley 
had been assassinated in 1901 by a self-professed anarchist, who 
purportedly was moved to act after hearing Emma Goldman 
speak.522  Memories of the Haymarket bombings of 1886, also 
blamed on anarchists, had not faded.523  Bombings in general were 
not unusual in that era of widespread social unrest and violent 
relations between labor unions and companies.  Vigorous response 
may have been needed, but Attorney General Palmer was less than 
level-headed, as he was convinced that “vast organizations . . . were 
plotting to overthrow the government.”524 
On November 7, 1919 (the second anniversary of the Russian 
Revolution), the soon-to-be notorious “Palmer Raids” began.525  
Federal agents arrested 250 people in 11 cities and summarily 
deported them.526  In December, Emma Goldman was taken to Ellis 
Island, placed by U.S. Marines on a ship with 243 others who had 
been declared “dangerous reds,” and packed off to Russia.527  Gen. 
Leonard Wood, a well-known military figure from his days as a 
Rough Rider with Theodore Roosevelt in the Spanish-American 
 520. Ward, supra note 516, at 46. 
 521. See COBEN, supra note 507, at 196–216; see also DONALD O. JOHNSON, THE 
CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 119–148 (1963); SCHEIBER, supra note 411, at 52-58.  See 
generally W. ANTHONY GENGARELLY, DISTINGUISHED DISSENTERS AND THE OPPOSITION 
TO THE 1919-1920 RED SCARE (1996); JULIAN J. JAFFEE, CRUSADE AGAINST RADICALISM: 
NEW YORK DURING THE RED SCARE, 1914-1924 (1972); MURRAY, supra note 497; H.C. 
PETERSON & GILBERT C. FITE, OPPONENTS OF WAR, 1917-18 (1957); WILLIAM 
PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS 1903-1933 
(2d ed. 1994). 
 522. Leroy Parker, The Trial of the Anarchist Murderer Czolgosz, 11 Yale L.J. 80, 87 
(1901). 
 523. See Rabban, supra note 198, at 519. 
 524. Palmer, supra note 502, at 226. 
 525. See Coben, supra note 503, at 217-45; see also MURRAY, supra note 497, at 
210–22; PRESTON, supra note 521, at 208–37; Renshaw, supra note 414, at 69. 
 526. MURRAY, supra note 497, at 196–98. 
 527. Herbert Mitgang, Book of the Times: Emma Goldman, Queen of Causes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1989, § 1, p. 16. 
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War, and then a leading candidate for the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1920, declared that the radicals “should be put on a 
ship of stone with sails of lead and their first stopping place should 
be hell.”528 
Two months later, in a second set of raids, around 3,000 
individuals were arrested in many cities, along with seizures of 
“[a]ll literature, books, papers and anything hanging on the walls” 
in their premises.529  In thousands of these cases, no arrest or search 
warrants were obtained.530  The object evidently was not 
prosecution, but deportation of those with communist ties.  Most of 
the targets of these actions were thought by federal officials to be 
members of the Communist Party of America and the Communist 
Labor Party, both heavily comprised of non-citizens, principally 
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and Russia.531  
“Virtually every local Communist organization in the nation was 
affected; practically every member of the movement, national or 
local, was put under arrest.”532  “Federal agents stormed into every 
Communist (and many a non-Communist) meeting house in the 
nation and arrested everyone, citizens and aliens, Communists and 
non-Communists . . . and then tore the meeting houses apart.”533  
Aliens were tried in administrative deportation proceedings under 
legislation specifically targeting noncitizen anarchists, which the 
Court had upheld in a 1904 ruling, or under the Anarchist 
Exclusion Acts of 1918 and 1920, which authorized expulsion of 
anarchists and their ideological sympathizers.534  Agitators with 
American citizenship were referred to state officials for prosecution 
under their syndicalism laws.535  Palmer announced that he was 
“sweeping the nation clean of such alien filth,” although in the end 
only several hundred of those detained were deported.536  
 528. Id. 
 529. Instructions from Department of Justice to U.S. Attorneys, Dec. 27, 1919, 
quoted in COBEN, supra note 507, at 226. 
 530. Id. at 227. 
 531. Id. at 223. 
 532. MURRAY, supra note 497, at 213. 
 533. JOHNSON, supra note 521, at 141. 
 534. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); Mae M. Ngai, 
The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in 
the United States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 74 (2003); Developments in the 
Law Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 687–88 (1953). 
 535. MURRAY, supra note 497, at 213.  With the war over, the statutory bases for 
federal prosecution of radicals diminished. 
 536. Palmer, supra note 505, at 227; Ngai, supra note 534, at 74. 
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Nevertheless, the raids had “a devastating effect on the domestic 
radical movement.”537 
Three days after the first of the Palmer Raids, which had been 
greeted with widespread public approbation, the Court handed 
down its next Espionage Act decision, Abrams v. United States,538 a 
case that had been argued less than three weeks earlier.  Justice 
John H. Clarke, a progressive Democrat appointed by Wilson, 
authored the majority opinion upholding sentences of up to twenty 
years for Jacob Abrams and four other Russian-born anarchists.539  
Justice Clarke noted gratuitous biographical details about the 
defendants: “All of the five defendants were born in Russia.  They 
were intelligent, had considerable schooling, and at the time they 
were arrested they had lived in the United States terms varying 
from five to ten years, but none of them had applied for 
naturalization.”540  These were not one-hundred percent Americans.  
But they were smart enough to be dangerous.  Their offense 
consisted of distributing a few thousand copies of two leaflets in 
New York City (one in Yiddish)⎯many were delivered airborne by 
tossing them out windows.541  Although this activity took place 
during the war, the target of their jeremiad was American military 
intervention on behalf of the White armies fighting Russian 
Bolsheviks.542  Using militant Marxist rhetoric throughout, they 
condemned Wilson as “too much of a coward to come out openly 
and say: ‘We capitalistic nations cannot afford to have a proletarian 
republic in Russia.’”543  Another piece, written in Yiddish, exhorted: 
“Workers in the ammunition factories, you are producing bullets, 
bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the Germans, but also your 
dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom.”544  
Much of the prose seemingly came straight from a treasury of 
Bolshevik slogans and platitudes: 
The Russian Revolution cries: Workers of the World!  
Awake!  Rise!  Put down your enemy and mine!’  ‘Yes 
 537. MURRAY, supra note 497, at 220. 
 538. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 539. Id.  Originally six were arrested, but one died in police custody, allegedly 
from beatings.  See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Coastwise Voyager and the First 
Amendment: The Fighting Faiths of the Abrams Five, 69 B.U. L. REV. 897, 906 n.36 
(1989). 
 540. Id. at 617. 
 541. Id. at 618–21. 
 542. Id. at 620–25. 
 543. Id. at 620. 
 544. Id.  at 621. 
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friends, there is only one enemy of the workers of the 
world and that is CAPITALISM.’. . . 
We, the toilers of America, who believe in real liberty, 
shall pledge ourselves, in case the United States will 
participate in that bloody conspiracy against Russia, to 
create so great a disturbance that the autocrats of America 
shall be compelled to keep their armies at home, and not 
be able to spare any for Russia.’. . . 
‘Workers, our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be 
a general strike!  An open challenge only will let the 
government know that not only the Russian Worker fights 
for freedom, but also here in America lives the spirit of 
Revolution.’”545 
Justice Clark surmised that “[t]his is clearly an appeal to the 
‘workers’ of this country to arise and put down by force the 
government of the United States.”546  Surely, he wrote for the 
majority, the defendants’ purpose was to deflate patriotism and 
thereby discourage assistance for the war.547  By calling for a general 
strike, “The Rebels” (as they named themselves) must have wanted 
to paralyze the nation, with the consequence of halting munitions 
productions.  “The plain purpose of their propaganda was to 
excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, 
and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of 
embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the 
government in Europe.”548  It did not matter that The Rebels were 
trying to stop American intervention in Russia, or that they 
denounced the Germans and the Allies with equal vigor, for Clark 
responded that the only question was the probable effect of their 
writings.  The defendants’ actual knowledge of probable effects was 
inferred: 
Men must be held to have intended, and to be 
accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to 
produce.  Even if their primary purpose and intent was to 
aid the cause of the Russian Revolution, the plan of action 
which they adopted necessarily involved, before it could 
be realized, defeat of the war program of the United 
States.549 
 545. Id.  at 620–23 (emphasis omitted). 
 546. Id.  at 620. 
 547. Id. 
 548. Id. at 623 (emphasis added). 
 549. Id. at 621. 
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Abrams made merely a mention of the defendants’ First 
Amendment arguments.550  Clark dismissed the issue with a virtual 
wave of his hand: “This contention is sufficiently discussed and is 
definitely negatived in Schenck,” and that was it.551  Absent from the 
Court’s analysis was any discussion of whether the leafleting 
affected the war effort in the slightest.  There was barely any 
allusion to Holmes’ “clear and present danger” formula (for that 
matter, Holmes himself had not relied on it in Frohwerk).552  Abrams 
and the other defendants were members of a group of about a 
dozen men and women, all young, who had immigrated from 
Eastern Europe or Russia.  At trial, three of them testified “that 
they were ‘rebels,’ ‘revolutionists,’ ‘anarchists,’ that they did not 
believe in government in any form, and they declared that they had 
no interest whatever in the government of the United States.”553 
By themselves, the defendants in Abrams were unlikely to 
overthrow the government.  That was beside the point to the Court.  
They had sent out their circulars “in the greatest port of our land, 
from which great numbers of soldiers were at the time taking ship 
daily, and in which great quantities of war supplies of every kind 
were at the time being manufactured for transportation 
overseas.”554  Their aim, the Court thought, was something other 
than provoking a rational exchange of ideas about public policy.  It 
was to instigate revolt.  “This is not an attempt to bring about a 
change of administration by candid discussion,” Clark reminded 
readers.555  Or at least the jury could so conclude, he thought, and 
that was the main point of his opinion, which sharply limited 
appellate review of jury verdicts in subversive speech cases.556  As 
long as there was “some evidence, competent and substantial,” the 
Court would not second-guess the jury’s judgment that the 
defendants’ publications had a dangerous tendency to encourage 
resistance to the war and to curtail war-related manufacturing.557  
And “some evidence” was nothing more than the strident 
 550. Id. at 618–19. 
 551. Id. at 619. 
 552. Id. at 627. 
 553. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617–18.  See also RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: 
THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 4–5, 22–23 (1987). 
 554. Id. at 622. 
 555. Id. 
 556. Id. at 619–24. 
 557. Id. at 619. 
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statements in the circulars.558  Considering Abrams together with 
Schenck, First Amendment scholar Harry Kalven concluded that the 
Court’s outlook was unmistakable: “While the nation is at war 
serious, abrasive criticism of the war or of conscription is beyond 
constitutional protection.”559 
From the perspective of history, the most startling aspect of 
Abrams was not the majority opinion, but the dissent by Holmes, 
which Brandeis joined.560  What Holmes had to say, and Brandeis 
followed up on in later dissents, was at the time about as effective as 
shouting into the full force of a category five hurricane.  In the 
fullness of time, however, Holmes and Brandeis would prevail, 
though neither lived to see the fruits of their efforts.  Explaining 
why Holmes seemed to change his entire perspective on the First 
Amendment in a matter of months has been a minor industry in 
academia.  Or did he change his mind?  Holmes always insisted that 
his votes in the three cases were consistent.  Where Abrams went 
amiss, Holmes thought, was in misapplying the “clear and present 
danger” test that he had articulated in Schenck, and which he now 
elaborated again:  “It is only the present danger of immediate evil 
or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a 
limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not 
concerned.  Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change 
the mind of the country.”561  Notice the disjunctive or in the 
statement.  Speech could be sanctioned if there was “an intent to 
bring [an ‘immediate evil’] about,” regardless of its actual impact.562  
Urging others to violate the law was proscribed, Holmes apparently 
still thought, but the question remaining was the immediacy of the 
danger posed by the expression in question.563 
Holmes had never before stressed the immediacy of the 
danger provoked by speech⎯in neither Schenck nor Debs had the 
government offered any evidence of immediate danger.  In Abrams, 
he lampooned the “poor and puny anonymities”564 who styled 
themselves revolutionaries: “Now nobody can suppose that the 
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, 
 558. Id. at 624. 
 559. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 
147 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1989). 
 560. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 561. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
 562. Id. 
 563. Id. 
 564. Id. at 629. 
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without more, would present any immediate danger that its 
opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have 
any appreciable tendency to do so.”565 
As to intent, Holmes insisted that there must be a showing of 
“actual intent.”566  “I am aware,” he acknowledged, “that the word 
‘intent’ as vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion means no more 
than knowledge at the time of the act that the consequences said to 
be intended will ensue.”567  The proper use of intent for First 
Amendment purposes, he thought, was that “a deed is not done 
with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence is 
the aim of the deed.”568  Assuming that intent were established, “the 
most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could be 
inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for 
what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow.”569  At 
worst, “The Rebels” were “poor and puny anonymities,” who posed 
no threat to anyone.570  Holmes’ analysis of intent showed that he 
was still wedded to the notion that the publications should be 
judged by the standard of criminal attempts.  “Publishing those 
opinions for the very purpose of obstructing, however, might 
indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of 
an attempt.”571  Despite Holmes’ continued reliance on his views 
about attempted crime, the position he took in Abrams represented 
a critical change from what he had written in Schenck, when he 
wrote, “Of course the document would not have been sent unless it 
had been intended to have some effect.”572  Starting with Abrams, 
Holmes would no longer rely solely on the text of the speech to 
reveal the speaker’s intent.  Rather, he required some independent 
evidence to reveal the actual state of mind of Jacob Abrams and his 
comrades.573 
All of this was a lead into the portion of Holmes’ dissent that is 
most often quoted and scrutinized.  In one long paragraph, 
Holmes laid out his philosophy of free expression, which was 
premised on the need for a free “marketplace of ideas”: 
 565. Id. at 628. 
 566. Id. 
 567. Id. at 626. 
 568. Id. at 627. 
 569. Id. at 629. 
 570. Id. 
 571. Id. at 628. 
 572. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919). 
 573. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628. 
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Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical.  If you have no doubt of your premises or 
your power and want a certain result with all your heart 
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away 
all opposition . . . . But when men have realized that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment.  Every year if not 
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some 
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.  While that 
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression 
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required to save the country.574 
If Holmes meant his description of “the theory of our 
Constitution” to be a summary of the actual intent of the framers of 
the First Amendment, it can at best be termed romantic in view of 
the limited protection afforded to expression in the eighteenth 
century.  No, this was Holmes’ reconsidered view of speech 
freedoms, and his metaphor about experimentation reflected 
Holmes’ disdain for moral absolutes and his parallel partiality to 
pragmatism.575 
Holmes proposed a simple test to ascertain if speech had gone 
beyond the pale of constitutional protection.  “Only the emergency 
that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil 
counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping 
command, ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech.’”576  Speech may be suppressed, in other words, if there is 
no opportunity for opposing speech to counter its malevolent 
tendencies.  On that count, the Sedition Act of 1798 did not pass 
muster: “I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government 
 574. Id. at 630 (emphasis added). 
 575. See supra text accompanying notes 442–60. 
 576. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31. 
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that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel 
in force.  History seems to me against the notion.  I had conceived 
that the United States through many years had shown its 
repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . by repaying fines that it 
imposed.”577  As already noted, Justice Brennan would say virtually 
the same thing years later in New York Times v. Sullivan, and the 
same rejoinder in order: History is not a court.578  Nothing after the 
original acts can change what happened or the meaning of the 
events to those alive when they transpired.579 
Whatever Holmes said to the contrary, his attitudes about free 
expression certainly did change rather abruptly between his 
opinions of March 1919 in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs, and his 
dissent the subsequent November in Abrams.  Multiple influences 
have been proposed to explain the transformation.  Holmes had 
private conversations and correspondence with Judge Learned 
Hand in New York, who had written a controversial opinion as a 
district judge proposing an alternative to the natural and probable 
tendency standard.580  In 1917, Hand ruled in Masses Publishing Co. 
v. Patten that words could be penalized under the Espionage Act 
only if they amount to a “direct incitement to violent resistance. . . .  
If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their 
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to 
have attempted to cause its violation.”581  Hand was interpreting a 
statute, yet in the process he had floated an alternative to the 
natural tendency approach.  Hand’s approach focused on whether 
certain words were uttered, rather than their effect under the 
circumstances.  Judicially, Hand’s idea went nowhere at the time, as 
he was overruled by the Second Circuit and ordered to use the 
natural and probable tendency test.582  In later years he abandoned 
the idea himself.  But what he wrote in Masses Publishing ripped the 
prevailing First Amendment doctrine to its foundations: 
[T]o arouse discontent and disaffection among the 
people with the prosecution of the war and with the draft 
 577. Id. at 630. 
 578. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
 579. Id. 
 580. See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975) 
(discussing the Holmes-Hand relationship). 
 581. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d 
Cir. 1917). 
 582. Masses, 246 F. at 37. 
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tends to promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper 
among the troops.  This, too, is true; men who become 
satisfied that they are engaged in an enterprise dictated by 
the unconscionable selfishness of the rich, and 
effectuated by a tyrannous disregard for the will of those 
who must suffer and die, will be more prone to 
insubordination than those who have faith in the cause 
and acquiesce in the means.  Yet to interpret the word 
‘cause’ so broadly would, as before, involve necessarily as a 
consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism, and 
of all opinion except what encouraged and supported the 
existing policies, or which fell within the range of 
temperate argument.583 
Judge Hand wished, as he wrote privately, for “a qualitative 
formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade.”584  As for Holmes’ 
alternative, Hand found it wanting: “I am not wholly in love with 
Holmesy’s test . . . . Once you admit that the matter is one of 
degree . . . you give to Tomdickandharry, D.J., so much latitude 
that the jig is at once up.”585  Capping that, he reminded Holmes 
that the members of the Court were themselves not immune to 
bias: “Besides . . . the Nine Elder Statesmen, have not shown 
themselves wholly immune from the ‘herd instinct’ and what seems 
‘immediate and direct’ to-day may seem very remote next year even 
though the circumstances surrounding the utterance be 
unchanged.”586  Hand appreciated that the judiciary itself could not 
be trusted in times of national crisis to uphold First Amendment 
rights, and tight doctrinal nets needed to be woven to forestall 
abuses.587  His concerns have preoccupied much of modern First 
Amendment law, as the Court has endeavored to erect fences of 
rules that cannot be evaded easily by any kind of official action. 
Holmes’ may have been influenced by the withering academic 
fire directed at his pre-Abrams’ opinions from several noted 
academics.  Most intriguing is the relationship between Holmes 
and a young Harvard Law School professor, Zechariah Chafee, who 
had been introduced to Holmes by Hand (the Tomdickandharry 
letter was from Hand to Chafee).  Chafee had opened his attack on 
 583. Masses, 244 F. at 539–40. 
 584. Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921) quoted 
in Gunther, supra note 580, at 770. 
 585. Id. 
 586. Id. 
 587. Id. 
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the Court’s speech cases with a short essay in the New Republic 
magazine in 1918, followed by a path-breaking article in the 
Harvard Law Review in 1919, Freedom of Speech in War Time; he 
expanded this article into a highly influential book, Freedom of 
Speech published in 1920.588  The premise of Chafee’s argument was 
that freedom of speech served “[o]ne of the most important 
purposes of society and government,” namely “the spread of truth 
on subjects of general concern.  This is possible only through 
unlimited discussion.”589 
Chafee’s ideas fit well with Holmes’s personal philosophy, 
which combined skepticism about ultimate knowledge and faith in 
the scientific method of testing theories publicly as the best 
approximation of truth.  His dissent in Abrams hinged on the 
pursuit of truth as the desideratum of speech⎯the best test of 
truth, he had said, was the test of the marketplace.  That part came 
not so much from Chafee, as it did John Stuart Mill, the English 
utilitarian whom Holmes had met as a young man, and whose 
philosophy of free expression could be detected in the Abrams’ 
dissent.  Mill had argued in On Liberty, that 
[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by 
authority may possibly be true.  Those who desire to 
suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not 
infallible.  They have no authority to decide the question 
for all mankind . . . . All silencing of discussion is an 
assumption of infallibility.590 
Human error was self-correcting if there was unlimited 
discussion, Mill had written, because a person “is capable of 
rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience.  Not by 
experience alone.  There must be discussion, to show how 
experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices 
gradually yield to fact and argument.”591 
Holmes had known about Mill’s theories for decades, yet he 
previously had ignored the Englishman’s philosophy in his legal 
writing, presumably because Mills was not stating the law as it 
existed, only as it should be.592  Chafee convinced Holmes⎯again, 
 588. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 69 (1920). 
 589. Id. 
 590. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) 
(1859).  See HOWE, supra note 483, at 226–29 for a discussion of Holmes’ meeting 
with Mill. 
 591. Id. at 80. 
 592. See Bogen, supra note 481, at 113–15. 
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quite inaccurately⎯that Blackstone did not correctly state the law 
of free speech as it had developed in America.  In a letter to Chafee 
in 1922, which responded to the professor’s inquiry as to the origin 
of the term “clear and present danger,” Holmes replied hastily: 
The expression that you refer to was not helped by any 
book that I know⎯I think it came without doubt after the 
later cases (and probably you⎯I do not remember 
exactly) had taught me that in the earlier Paterson [sic] 
case, if that was the name of it, I had taken Blackstone . . . 
as well founded, wrongly.  I surely was ignorant. But I did 
think hard on the matter of attempts in my Common Law 
and a Mass case, later in the Swift case (U.S.) And I 
thought it out unhelped . . . .  And much later I found an 
English . . . case in which one of the good judges had 
expressed this notion in a few words.593 
Ultimately only so much can be done to probe a judge’s 
reasons for adopting a new course of thinking about a subject, 
especially when the subjects insist that they hadn’t changed their 
minds.  Perhaps they weren’t even aware that they were doing so.  
These were tense years, and Holmes and the other Justices felt 
multiple pressures.  The war had ended, but bombs were exploding 
at home.  Agriculture was in the dumps.  Mass strikes hit 
everywhere.  The war had been backed by progressive intellectuals 
and politicians, who loathed ceding to judges the task of 
articulating social interests, since that was precisely what they saw as 
the flaw in the Lochner line of cases.  Progressives, however, began 
to voice doubts about the European venture as the American death 
tolls grew to staggering numbers.  The repression of dissent and 
the rise of intolerance were unmistakable and would get worse. 
That Holmes’ words fell mostly on deaf ears became apparent 
in March 1920, when the Court sustained Espionage Act 
convictions in two more cases.594  Both involved allegations that they 
published “false reports” harmful to military success and 
recruiting.595  In Schaefer v. United States, the defendants received 
sentences of up to five years for publishing two German-language 
newspapers that caustically attacked American intervention in the 
 593. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 
1922) (Chafee Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Box 14, Folder 12), quoted in 
Bogen, supra note 481, at 100. 
 594. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 
251 U.S. 466 (1920). 
 595. Pierce, 252 U.S. at 242; Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 468. 
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war.596  By their account, recruiting was a failure because American 
men did not wish to fight “to satisfy British lust for the mastery of 
the world.”597  Justice McKenna took this remark and others of a 
similar nature to be “willfully false,” in that they depicted the war as 
contrary to the wishes of the people and “the result of the 
machinations of executive power.”598  One article, a reprint from 
another source, was picked out by McKenna as an exemplar of a 
number of purportedly falsified accounts.599  It reported a speech by 
Senator Robert La Follette, who had urged that the war be 
financed by taxes on the rich who profited from the war, lest the 
people find themselves in “bread lines.”600  Defendants’ newspaper 
changed the last words to “bread riots.”601  That altered the 
meaning profoundly, McKenna contended, from a mild statement 
about wartime sacrifices to a prophesy of “turbulent resistance.”602  
Referring to Americans as “Yankees,” another article lambasted 
their “spiritual quality”⎯Yankees had “a capacity for lying, which is 
able to conceal to a remarkable degree a lack of thought behind a 
superfluity of words.”603  This was said to deflate assurances by the 
Wilson administration that the United States would send an 
enormous force to defeat the Germans⎯the newspaper referred to 
this move as a “Yankee Bluff” that was belied by the failure of 
recruiting and conscription.604  In sustaining most of the 
convictions, the Court approved a jury instruction that invited the 
panel “to call upon the fund of general information which is in 
your keeping.”605  No evidence was introduced by the government 
tending to show the falsity of the articles.606  But a jury could find, 
based on their common knowledge, that “[t]he tendency of the 
articles and their efficacy were enough” to establish both criminal 
intent and an illegal attempt to frustrate the war effort.607 
 596. Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 468, 482. 
 597. Id. at 480. 
 598. Id. at 481. 
 599. Id. 
 600. Id. 
 601. Id. 
 602. Id. 
 603. Id. at 478. 
 604. Id. 
 605. Id. at 473. 
 606. Id. at 472. 
 607. Id. at 479. 
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Schaefer prompted the first of several dissenting opinions by 
Justice Brandeis on the subject of free expression.608  Brandeis, as 
Holmes had done earlier, rebuked the majority for not following 
the clear and present danger test.609  No proof was offered, nor even 
suggested, he argued, tending to show that the articles could have 
interfered with the military or caused a dereliction of duty.610  
Instead, the prosecution was an effort at thought control: “The jury 
. . . must have supposed it to be within their province to condemn 
men, not merely for disloyal acts, but for a disloyal heart: provided 
only that the disloyal heart was evidenced by some utterance.”611  
Inevitably, the convictions would serve as warnings to others, and 
“doubtless discourage criticism of the policies of the 
government.”612 
A week later, the Court decided the last of its cases that term 
involving prosecutions under the Espionage Act.  Pierce v. United 
States613 proved beyond doubt that a majority of the Court would 
uphold convictions for doing nothing other than aggressively 
questioning of the basis for the war.614  It also would be the last 
straw for Justice Brandeis, who could not accept the imprisonment 
of people for expressing a partisan opinion about a matter of the 
gravest national importance.615 
The defendants were members of the Albany, New York 
branch of the Socialist Party.616  They obtained a four-page 
pamphlet from the national party, titled “The Price We Pay,” 
written by Irwin St. John Tucker, a controversial Episcopalian priest 
who integrated socialism into a religion based on the tenets of the 
Anglican Church.617  Tucker himself had been convicted under the 
Espionage Act in a separate case and sentenced to twenty years.618  
Much of his paper questioned America’s motives for entering the 
war and depicted a dire future for the soldiers who were sent to the 
 608. Id. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 609. Id. 
 610. Id. at 493. 
 611. Id. 
 612. Id. at 494. 
 613. 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
 614. Id. 
 615. Id. at 253 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 616. Id. at 247 (majority opinion). 
 617. Id. 
 618. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 27 (1921); Berger v. United States, 
275 F. 1021, 1021 (7th Cir. 1921). 
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war.619  Tucker featured gruesome visual imagery in his writing: 
Into that seething, heaving swamp of torn flesh and 
floating entrails they will be plunged, in regiments, 
divisions and armies, screaming as they go. 
Agonies of torture will rend their flesh from their sinews, 
will crack their bones and dissolve their lungs; every pang 
will be multiplied in its passage 
to you. 
Black death will be a guest at every American fireside.  
Mothers and fathers and sisters, wives and sweethearts will 
know the weight of that awful vacancy left by the bullet 
which finds its mark.620 
Unlike other provocateurs who urged or implied defiance of 
the military, Tucker practically sneered as he informed men that 
they were powerless to resist: “You cannot avoid it; you are being 
dragged, whipped, lashed, hurled into it; Your flesh and brains and 
entrails must be crushed out of you and poured into that mass of 
festering decay; It is the price you pay for your stupidity—you who 
have rejected Socialism.”621 
This possibly may have been one of the most ill-conceived 
political recruitment strategies ever devised, but that was its 
ostensive purpose.  Enclosed in many of the flyers were additional 
sheets with information on joining in the Socialist Party.622 
The Albany Socialists waited to distribute copies of Tucker’s 
diatribe until the outcome of a federal trial in Baltimore, which 
also was considering the lawfulness of the same writing.623  After 
that trial resulted in a directed acquittal, the Albany contingent 
proceeded with their distribution, placing hundreds of copies on 
doorsteps in Albany.624  Prudent as they may have been in waiting 
for the Baltimore ruling, the defendants nonetheless were 
convicted under the Act for making false reports based on alleged 
falsehoods in Tucker’s work and for attempting or conspiring to 
disrupt military operations.625 
Tucker’s screed contained a series of assertions that, if taken as 
 619. See Pierce, 252 U.S. at 245–46. 
 620. Id. 
 621. Id. at 246. 
 622. Id. at 248. 
 623. Id. 
 624. Id. 
 625. Id. at 240. 
85
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
858 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
literal statements of fact, could be questioned for veracity.626  For 
example: “Our entry into [the war] was determined by the certainty 
that if the Allies do not win, J. P. Morgan’s loans to the Allies will be 
repudiated, and those American investors who bit on his promises 
would be hooked.”627  Justice Mahlon Pitney’s majority viewed this 
exuberant prose literally, intended “to produce a belief that our 
participation in the war was the product of sordid and sinister 
motives, rather than a design to protect the interests and maintain 
the honor of the United States.”628  Rather the opposite was true of 
the American entry into the war, Pitney asserted, and moreover the 
defendants must have known it: 
Common knowledge (not to mention the President’s 
address to Congress of April 2, 1917, and the Joint 
Resolution of April 6 declaring war . . . which were 
introduced in evidence) would have sufficed to show at 
least that the statements as to the causes that led to the 
entry of the United States into the war against Germany 
were grossly false, and such common knowledge went to 
prove also that defendants knew they were untrue. 629 
Whether or not one was convicted depended on the “common 
knowledge” of a jury as understood by judges, which was a system 
that easily could produce inconsistent adjudications concerning the 
same publication.  Juries also were assigned the task of determining 
if “the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate result a 
material interference with the recruiting or enlistment service, or 
the operation or success of the forces of the United States,” based 
on “all the circumstances of the time and considering the place and 
manner of distribution.”630  Critics of the war had to choose their 
words carefully.  Hyperbole and metaphor could send one to 
prison.631 
Brandeis again dissented with a methodical dissection of the 
majority’s opinion.632 (Holmes joined him, but wrote nothing.)633  
To begin with, Brandeis wrote, Tucker’s contentions were “in 
essence matters of opinion and judgment, not matters of fact to be 
 626. See id. at 245–47. 
 627. Id. at 247. 
 628. Id. at 249–50. 
 629. Id. at 251. 
 630. Id. at 250. 
 631. See id. 
 632. Id. at 253 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 633. Id. 
86
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 859 
 
determined by a jury.”634  To tackle the assertion that the war was 
being fought to assure repayment of loans made by J. P. Morgan, 
Brandeis quoted similar statements in the congressional record by 
Senators and Representatives.635  President Wilson, “himself a 
historian,” Brandeis noted, “said before he was President and 
repeated in the New Freedom that: ‘The masters of the 
government of the United States are the combined capitalists and 
manufacturers of the United States.’”636  In any event, Brandeis 
thought there was no evidence that the defendants themselves were 
aware of any falsities in Tucker’s presentation: “They were mere 
distributors of the leaflet. It had been prepared by a man of some 
prominence.”637  Nor did they act rashly, intending to break the 
law—they waited until a federal judge had cleared the pamphlet.638  
Finally, it could hardly be claimed that they created a clear and 
present danger to the prosecution of the war, inasmuch as “the 
leaflet, far from counseling disobedience to law, points to the 
hopelessness of protest . . . and indicates that acquiescence is a 
necessity.”639 
Pierce and Schaeffer were turning points for Louis Brandeis.  In 
1921, he told Professor Felix Frankfurter in a recorded 
conversation that “I have never been quite happy about my 
concurrence in [the] Debs and Schenck cases.  I had not then 
thought the issues of freedom of speech out⎯I thought at the 
subject, not through it.  Not until I came to write the Pierce and 
Schaeffer dissents did I understand it.”640  Brandeis also believed that 
it would have been better to reserve the “clear and present danger” 
standard for peacetime.641  It would have been wiser to justify the 
Espionage Act convictions as justified “frankly on the war power . . . 
and then the scope of espionage legislation would be confined to 
war.  But in peace the protection against restriction on freedom of 
speech would be unabated.”642  In wartime, “all bets are off.”643 
 634. Id. at 269. 
 635. Id. at n.4. 
 636. Id. at 270–71 (quoting WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR 
THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 57 (1921)). 
 637. Id. at 270. 
 638. Id. at 271. 
 639. Id. at 272. 
 640. Conversation between Felix Frankfurter and Louis Brandeis (Aug. 8, 
1921) (transcript available at Harvard Law School Library, Louis D. Brandeis 
Papers, Box 114, Folder 14), quoted in RABBAN, supra note 210, at 362–63. 
 641. Id. 
 642. Id. 
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State governments also had been active in suppressing political 
speech since the end of the century, when anti-anarchism laws were 
enacted following the Haymarket bombing.644  President McKinley’s 
assassination had led to enactment of criminal syndicalism statutes 
that were specifically aimed at stopping efforts to overthrow 
government by force or violence.645  Following McKinley’s murder, 
there were hundreds of state prosecutions under syndicalism laws 
to counter anarchist speech. States passed new statutes to deal with 
anarchists and Bolsheviks.  When America entered the World War 
I, many states supplemented the Espionage Act with their own 
versions.646  By 1920 thirty-two states had passed statutes outlawing 
seditious utterances or display of the red flag, which was considered 
a symbol of anarchism or Bolshevism.647  Minnesota made it a crime 
to publicly “advocate or teach by word of mouth or otherwise that 
men should not enlist in the military or naval forces of the United 
States or the state of Minnesota.”648  A separate section made it 
unlawful to teach or advocate “that the citizens of this state should 
not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or carrying on war 
with the public enemies of the United States.”649 
One case reached the Court to review a conviction under 
Minnesota’s act: Gilbert v. Minnesota,650 decided in the closing days 
of 1920.  Joseph Gilbert was an official of the Nonpartisan League, 
a populist farmers’ organization centered in the upper Midwest 
and Northwestern states.651  At a public meeting of the league in 
1917, Gilbert delivered a speech in which he derided President 
Wilson’s claim that the war would “make the world safe for 
democracy.”652  America itself was not exactly democratic, Gilbert 
responded: 
Have you had anything to say as to whether we would go 
into this war?  You know you have not.  If this is such a 
 643. Id. 
 644. Wiecek, supra note 496, at 382; see also RABBAN, supra note 210, at 25. 
 645. Id. at 382–83. 
 646. See, e.g., 1917 Minn. Laws §§ 8521-2 to 8521-5.  See also David M. Rabban, 
The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1304 
(1983). 
 647. See MURRAY, supra note 497, at 233–34. 
 648. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 326–27 (1920) (quoting 1917 Minn. 
Laws §§ 8521-2 to 8521-5). 
 649. Id.  See also SCHEIBER, supra note 411, at 54. 
 650. 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
 651. Id. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 652. Id. at 327 (majority opinion). 
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good democracy, for Heaven’s sake why should we not 
vote on conscription of men?  We were stampeded into 
this war by newspaper rot to pull England’s chestnuts out 
of the fire for her. I tell you if they conscripted wealth like 
they have conscripted men, this war would not last over 
forty-eight hours.653 
The speech was not especially well received by its immediate 
audience, as Justice McKenna reported in his majority opinion: 
“There were protesting interruptions, also accusations and threats 
against him, disorder, and intimations of violence.”654  Nevertheless, 
Gilbert was convicted under the statute and served a year in jail.655 
In upholding Gilbert’s conviction, Justice McKenna’s opinion 
perceived the statute as “a simple exertion of the police power to 
preserve the peace of the state.”656  The audience’s hostile reaction 
to the speech justified the law as an exercise of the state’s police 
power to prevent violence.  Assuming for sake of argument, that 
the First Amendment applied to a state law, Gilbert’s declamation 
went beyond the bounds of a citizen’s right to discuss public policy:  
“Gilbert’s speech had the purpose they denounce.  The nation was 
at war with Germany, armies were recruiting, and the speech was 
the discouragement of that—its purpose was necessarily the 
discouragement of that.”657  McKenna added that “every word that 
he uttered in denunciation of the war was false, was deliberate 
misrepresentation of the motives which impelled it, and the objects 
for which it was prosecuted.”658  It was seditious libel, plain and 
simple.  That was restrictive enough of public opposition to the 
war, but McKenna’s suggestion that speech could be quashed 
because it provoked an adverse audience reaction had even more 
far-reaching implications.  Anyone presenting a controversial thesis 
might be silenced⎯arrested⎯on account of a crowd’s unruly 
actions. 
Justice Brandeis contributed the only dissent on the First 
Amendment aspects of the case.659  (Holmes, inexplicably, 
concurred in the judgment upholding Gilbert’s conviction).660  
 653. Id. 
 654. Id. at 331. 
 655. Id. at 333. 
 656. Id. at 331. 
 657. Id. at 333. 
 658. Id. 
 659. Id. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 660. Id.  (Holmes, J., concurring). 
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Minnesota’s law was striking in its breadth, Brandeis emphasized.661  
A conviction was possible even if the advocacy was “wholly futile 
and no obstruction resulted.”662  It did not matter what the 
speaker’s intent happened to be.  Even if the speaker was giving 
career advice to young men⎯advising them to pursue the civil 
service, farming, or a profession as ways to serve their country⎯a 
violation would occur.  (If enforced today, someone counseling 
against enlisting in the National Guard because of the possibility of 
extended overseas combat deployment could be found guilty.)  
And, unlike the Espionage Act, the state law remained in force 
when “the United States was at peace with all the world.”663  “It 
abridges freedom of speech and of the press, not in a particular 
emergency, in order to avert a clear and present danger, but under 
all circumstances.”664  It applied even in the privacy of a home.  
Religiously motivated pacifists would run afoul of the law by 
advising their children not to enlist.  For Brandeis, this was a law 
that “aims to prevent, not acts, but beliefs.”665 
Regarding Minnesota’s purported need to maintain public 
order, Brandeis countered that for democracy to function the 
citizen must have the right to speak or write about governmental 
affairs, “to teach the truth as he sees it.”666  Political conflict was 
inevitable and actually could be healthy for a nation: “Like the 
course of the heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a 
resultant of the struggle between contending forces. In frank 
expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise of 
wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily 
the greatest peril.”667  Brandeis implicitly balanced the possibility of 
turmoil against the advantages of candid commentary about the 
course of public affairs, with the scale tipping toward the latter in 
the absence of a clear and present danger.668  Borrowing from 
Holmes’ dissent in Abrams, he said that the question to ask was 
 661. See id. at 334–43. 
 662. Id. at 341. 
 663. Id. 
 664. Id. at 334. 
 665. Id. at 335. 
 666. Id. at 338. 
 667. Id. 
 668. See id. 
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whether there was time for error to be conquered by truth.669  If 
there was, repression of the speech was not allowed.670 
For the remainder of the 1920s, state cases provided the grist 
for the Court’s First Amendment rulings, all of which involved 
radicals of one type or another.  Most of these were reviews of 
convictions under the criminal syndicalism statutes described 
previously.  During 1919 and 1920 alone, the height of the Red 
Scare, some 1400 individuals were arrested under state syndicalism 
and sedition laws, with hundreds convicted.671  New York’s statute, 
which was enacted in 1902, became the subject of one of the 
Court’s most important First Amendment rulings, Gitlow v. New 
York.672  The legislation defined “criminal anarchy” as “the doctrine 
that organized government should be overthrown by force or 
violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the 
executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means.”673  It 
was a felony in New York to “advocate[]” anarchism or to 
“advocate[], advise[], or teach[] the duty, necessity or propriety” of 
toppling the government by force or by assassination of officials.674  
Publishing or distributing anarchist literature was likewise a 
felony.675  Note the contrast between the legislative means used 
here and in the Espionage Act.  The latter made it illegal to 
accomplish certain substantive acts, such as disrupting recruiting; 
speech could be punished if it attempted to incite others to engage 
in the criminal act.  New York’s statute, like Minnesota’s in Gilbert, 
prescribed specific assertions.  In Minnesota, one could not “teach 
or advocate” that a man should not join the army or navy.676  New 
York law, by directly prohibiting certain words, did not allow a 
person to advocate the theory that a government should be 
overthrown by violence.677  Selling a copy of John Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Government, in theory, could earn one a trip to Sing Sing.  
Locke not only defended the peoples’ ultimate right of rebellion, a 
view endorsed by American revolutionaries in 1776, but he 
 669. Id. 
 670. Id. 
 671. ROBERT J. GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 
1870 TO THE PRESENT 147 (1978). 
 672. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160–61 (1909), quoted in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 654–55 (1925). 
 673. Id. § 160. 
 674. Id. § 161. 
 675. Id. 
 676. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 326 (1920). 
 677. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160 (1909). 
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specifically stated that the book was dedicated to defending the 
Glorious Revolution.678 
Although aimed at anarchists, who usually espoused the 
elimination of government as people knew it, the New York law 
eventually snared quite another animal, the revolutionary 
socialist.679  In June 1919, the “mainstream” Socialist Party 
underwent a schism that created the Left Wing Section of the party, 
a group that embraced militant, revolutionary action to achieve a 
socialist society.680  In short order, the Left Wing would bifurcate 
into the Communist Party of America and the Communist Labor 
Party, with a combined membership of around 70,000; they merged 
in 1923 as the Communist Party of the United States.681  Benjamin 
Gitlow was a board member and business manager of the Left 
Wing’s newspaper, The Revolutionary Age.682  Tucked into each of the 
16,000 copies of the first edition of the paper was the “Manifesto” 
of the Left Wing.683  On account of his role in these publishing 
activities, Gitlow was convicted under the New York act.684 
As Justice Edward T. Sanford related in his majority opinion, 
the Manifesto 
advocated, in plain and unequivocal language, the 
necessity of accomplishing the ‘Communist Revolution’ 
by a militant and ‘revolutionary Socialism,’ based on ‘the 
class struggle’ and mobilizing the ‘power of the proletariat 
in action,’ through mass industrial revolts developing into 
mass political strikes and ‘revolutionary mass action,’ for 
the purpose of conquering and destroying the 
parliamentary state and establishing in its place, through a 
‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat,’ the system 
of Communist Socialism.685 
Despite the stridency, Sanford conceded that “[t]here was no 
evidence of any effect resulting from the publication and 
 678. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 386 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., 1952) (1690). 
 679. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 655–56 (1925). 
 680. Id. at 655–56. 
 681. MURRAY, supra note 497, at 51–53, 277. 
 682. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 655.  Gitlow was the co-founder of the Communist 
Labor Party and the vice-presidential candidate of the Communist Party in 1924 
and 1928.  MURRAY, supra note 497, at 51, 277. 
 683. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 655–56. 
 684. Id. at 654. 
 685. Id. at 657–58. 
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circulation of the Manifesto.”686  And the absence of effect was 
Gitlow’s principal defense.687  It was to no avail.  Regardless of the 
publication’s effectiveness, the Court held that “a State may 
penalize utterances which openly advocate the overthrow of the 
representative and constitutional form of government of the 
United States and the several States, by violence or other unlawful 
means.”688  Inherently, words of this nature “involve danger to the 
public peace and to the security of the State.  They threaten 
breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution.”689  That “the effect 
of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen” was irrelevant:  
“A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering 
for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive 
conflagration.”690  Indubitably, the state need not wait until the 
flames engulf it; rather, it may “suppress the threatened danger in 
its incipiency.”691 
But what about “clear and present danger”?  At least in the 
Espionage Act cases the Court had judged the defendants’ 
expressions in relation to something specific, such as interfering 
with recruiting.  That approach was inapposite to the situation in 
Gitlow, Justice Sanford responded, “where the legislative body itself 
has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising 
from utterances of a specified character.”692  Cases like Schenck, 
Frohwerk and Abrams involved a prohibited substantive result 
(frustrating the war effort), and “the general provisions of the 
statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance of 
the defendant if its natural tendency and probable effect was to 
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might 
prevent.”693  New York’s legislature, by contrast, had “previously 
determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances 
of a specified character.”694  The state had banned specific words, and 
a conviction could be obtained regardless of their actual 
consequences on a given occasion (note the similarity to Hand’s 
 686. Id. at 656. 
 687. Id. at 664.  Surely it is a sorry revolutionary who resorts to arguing that his 
propaganda is ineffectual.  Gitlow, as it happens, later became a crusading anti-
communist.  
 688. Id. at 668. 
 689. Id. at 669. 
 690. Id. 
 691. Id. 
 692. Id. at 671. 
 693. Id. 
 694. Id. 
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approach).695 
Gitlow did not directly hold that the First Amendment was 
applicable to the states.  “For present purposes,” Justice Sanford 
assumed that “the First Amendment . . . [was] among the 
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by 
the States.”696  Sanford did not explain the reason for this 
assumption, aside from citing several substantive due process cases 
upholding liberty of contract.697  He gave no explanation for these 
references, although he seems to have meant that inasmuch as 
liberty of contract was grounded in the Due Process Clause under 
Lochner v. New York, and thereby restrained state power, then surely 
speech and press rights must be implied from the same 
constitutional text.698  After Gitlow, the Court invariably held that 
the First Amendment applied to the states, without extensive 
justification.  “It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the 
press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by 
state action,” Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote in the 1931 
case, Near v. Minnesota.699  Citing nothing other than the previous 
cases in which the application of the First Amendment had merely 
been asserted, Hughes opined that the Court had “found [it] 
impossible to conclude that this essential personal liberty of the 
citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of 
fundamental rights of person and property.”700  If liberty of contract 
could be inferred from the Due Process Clause, it was embarrassing 
not to acknowledge free speech as a fundamental liberty.  As 
Brandeis had written in his Gilbert dissent, “I cannot believe that the 
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only 
liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”701 
In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products702 in 1938, 
Justice Stone suggested another basis for applying the First 
Amendment to the states: it protects against “legislation which 
 695. See id. at 654. 
 696. Id. at 666. 
 697. Id. at 666 n.9. 
 698. At least these rights are specifically mentioned in the Constitution, 
whereas the same could not be said of liberty of contract. 
 699. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). 
 700. Id. 
 701. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 702. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected 
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation. . . .”703  Stone gave 
this hint in the course of explaining why a trade restriction would 
be subject only to rational basis review.704  If in the post-Lochner era 
the reasonableness of laws was left to the judgment of elected 
officials or their designees, then free speech was essential to inform 
their decisions. 
Practically speaking, the application of the First Amendment 
to the states made no immediate difference, for as Justice Sanford 
wrote in Gitlow: 
[T]he freedom of speech and of the press which is 
secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute 
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever 
one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license 
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and 
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this 
freedom.705   
To be specific, “a State in the exercise of its police power may 
punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the 
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or 
disturb the public peace, is not open to question.”706  Again, the 
illusive notion of the “police power” was the determinative 
justification for the result.  Sanford did not mention the possible 
value that Gitlow’s speech might have had, or the value of other 
kinds of content that could be banned by a legislature under the 
Court’s doctrine.  As Sanford candidly stated, “the State is primarily 
the judge of regulations required in the interest of public safety 
and welfare.”707  Deference to the state was not total, but it was 
heavy.  Here the state was acting from the most primal of 
groundings: “In short this freedom does not deprive a State of the 
primary and essential right of self preservation; which, so long as 
human governments endure, they cannot be denied.”708 
This time it was Holmes who dissented, with Brandeis tagging 
along.709  Holmes disregarded the majority’s deference to the 
legislature entirely and wrote as if the clear and present danger 
 703. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 704. Id. at 152. 
 705. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 706. Id. at 667. 
 707. Id. at 668 (quoting Great N. Ry. v. Clara City, 246 U. S. 434, 439 (1918)). 
 708. Id. 
 709. Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.). 
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standard were the applicable law.710  Moreover, he embellished the 
standard considerably.  In Gitlow’s case, “there was no present 
danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the 
part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defendant’s 
views.”711  It was all talk, to which a much higher standard should 
attach than for actions: “If the publication of this document had 
been laid as an attempt to induce an uprising against government 
at once and not at some indefinite time in the future it would have 
presented a different question.”712  What about Sanford’s argument 
that Gitlow’s publications were incitements to illegal actions?  To 
this, Holmes responded with one of the most eloquent monologues 
of his career: 
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it 
was an incitement.  Every idea is an incitement . . . . The 
only difference between the expression of an opinion and 
an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s 
enthusiasm for the result.  Eloquence may set fire to 
reason.  But whatever may be thought of the redundant 
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present 
conflagration.  If in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by 
the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning 
of free speech is that they should be given their chance 
and have their way.713 
Holmes here articulated a much more nuanced theory of the 
First Amendment than he revealed in prior opinions.  He also 
discarded any doubts that the Amendment applied to the states, 
although he allowed that the states might be given “a somewhat 
larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress,” 
considering “the sweeping language that governs or ought to 
govern the laws of the United States.”714  By “present danger,” 
Holmes emphatically meant now.  Words could not be punished, 
whatever their tendency, unless they were likely to cause an 
immediate evil otherwise punishable by the government.  It 
mattered decisively whether the defendants posed serious threats 
or were merely “puny anonymities,” as he had labeled the five in 
 710. See id. 
 711. Id. at 673. 
 712. Id. (emphasis added). 
 713. Id. 
 714. Id. at 672. 
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Abrams.715  Much more provocatively, Holmes embraced the full 
logic of the marketplace of ideas⎯if the advocates of proletarian 
dictatorship persuade the majority, so be it.  After all, life was an 
experiment. 
Two last pieces of the Red Scare era remain to be laid in place, 
one expanding its reach and the other signifying the beginning of 
a retreat from the “natural and probable tendency” era.  They were 
decided on the same day.  Whitney v. California716 was an appeal 
from the conviction of Anita Whitney for criminal syndicalism.717 
At the time of her arrest, Whitney had recently been a delegate 
from Oakland to the Socialist Party Convention in 1919, a meeting 
at which the left wing split from “the old-wing Socialists” to form 
the Communist Labor Party.718  She and other less moderate Leftists 
were thrown out of the convention, whereupon they promptly 
reassembled and created the Communist Labor Party of California 
(CLP), which had a membership of about 3000 in 1919.  Whitney 
was an alternate member of the state executive committee of the 
Party.719  Essentially, Whitney was convicted of active membership in 
the CLP, whose syndicalist tendencies were evidenced by the party’s 
official platform, which espoused the creation of a “revolutionary 
working class movement in America”720 that would overthrow 
capitalism and replace it with the “Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat.”721  Mass strikes were singled out as valuable political 
weapons to mobilize the working class.722  A model member of the 
party was one “who can not only teach, but actually help to put in 
practice the principles of revolutionary industrial unionism and 
Communism.”723 
Whitney herself claimed to be ambivalent about the militant 
course of the party, as she unsuccessfully urged an amendment that 
encouraged the CLP’s participation as a political party in elections, 
 715. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, 
joined by Brandeis, J.). 
   716.     274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 717. Id. at 359. 
 718. Id. at 363.  See also Ralph E. Shaffer, Formation of the California Communist 
Labor Party, 36 PAC. HIST. REV. 59, 70–71 (1967). 
 719. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 363–65.  See also Shaffer, supra note 718, at 63, 67 
(giving membership numbers), and 76 (indicating Whitney’s alternate 
membership on the state executive committee of the Party). 
 720. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 363. 
 721. Id. at 364. 
 722. Id. 
 723. Id. 
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and commended ordinary political activism for its “tremendous 
assistance to the workers in their struggle of emancipation.”724  A 
major part of her defense at trial was that she had tried to steer the 
party toward a moderate, lawful course.725  Whatever her intentions, 
Justice Sanford replied, she remained at the convention that 
adopted the radical platform and thereafter continued her 
membership in the party, even serving as an alternate to its state 
executive committee.726 
In a blink-and-you’ll-miss-it passage, Justice Sanford 
acknowledged without explanation that “freedom of speech” was 
“secured by the Constitution,” and thus imposed a federal 
constitutional constraint on California.727  Whitney did not profit 
from this development—Gitlow had settled that advocacy of 
syndicalism could be proscribed.  The CLP “partakes of the nature 
of a criminal conspiracy” and “such united and joint action involves 
even greater danger to the public peace and security than the 
isolated utterances and acts of individuals . . . .”728  Or, at least, a 
legislature was entitled to so conclude, and its “determination must 
be given great weight.  Every presumption is to be indulged in favor 
of the validity of the statute . . . .”729  Effectively, the Court had 
allowed the complete suppression of the CLP.730 
Brandeis, joined by Holmes, concurred in the result, 731 but his 
opinion rejected virtually every premise of the majority.  Free 
speech may not be absolutely privileged, Brandeis wrote, but it can 
only be restricted to avoid a serious harm that was imminent⎯an 
emergency in which an evil will occur “before there is opportunity 
for full discussion.”732  Apprehension of danger was not enough.  
“Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free 
speech and assembly.  Men feared witches and burnt women.”733  
Nor was Brandeis willing to genuflect to legislative bans on specific 
advocacy.  A state declaration of an imminent danger is entitled to 
“a rebuttable presumption,” but a defendant must be afforded an 
 724. Id. at 365. 
 725. Id. at 366–67. 
 726. Id. at 367–68. 
 727. Id. at 371. 
 728. Id. at 372. 
 729. Id. at 371. 
 730. Id. at 371–72. 
 731. Id. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 732. Id. at 377. 
 733. Id. at 376. 
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opportunity to question “whether there actually did exist at the 
time a clear danger, whether the danger, if any, was imminent, and 
whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify 
the stringent restriction interposed by the Legislature.”734  Brandeis 
still upheld her conviction, on the basis that Whitney had not 
brought up the absence of a clear and present danger as a defense, 
and that in any event there “was evidence on which the court or 
jury might have found that such danger existed.”735 
Those were the bare legal conclusions of Brandeis’s opinion.  
What transformed it into one of the most compelling pieces of 
legal writing in American history was his stirring defense of the 
importance of free expression.  Pointedly aligning himself with the 
Jeffersonian thesis that “error of opinion may be tolerated where 
reason is left free to combat it,”736  Brandeis presented a glowing 
picture of what free expression supposedly meant to the framers of 
the First Amendment. 
 Those who won our independence believed that the 
final end of the state was to make men free to develop 
their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative 
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued 
liberty both as an end and as a means.  They believed 
liberty to the secret of happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination 
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.  They recognized the risks to 
which all human institutions are subject.  But they knew 
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to 
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear 
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate 
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in 
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
 734. Id. at 379. 
 735. Id. 
 736. Id. at 375 n.3. 
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proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones.  Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence 
coerced by law⎯the argument of force in its worst form.  
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing 
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 
 . . . . 
 Those who won our independence by revolution were 
not cowards.  They did not fear political change.  They did 
not exalt order at the cost of liberty.737 
Well, yes and no.  Early Americans were not cowards, nor did 
they balk at taking dramatic, unprecedented steps.  That does not 
mean they would have favored a movement fundamentally away 
from a republican society, as the CLP proposed.  To the contrary, 
the Constitution in Article IV obliges the federal government to 
assure that the states maintain republican governments, not 
proletarian dictatorships.  The end of the state to most of the 
framing generation was protection of private property, and that 
implied stability and some form of a free market economy.  They 
did not always practice the doctrine that “discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of 
noxious doctrine,”738 or “that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is 
good ones.”739  Silence was at times “coerced by law,” and a person 
was not always allowed to “speak as you think.”740  Some of 
Brandeis’s rendition was a misty-eyed version of early 
republicanism⎯that people had a duty to discuss politics, to 
correct public error, to not be “inert.”  Much of Brandeis’ dissent, 
as with Holmes’s in other cases, reflected a newly-found vision of 
free expression, not the prevailing view of eighteenth-century 
Americans, and certainly not of the law.  His contention that the 
founders wanted to “make men free to develop their faculties” has 
more affinity with John Dewey’s pragmatism than the sentiments of 
1776 or 1787.741  Still, what a vision! 
Brandeis’s history lesson was not so much untrue as 
exaggerated and incomplete.  Repression did produce resentment 
 737. Id. at 375–77. 
 738. Id. at 375. 
 739. Id. 
 740. Id. at 375–76. 
 741. See Rabban, supra note 198, at 370. 
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among the American colonials.  They, of all people, had used 
printing to foment rebellion.  Yet revolutionary governments 
extracted loyalty oaths from the people on pain of losing the right 
to vote, to hold office, or to remain in the state.  Tens of thousands 
of Loyalists were forced from the country for their beliefs, not 
uncommonly having left confiscated property behind them.742  
“From 1775 into the 1780s . . . woe betide the printer who dared 
question the propriety of separation from England or the War for 
Independence.  Those kinds of printed sentiments could bring 
mobs, press-smashings, buckets of tar, and denuding of poultry.”743  
To be sure, there existed a vigorous political press in the 1790s, 
flaming with harsh judgments about government figures and 
policies.  That does not mean there were not limits, and calling for 
the overthrow of the government would have supported charges of 
seditious libel at common law. 
On the same day that Whitney was decided in 1927, a 
unanimous Court struck down a conviction under the Kansas 
Syndicalism Act in Fiske v. Kansas.744  Fiske marked the first occasion 
in which the Court squarely upheld a free speech claim on 
constitutional grounds.  Adding to its distinctiveness was the author 
of the opinion: Edward T. Sanford, the man who had written Gitlow 
and Whitney.  Harold B. Fiske was arrested because of his organizing 
activities in Kansas for the Industrial Workers of the World 
(“IWW”).745  The state had enacted a typical syndicalism statute, 
forbidding advocacy of violence as a means of effecting political or 
industrial change.746  Justice Sanford did not criticize the statute 
itself⎯it was the application to Fiske that violated the Due Process 
Clause.747  The entirety of the state’s case against him consisted of a 
brief preamble from an IWW document depicting the perpetual 
struggle between the workers and the employers.748  It said that 
 742. See generally HAROLD M. HYMAN, TO TRY MEN’S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (1959); MARY BETH NORTON, THE BRITISH-AMERICANS: THE 
LOYALIST EXILES IN ENGLAND, 1774-1789 (1972); Ruth M. Keesey, Loyalism in Bergen 
County, New Jersey, 18 WM. & MARY Q. (3rd Ser.) 558 (1961); Robert S. Lambert, The 
Confiscation of Loyalist Property in Georgia, 1782-1786, 20 WM. & MARY Q. (3rd Ser.) 
80 (1963); Harry E. Seyler, Pennsylvania’s First Loyalty Oath, 3 HIST. OF EDUC. J. 114 
(1952). 
 743. Teeter, supra note 121, at 521. 
 744. 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
 745. Id. at 382. 
 746. Id. 
 747. Id. at 387. 
 748. Id. at 383. 
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“hunger and want are found among millions of working people 
and the few who make up the employing class have all the good 
things of life.”749  Only an abolition of the wage system would cure 
these ills, the IWW urged in the booklet.750  Fiske testified that, as 
he understood the IWW’s plans, the union intended to obtain 
industrial control entirely through legal, peaceful means.751  
Nevertheless, the jury convicted him, possibly because the IWW’s 
reputation for aggressively confronting authorities convinced the 
jurors that its plans in Kansas were not entirely pacific.752 
Sanford could find “no evidence” whatsoever that Fiske 
advocated syndicalism as defined by the statute.753  Bad reputations 
could not justify convictions.  Not a word in the preamble 
suggested violence or other unlawful methods, which the statute 
required.754  “Thus applied the Act is an arbitrary and unreasonable 
exercise of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing 
the liberty of the defendant in violation of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”755  In one sense, Fiske was not so 
much about freedom of speech as due process: a court cannot 
convict a defendant when literally no evidence or reasonable 
inferences from proven facts support the verdict.  Sanford 
distinguished the constitutional rulings in Gitlow and Whitney by the 
content of the messages—the defendants in those cases threatened 
unlawful behavior.756 
Fiske was one of those cases, easy on the facts, that allow the 
Court to slip into another doctrinal direction without justifying the 
shift—or seemingly unaware of its ever-so-slightly altered course.  
Formally, nothing much had changed.  There had been no 
repudiation of the natural and probable tendency test.  Sanford’s 
opinion only overturned the conviction of one man; it did not 
question to the constitutionality of the state’s syndicalism act.  
Advocacy of violent actions remained unprotected.  Most of the 
Justices had not abandoned the idea that a valid police power 
rationale would prevail over assertions of speech rights.  Subtle 
changes were nevertheless apparent, or at least apparent when 
 749. Id. at 382–83. 
 750. See id. at 383. 
 751. Id. 
 752. Id. at 383–84. 
 753. Id. at 386. 
 754. Id. at 386–87. 
 755. Id. at 387. 
 756. Id. 
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reviewed years later.  That the First Amendment applied to the 
states was by 1927 unquestionably accepted by the Court.  And, 
importantly, Fiske showed a willingness to examine the evidence 
and reassess a jury’s determination of guilt, something the Court 
consistently had been unwilling to do, so long as the jury was 
correctly instructed.757  Rather than defer to the factual conclusions 
of the Kansas courts, Sanford announced: 
this Court will review the finding of facts by a State court 
where a Federal right has been denied as the result of a finding 
shown by the record to be without evidence to support it, 
or where a conclusion of law as to a federal right and a 
finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, 
in order to pass upon the federal question, to analyze the 
facts.758 
“Where a federal right has been denied” was a new direction 
for a free expression case, but it was not so different than the type 
of strict scrutiny the Court applied to liberty of contract cases.  In 
many of those, the Court openly substituted the collective 
understanding of the Justices on matters of fact. 
• 
Eventually Holmes and Brandeis prevailed in shaping the 
modern judicial interpretation of free expression.  It took fortitude 
to protect radicals whom most would just as soon have locked up 
and forgotten.  And they did it eloquently, in words that ordinary 
people could read and appreciate when reprinted in newspapers.  
For all their accomplishments, however, both had incomplete 
visions of free expression.  Holmes championed the marketplace of 
ideas generated by free speech as the “best test of truth” that 
humans could expect.  For testing scientific theories, valuing the 
worth of a corporation’s stock, or deciding the best price for a 
product, among many other uses, the metaphor made sense.  But it 
did not fit well in non-empirical pursuits, such as art and fiction, 
whose practitioners and consumers have another kind of truth in 
mind.  Beauty and morality, for example, are two subjects that 
humans quarrel over, but only to a certain point are they 
susceptible to rational argument.  Of course, one’s consideration of 
the beautiful or the good may benefit from discussion, but all the 
talk for eternity cannot prove the ultimate about one or the other.  
Eventually, facts fail to provide the answer and some non-empirical 
 757. See id. 
 758. Id. at 385–86 (emphasis added). 
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method is needed.  People can discuss a piece of art, and rate its 
beauty, but that would only show the weight of preferences, not 
whether the art was beautiful.  In some settings, such as a trial on 
the guilt or innocence of an alleged criminal, or on the negligence 
of someone who caused harm, we do not want the marketplace of 
the public to affect the mini-market of the jury.  Buildings are often 
better designed by one rather than the community.  In wartime or 
serious emergencies, the marketplace may need to be shuttered 
temporarily to preserve national existence and lives⎯or at least 
Holmes argued in Schenck, and never repudiated it in an opinion. 
Holmes did not consider that the market in ideas, like the 
financial market, is fraught with imperfections that hinder it from 
even approximating the truth at times.  This already had produced 
a dilemma for some progressive thinkers.  If, as it was well known, 
markets in stocks and commodities were in need of regulation, why 
wouldn’t it follow that the market in expression needed 
governmental oversight?  Progressivism encouraged the view that 
individual rights should be interpreted in light of the social needs 
of the community, as opposed to being privileges to speak or act in 
ways that served only a person’s or a group’s interests irrespective 
of injuries to others.  However, after witnessing wartime repression 
and the subsequent harassment of left-wing activists, a fair number 
of progressives developed into civil libertarians, forming advocacy 
groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union.759 
Brandeis agreed with Holmes’ free speech positions in key 
respects.  He embraced the concept of a marketplace of ideas by 
extolling the proposition that in “frank expression of conflicting 
opinion lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental 
action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril.”760  
Along with Holmes, he approved a practical criterion for 
determining whether an emergency existed that justified curtailing 
speech.  The question to ask was whether there was time for the 
market to work—for error to be rebutted.  This translated into a 
requirement that speech must be the cause of immediate harm 
before action could be taken to curtail or punish it.  Fear alone was 
not sufficient for suppression, because apprehension easily 
becomes panic.  Rebuttal of erroneous ideas by counter-speech was 
the preferred means of deflating the social harms caused by false 
 759. See Rabban, supra note 198, at 211–47. 
 760. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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utterances or incitements to illegal actions.  Some harms would 
justify state suppression, but not just any ones: there must be “the 
probability of serious injury to the State,” as opposed to merely 
“some violence” or “destruction of property.”761 
At the same time, Brandeis limited his solicitude to expression 
that contributed “to the discovery and spread of political truth,” 
which excluded an enormous range of expression.762  He placed 
much confidence, too much possibly, in the capacity of the public 
to exercise “the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion.”763  Brandeis did not find much clarity in the Court’s use 
of the “clear and present danger” test: “This court has not yet fixed 
the standard by which to determine when a danger shall be 
deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed 
present . . . .”764 
All of these positions taken by Holmes and Brandeis were 
rooted in value judgments that, consciously nor not, set up free 
expression as a preferred right, one that could not be overcome by 
ordinary uses of police powers.  Brandeis’s homage to a somewhat 
mythical founding notwithstanding, their outlooks were thoroughly 
modern in their disavowal of ultimate truth and repudiation of a 
reflexive deference to police powers.  As value judgments, they are 
not immune from questioning.  Why should advocacy of violence, 
or urging illegal acts, be tolerated in the name of free expression?  
Why must the state abide advocacy of its own elimination?  Why 
must there be an immediate consequence for the speech to be 
prosecuted, as opposed to one somewhat more remotely, especially 
if it were a really serious harm, such as terrorists flying planes into 
buildings?  Is the state supposed to wait until the eleventh hour?  
All of these questions were on the table, and the Court continues to 
refine its answers to them. 
A.  Free Expression⎯From World War I to the Cold War 
From Fiske v. Kansas in 1927 until nearly the end of the 1940s, 
the Court upheld free expression claims in a variety of settings.  
During this period the Court begin to define more systematically 
than before what types of speech could be outlawed and the 
 761. Whitney v. United States, 274 U.S. 357, 377–78 (1927) (emphasis added). 
 762. Id. at 375. 
 763. Id. 
 764. Id. at 374. 
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methods by which it could be regulated.  Once the Court subjected 
state actions to the First Amendment, entirely new kinds of claims 
were presented alongside replays of the older decisions.  By the end 
of the 1930s, the doctrine of substantive due process as applied to 
economic and social legislation was overturned, to be replaced by 
rational basis review.765  At the same time that the Court was 
permitting far more regulation of social and economic issues than 
it had in anyone’s memory, the Justices granted greater freedom 
from state control for speech and the press.766  Formally, this was 
because the Court had recognized the rights of speech and press as 
ones for which “neither liberty nor Justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.”767  Why?  It was no longer possible to argue that since 
liberty of contract was protected by the Due Process Clause, ergo 
freedom of expression must be as well.  As noted, the new answer 
was some version of footnote four of Carolene Products, that speech 
had an elevated status under the Constitution due to its 
indispensability to the democratic process, particularly to 
correcting legislative errors.768  Most other societal issues were 
matters of policy judgment, and free speech was essential to 
reaching the optimal outcomes.769 
A major part of this abrupt development took place as the 
Court reconsidered its approach to speech by political dissidents.  
Three different cases in the 1930s upheld the speech rights of 
Communists.  The first opportunity came when the Justices 
reviewed a conviction under a “red flag” statute.770  Along with 
criminal syndicalism laws, many states made it a crime to display a 
red flag as an expression of resistance to government or 
disloyalty.771  In 1919 alone, twenty-seven states passed laws of this 
type.772  California’s law made it a felony to display a red flag or 
banner in a public place or assembly “as a sign, symbol or emblem 
of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or 
stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a 
 765. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free 
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 329–30 (1996). 
 766. Id. 
 767. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). 
 768. See White, supra note 765, at 301. 
 769. Id. 
 770. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 671, at 147 (twenty-seven red flag laws were passed 
in 1919). 
 771. Id. 
 772. Id. 
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seditious character.”773  Yetta Stromberg was a nineteen-year old 
California woman who worked at a summer camp for children 
under the auspices of the Young Communist League, itself 
associated with the Communist Party.774  Each morning she directed 
a flag-raising ceremony at which “a red flag, ‘a camp-made 
reproduction of the flag of Soviet Russia,’” was raised while “the 
children stood at salute and recited a pledge of allegiance ‘to the 
workers’ red flag, and to the cause for which it stands, one aim 
throughout our lives, freedom for the working class.’”775  (Sounds 
like a fun camp.)  For this activity, Stromberg received up to ten 
years in prison under the state red flag law. 
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a majority of six, found the 
first part of the statute unconstitutional (display of a red flag “as a 
sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized 
government”).776  Hughes pronounced the statute “vague and 
indefinite,” a conclusion in accord with the California Supreme 
Court’s own judgment.777  By that court’s account, the law could be 
“‘construed to include peaceful and orderly opposition to 
government by legal means and within constitutional 
limitations.’”778  Given this possibility, Hughes found the statute 
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment: “The maintenance of 
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that 
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential 
to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.”779 
Hughes’s association of free speech with democracy and social 
stability was a world away from the authoritarian tones displayed by 
the Court a decade earlier.  Hughes did not explain how flying a 
red flag constituted “free political discussion,” but he must have 
thought that purely symbolic representations qualified as free 
expression for the message it conveyed.  Many years later, the Court 
repeatedly drew upon Hughes’s homage to the necessity of “free 
political discussion” in formulating the modern judicial approach 
to the First Amendment.  Quoting Hughes, Justice Brennan wrote 
 773. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931). 
 774. Id. at 362. 
 775. Id. 
 776. Id. at 369–70. 
 777. Id. at 369. 
 778. Id. at 366 (quoting People v. Mintz, 290 P. 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930)). 
 779. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369. 
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for the Court in 1980 that political expression “‘has always rested 
on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”780 
Six years later, in 1937, the Court decided two more cases that 
followed Fiske and Stromberg in closely examining the justifications 
given by the state for imprisoning radical activists.  In the first of 
these cases, De Jonge v. Oregon,781 the defendant was sentenced to 
seven years under a syndicalism statute for organizing a meeting in 
Portland under the auspices of the Communist Party.782  It had 
been a public gathering⎯most of the attendees were not 
Communists⎯at which people discussed a variety of local concerns, 
including allegations of illegal police activities.783  Chief Justice’s 
Hughes’s opinion for a unanimous Court rejected the state’s theory 
that De Jonge could be punished merely for holding a meeting to 
express community grievances when that the session was entirely 
orderly.784  “However innocuous the object of the meeting, however 
lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable 
and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the 
meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting 
were held by the Communist Party.”785  Rejecting that result, 
Hughes made the most pointed free speech statement yet to come 
from the Court: “Freedom of speech and of the press are 
fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”786  
Subsequent opinions emphasized that the term “fundamental 
right” was “not an empty one and was not lightly used” in De Jonge.787  
“It reflects,” Justice Owen J. Roberts wrote for the Court in 1939, 
“the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the 
rights [of freedom of speech and press] lie[at the foundation of 
free government by free men.”788  Furthermore, another right was 
involved—freedom of association: “The right of peaceable assembly 
is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is 
equally fundamental.”789 
 780. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (quoting Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 
369). 
 781. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
 782. Id. at 357. 
 783. Id. 
 784. See id. at 362. 
 785. Id. 
 786. Id. at 364 (emphasis added). 
 787. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939). 
 788. Id. at 150–51. 
 789. Id. 
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A few months thereafter, the Court strengthened its 
conclusion in De Jonge by protecting the organizational activities of 
a Communist in Georgia.790  At the time of his offense, Angelo 
Herndon was a nineteen-year old African-American recruiter for 
the Communist Party in Georgia and he was attempting to set up a 
Communist-affiliated council in Atlanta to deal with 
unemployment.  Herndon was either a very brave or very foolish 
fellow, or perhaps both.  He already had riled authorities by 
leading a sizeable demonstration demanding jobs and welfare 
benefits.  “Frightened county administrators publicly responded 
with an emergency appropriation of six thousand dollars.  Privately, 
though, they complained to law enforcement officials about this 
Communist-inspired activity.”791 
Georgia responded by accusing Herndon of organizing a 
Communist Party branch to incite riots, resistance to authority and 
ultimately overthrow of the state.792  He was convicted and 
sentenced from eighteen to twenty years imprisonment.793  (The 
jury recommended leniency; Herndon could have received a death 
sentence for his crime.)794  As in Fiske, the state presented no 
evidence to support its claim that the party was planning illegal 
acts.795  Meetings arranged by Herndon discussed such innocuous 
subjects as unemployment compensation.796  Blank membership 
cards found in Herndon’s possession proclaimed the 
“revolutionary” aspirations of the party,797 but that was not good 
enough for Justice Roberts, whose majority opinion reversed the 
conviction.798  (Still, all totaled, Herndon was incarcerated for five 
years before being exonerated by the Court.)799 
For the first time since Schenck in 1919, the Court in Herndon 
invoked the “clear and present danger doctrine,”800 only enhanced 
by stressing the need for proximity between the speech and illegal 
acts: “[t]his vague declaration falls short of an attempt to bring 
 790. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
 791. Charles H. Martin, Communists and Blacks: The ILO and the Angelo Herndon 
Case, 64 J. NEGRO HIST. 131, 131 (1979). 
 792. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 245. 
 793. Id. at 243–44. 
 794. Martin, supra note 791, at 132. 
 795. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 248–49. 
 796. Id. at 249. 
 797. Id. 
 798. See id. at 259–60. 
 799. Martin, supra note 791, at 132. 
 800. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 255. 
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about insurrection either immediately or within a reasonable time, but 
amounts merely to a statement of ultimate ideals.”801  No evidence 
was introduced establishing that Herndon “advocated, by speech or 
written word, at meetings or elsewhere, any doctrine or action 
implying such forcible subversion.”802  Rejecting the state’s 
argument that Herndon’s activities had “a dangerous tendency,” 
Roberts put several centuries of doctrine to rest with a few lines: 
“The question thus proposed to a jury involves pure speculation as 
to future trends of thought and action.”803  Conjecture was 
unacceptable when the fundamental right to speak was at stake:  
Every person who attacks existing conditions, who agitates 
for a change in the form of government, must take the 
risk that if a jury should be of opinion he ought to have 
foreseen that his utterances might contribute in any 
measure to some future forcible resistance to the existing 
government he may be convicted of the offense of inciting 
insurrection.804 
For several decades, the Court relied on the “clear and present 
danger” standard for speech cases, invoking it in a variety of 
settings, although not always with consistent application.  A leading 
decision in 1940, Cantwell v. Connecticut,805 was highly influential in 
tightening the standard for finding speech to be a clear and 
present danger.  Jesse Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witness, was 
proselytizing with the aid of a phonograph on a sidewalk in New 
Haven, Connecticut.806  It was a tough site for gaining converts, as 
the neighborhood was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic.807  
Nonetheless, two men agreed to listen to the record.808  They were 
“highly offended” by what they heard.809  One of them said he felt 
like hitting Cantwell and the other reported “that he was tempted 
to throw Cantwell off the street.”810  Justice Roberts again wrote the 
Court’s opinion, describing the recording as a “general attack on 
all organized religious systems as instruments of Satan and 
injurious to man,” with particular condemnation of Roman 
 801. Id. at 250. 
 802. Id. at 253. 
 803. Id. at 263. 
 804. Id. at 262. 
   805.     310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 806. Id. at 301. 
 807. Id. 
 808. Id. at 302–03. 
 809. Id. at 309. 
 810. Id. 
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Catholicism.811  The words “naturally would offend not only persons 
of that persuasion,” Roberts continued, “but all others who respect 
the honestly held religious faith of their fellows.”812  No fisticuffs 
occurred, however, as Cantwell beat a hasty retreat with his Victrola 
rather than face a thrashing.813  Subsequently, he was charged with 
inciting others to breach of the peace.814 
Reversing Cantwell’s conviction, Justice Roberts began his 
analysis by setting out the guidelines for judging whether a clear 
and present danger existed: 
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the 
principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to 
riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to 
exhort others to physical attack upon those belonging to 
another sect.  When clear and present danger of riot, 
disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, 
or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or 
order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or 
punish is obvious.815 
In following this formula, Justice Roberts cautioned, “a state 
may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or 
other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.”816  But 
hadn’t Cantwell created an “immediate threat” to public order, 
saved only by his swift retreat?  Roberts’s response did not so much 
answer this question as divert the inquiry to another issue: intent.  
Cantwell claimed that he had not intended “to insult or affront the 
hearers by playing the record.”817  All he wished, Roberts reported, 
was “to interest them in his propaganda.”818  Roberts, however, 
concluded that the speaker’s intent was not necessarily 
determinative: “One may . . . be guilty of the offense if he commit 
acts or make[s] statements likely to provoke violence and 
disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be 
intended.”819  A person was assumed to know that certain 
expressions are inherently likely to cause breaches of the peace.  
 811. Id. 
 812. Id. 
 813. See id. 
 814. Id. at 303. 
 815. Id. at 308. 
 816. Id. 
 817. Id. at 309. 
 818. Id. 
 819. Id. 
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“Decisions to this effect are many,” Roberts explained, “but 
examination discloses that, in practically all, the provocative 
language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace 
consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the 
person of the hearer.”820  The Court was not, in other words, willing 
to protect all manner of insults under the aegis of the First 
Amendment.  “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any 
proper sense communication of information or opinion 
safeguarded by the Constitution.”821  But measured by this standard, 
Cantwell was innocent, according to Roberts: 
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of 
bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional 
discourtesy, no personal abuse.  On the contrary, we find 
only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book 
or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell, 
however misguided others may think him, conceived to be 
true religion.822 
Untangling these points, Cantwell both clarified the meaning 
of clear and present danger while introducing new complexities.  
For First Amendment purposes, the speaker’s subjective intent was 
no longer determinative.  The issue became an objective one: 
under the circumstances, were the words likely to provoke an 
immediate hostile response?  Were the words “profane, indecent, or 
abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer”?823  
Moreover, in judging the circumstances, the Court included the 
“bearing” of the speaker⎯Cantwell was neither truculent nor 
threatening.824  Words alone were not necessarily conclusive. 
Cantwell squared perfectly with a 1942 case, Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire,825 known to all students of the First Amendment as the 
“fighting words” case.  Yet another Jehovah’s Witness was 
involved.826  (It has been observed more than once that modern 
free speech law owes much to the litigiousness of this sect, 827 which 
 820. Id. 
 821. Id. at 309–10. 
 822. Id. at 310. 
 823. Id. at 309. 
 824. Id. at 310. 
 825. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 826. Id. at 569. 
 827. See, e.g., SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 18, at 126-27 (2000); 
Patrick J. Flynn, “Writing Their Faith into The Laws of the Land:” Jehovah's Witnesses 
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resulted in twenty-three decisions by the Supreme Court between 
1938 and 1946.828)  Walter Chaplinsky was distributing his religious 
literature on a busy street corner in Rochester, New Hampshire, 
while “denouncing all religion as a ‘racket,’”829 presumably 
exempting his own denomination from the charge.  Apparently the 
crowd grew either “restless” or “a riot was under way,” depending 
on which version is credited.830  In any event, Chaplinsky was led 
away by a police officer.831  At some point, they encountered the 
City Marshal, who exchanged words with Chaplinsky.832  It is unclear 
who said what first.  Chaplinsky claimed that he demanded that the 
Marshal arrest the troublemakers in the crowd, and that in 
response he was cursed by the officer.833  During this interview, 
according to the criminal complaint, Chaplinsky uttered the words 
that led to his conviction: “You are a God damned racketeer and a 
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are 
Fascists or agents of Fascists.”834  Chaplinsky admitted that he said 
this, except that he denied invoking “the name of the Deity.”835 
Chaplinsky was convicted under a statute that apparently 
aimed at enforcing a degree of civility in public speakers.836  It was 
illegal on a street or other public place in New Hampshire to 
address a person with “any offensive, derisive or annoying word,” or 
call someone “by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any 
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to 
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his 
lawful business or occupation.”837  Earlier the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court limited the statute’s coverage to words spoken in a 
“face-to-face” encounter that had “a direct tendency to cause acts of 
violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is 
addressed.”838  As was well known, Justice Frank Murphy wrote for a 
and the Supreme Court's Battle for the Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 1939-1945, 10 
TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 1–2 (2004). 
 828. See Neil M. Richards, Book Review: The ‘Good War,’ The Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
and the First Amendment, 87 VA. L. REV. 781, 785 (2001). 
 829. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569–70. 
 830. Id. at 570. 
 831. Id. 
 832. Id. 
 833. Id. 
 834. Id. at 569. 
 835. Id. at 570. 
 836. Id. at 569. 
 837. Id. 
 838. Id. at 573. 
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unanimous Court, “[t]he English language has a number of words 
and expressions which by general consent are ‘fighting words’ 
when said without a disarming smile.”839  Fighting words were those 
choice bits of language that, “as ordinary men know, are likely to 
cause a fight.  So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings.”840  
As in Cantwell, a supposedly objective test was to be applied to 
detect words with pugnacious potential: “what men of common 
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an 
average addressee to fight.”841  (No mention was made of the 
average woman.) 
Chaplinsky’s outburst did not qualify for First Amendment 
protection under this standard.  Justice Murphy gave a cursory 
explanation: “Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the 
appellations ‘damn racketeer’ and ‘damn Fascist’ are epithets likely 
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a 
breach of the peace.”842  What would count as “fighting words,” 
then, would vary according to the sensibilities of the local populace 
as reflected by the jury and the makeup of the appellate court.  
Needless to say, that tended to undermine the objectiveness of the 
standard. 
In the year between Cantwell and Chaplinsky, the Court had 
another occasion to shrink the contours of speech that counted as 
a clear and present danger.  Writing in Bridges v. California, Justice 
Black summarized the Court’s thinking in the early 1940s: “What 
finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a 
working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely 
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before 
utterances can be punished.”843  A mere “inherent tendency” of 
speech to cause harm was not enough under the First 
Amendment.844  Well, yes, this test had “emerged,” but as Black’s 
citations showed, the authority for this restatement of clear and 
present danger came mostly from the dissenting opinions of 
Brandeis.  Added to that, Black took the occasion to assert that the 
First Amendment should not be interpreted in accordance with 
 839. Id. 
 840. Id. 
 841. Id. 
 842. Id. at 574. 
 843. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). 
 844. Id. at 273. 
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English precedent.  It was irrelevant what contempt powers English 
judges might have had in the eighteenth century, he concluded: 
[T]o assume that English common law in this field 
became ours is to deny the generally accepted historical 
belief that “one of the objects of the Revolution was to get 
rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of 
the press.”  
. . . . 
No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than 
that of securing for the people of the United States much 
greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and 
petition than the people of Great Britain had ever 
enjoyed.845 
The case in which Black wrote these lines, Bridges v. California, 
developed out of the labor battles in California prior to World War 
II.  Actually the case combined two separate judicial proceedings.846  
In both, defendants had been held in criminal contempt for 
remarks they made about ongoing cases in California courts.847  
One of the contempt cases involved the longshore workers’ leader 
Harry Bridges, who had played a key role in organizing a massive 
strike up and down the Pacific Coast in 1934.848  Later, Bridges 
became embroiled in a dispute over which union⎯the A.F.L. or 
the C.I.O⎯would represent dockworkers.  While a decision on the 
matter was pending in court, Bridges sent a telegram to the 
Secretary of Labor in which he predicted that a ruling contrary to 
his side’s interest would result in a strike that “would tie up the port 
of Los Angeles and involve the entire Pacific Coast.”849  Bridges had 
some credibility in this regard.  Not amused, the judge hearing the 
case found Bridges in contempt and fined him.850 
The second case decided with Bridges’ involved the notoriously 
anti-union Los Angeles Times, which had published three editorials 
concerning the pending sentencing of two union members for 
violent acts during a strike.851  Under the headline “Probation for 
 845. Id. at 264–65 (quoting Henry Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United 
States, 9 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AM. SOC. SOC’Y 67, 76 (1914)). 
 846. Id. at 258. 
 847. Id. 
 848. See generally Robert W. Cherny, The Making of a Labor Radical, Harry Bridges: 
1901-1934, 64 PAC. HIST. REV. 363 (1995). 
 849. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 258.  
 850. Id. at 278. 
 851. Id. at 298. 
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Gorillas?” one of the editorials addressed the judge and defendants 
by name, and said that the judge would “make a serious mistake if 
he grants probation to Matthew Shannon and Kennan Holmes.  
This community needs the example of their assignment to the jute 
mill.”852  (The jute mill was a reference to one of the least desirable 
prisoner jobs at San Quentin Penitentiary, turning raw jute into 
burlap bags.)853  Two specifically identified individuals, the Times 
asserted, were “members of Dave Beck’s wrecking crew, 
entertainment committee, goon squad or gorillas,” and did not 
deserve probation.854  (Dave Beck was the Teamsters’ West Coast 
organizer.)  For this unsolicited advice to the judge, the Times’ 
publisher and its managing editor were fined for contempt of 
court.855 
After reciting the clear and present danger test, Black then 
retooled it by turning to a method of reasoning that heretofore had 
been missing from speech cases: an overt balancing process in 
which all of the consequences to free expression from upholding 
the contempt sanctions would be weighed against the state’s 
asserted interest in protecting the judicial process from undue 
influence.  Black first put on the scale an issue that had not figured 
explicitly in prior cases: the liberty to be lost by sustaining the 
restraint on speech.  “For it is a prized American privilege to speak 
one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all 
public institutions,” Black stated as an opening premise.856  Labor 
conflicts were hot news items at that moment.  In effect, the 
contempt orders “produce their restrictive results at the precise 
time when public interest in the matters discussed would naturally 
be at its height.”857  On the other hand, the assumption that judges 
would be intimidated by such writings could not be credited.  Both 
judges involved were fully aware of the likely reactions to their 
decisions, regardless of the publicity created by the alleged 
contemnors.  More fundamentally, the assumption that judges 
might be swayed by such external pressure “would be to impute to 
judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor, which we cannot 
 852. Id. at 298–99. 
 853. Miriam Allen De Ford, "Vacation" at San Quentin, THE NATION, Aug. 1, 
1923. 
 854. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 298. 
 855. Id. at 258–59, 299–300.  See generally Robert E. Herman, The Los Angeles 
Times Case: Right of Press to Comment on "Pending Cases," 48 YALE L.J. 54 (1938). 
 856. Id. at 270. 
 857. Id. at 268. 
116
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 889 
 
accept as a major premise.”858  Considering the “negligible” effect of 
the writings on the adjudications versus the substantial impact on 
discouraging comment about the cases, the balance fell on the side 
of allowing publication.859  Put differently, there was no clear 
danger, much less a serious or imminent one.860  Weighed against 
that was the urgency of speaking at the precise moment when 
public policy was being made. 
Cantwell, Chaplinsky, and Bridges together imposed tight limits 
on what speech would be found to present a clear and present 
danger of inciting violence or other criminal conduct.  Only 
immediate and serious dangers counted.  Speakers were still 
responsible for their words, as when the utterances themselves were 
criminal (for example, a threat) or amounted to an in-your-face 
insult.  Cantwell had not been personally abusive, he was not 
“truculent,” and in that circumstance he could not be punished 
even though the recording outraged his listeners.  Neither 
Chaplinsky nor Cantwell provided much of an explanation for why 
fighting words were unprotected by the First Amendment.  Why 
not demand that the insulted person walk away instead of throwing 
a punch?  Shouldn’t police officers be expected to have especially 
thick skins?  Realism apparently accounted for the answer in 
Chaplinsky: People often don’t back down.  They punch, pummel, 
stab, and shoot each other.  Knowing this, the Court continued to 
think that society could defuse imminent violence, which otherwise 
might wind up hurting innocent people.  As to Bridges, the Court 
went further than any previous opinion for the Court in 
emphasizing the importance of public discussion of governmental 
affairs, including of the judiciary. 
Each of these cases took into account the gravity of the evil 
that might flow from not controlling speech.  It remained to be 
seen how the Court would assess the balance when the facts were 
closer to the World War I speech cases.  Only a few cases in the 
1940s provided an opportunity for the Court to consider the 
impact of national security on free expression.  Overall, however, 
the World War II record of the government in regard to civil 
 858. Id. at 273. 
 859. See id. at 274. 
 860. See id.  See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377 (1947) (holding 
contempt sanction for newspaper’s unfair criticism of trial judge not a clear and 
present danger); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348–50 (1946) (holding no 
clear and present danger was created by editorials and cartoon accusing circuit 
judges of favoring criminal defendants). 
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liberties was an enormous change from the previous war, at least as 
far as harassment of the radical left went.  According to an ACLU 
study in 1944, there was an “extraordinary and unexpected record 
of the first two years (of the war) in freedom of debate and dissent 
on all public issues,” with only a “comparatively slight resort to war-
time measures of control or repression of opinion.”861  
Approximately 200 individuals were charged with sedition or 
violation of the Espionage Act during the conflict, and these were 
mostly supporters of Germany or Nazism.862  Few state cases were 
brought.863  In the first year of the war, the post office revoked 
mailing privileges for seventy newspapers under the Espionage 
Act.864  Almost none of these cases reached the Court.  Yet when the 
Court did become involved, the Justices were far more skeptical of 
government claims than their predecessors, which is interesting 
considering that these were the same men who produced Korematsu 
v. United States.  Several reasons can be cited for the comparatively 
light treatment of dissenters in World War II.  Support for the war 
among Americans was nearly universal.  Because the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union were allies, American Communists likewise backed 
the military effort, giving the government less of a reason to 
prosecute them.  Finally, on the whole, Roosevelt’s administration 
was more inclined to respect civil liberties than Wilson’s did, 
although FDR had little regard for dissenters.865 
In Taylor v. Mississippi,866 a 1943 case, three Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were convicted under a Mississippi law criminalizing, among other 
things, any communication intended to induce disloyalty or 
disrespect for the flag or government of the United States or 
Mississippi.867  They passed out literature claiming that every nation 
on earth was “under the influence and control of the demons,” and 
that America should remain neutral in the war.868  Saluting the flag 
“amounted to a contemptible form of primitive idol worship.”869  
 861. American Civil Liberties Union, Annual Report 1943-44, at 5 (1944), quoted 
in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 671, at 262–63. 
 862. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 671, at 268. 
 863. Id. at 281–83. 
 864. Id. at 268. 
 865. See generally RICHARD W. STEELE, FREE SPEECH IN THE GOOD WAR (1999) 
(discussing free expression during World War II). 
 866. 319 U.S. 583, 588 (1943). 
   867.    Id. at 588. 
 868. Id. at n.3. 
 869. Id. at 587. 
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One of the defendants told two women whose sons had died in the 
war “that it was wrong for our President to send our boys across in 
uniform to fight our enemies; that it was wrong to fight our 
enemies; that these boys were being shot down for no purpose at all 
. . . .”870  These were the sorts of expressions that had earned stiff 
prison sentences in World War I. Mississippi gave the defendants 
up to ten years in the penitentiary.  In reversing, the Court 
demonstrated that it was unwilling to allow punishment for disloyal 
speech (or just incredibly insensitive speech).  On behalf of a 
unanimous Court, Justice Roberts wrote that the defendants had 
not made their declarations “with an evil or sinister purpose,” or 
“advocated or incited subversive action against the nation or state 
or to have threatened any clear and present danger to our 
institutions or our government.”871  All they had “communicated 
were their beliefs and opinions concerning domestic measures and 
trends in national and world affairs.”872 
The Espionage Act of 1917 remained on the books during 
World War II (Congress increased its penalties in 1940),873 but the 
Court reviewed only one conviction under the law.874  That case 
involved Elmer Hartzel, who surely counted as one hundred 
percent American: he was native-born and his ancestors had arrived 
in the United States 120 years earlier; he served in the Great War, 
and he pursued a professional career.875  But he was not in favor of 
the war against Hitler.  In three self-published essays, Hartzel 
“depict[ed] the war as a gross betrayal of America, denounce[d] 
our English allies and the Jews and assail[ed] in reckless terms the 
integrity and patriotism of the President of the United States.”876  
Calling for a conversion of the war into a “racial conflict,” Hartzel 
proposed the novel idea of occupying the U.S. “by foreign troops 
until we are able to stand alone.”877  To disseminate these curious 
views, Hartzel sent 600 copies of an article he wrote to all sorts of 
prominent people, including high-ranking military officers and the 
Infantry Journal.878  Sentenced to five years in prison, Hartzel went 
 870. Id. at 586. 
 871. Id. at 589–90. 
 872. Id. at 590. 
 873. Act of Mar. 28, 1940, ch. 72, 54 Stat. 79. 
 874. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944). 
 875. Id. at 682. 
 876. Id. at 683. 
 877. Id. (quoting Hartzel’s work). 
 878. Id. at 683–84. 
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free on a slim 5-4 vote by the Court.879 
Other than noting the clear and present danger standard from 
Schenck,880 Justice Murphy’s plurality opinion for four Justices did 
not cite a single case from the World War I era.  Murphy decided 
the case on a statutory ground, that Hertzel lacked the specific 
intent required by the law to cause insubordination or obstruction 
of enlistment.881  Every point Murphy made, however, conflicted 
with constitutional and statutory holdings on intent from the 
decisions two decades earlier: 
There is nothing on the face of the three pamphlets in 
question to indicate that petitioner intended specifically 
to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of 
duty in the military forces or to obstruct the recruiting 
and enlistment service.  No direct or affirmative appeals 
are made to that effect and no mention is made of 
military personnel or of persons registered under the 
Selective Training and Service Act.  They contain, instead, 
vicious and unreasoning attacks on one of our military 
allies, flagrant appeals to false and sinister racial theories 
and gross libels of the President.882 
As Justice Reed’s dissent riposted, this reasoning violated the 
edict of Schenck: “[O]f course the documents would not have been 
sent unless they had been intended to have some effect.”883  A 
hallmark of the cases under the prior Espionage Act cases was their 
inference of subjective intent from the words used in publications 
or speeches⎯the writings spoke for themselves as to what the 
person wished to occur.  Reed’s group of dissenters included the 
famed civil libertarian William O. Douglas, along with Frankfurter 
and Jackson.  They thought that there was plenty of evidence of 
Hartzel’s intent.884  Murphy, nonetheless, was uncertain about 
Hartzel’s state of mind.  At best, Hartzel had engaged in a bizarre 
attempt to influence public policy, which he had a right to do.  At 
worst, he was involved in some sort of German-inspired 
“psychological warfare” designed “to cause unrest and disloyalty.”885  
 879. Id. at 689–90. 
 880. Id. at 687. 
 881. Id. 
 882. Id. 
 883. Id. at 693 (rephrasing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) 
(Reed, J., dissenting)). 
 884. Id. at 691–92. 
 885. Id. at 689. 
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Yet the latter had not been proved, and the fact that Hartzel sent 
his dispatches to leading public figures undermined that theory.  
Even accepting the hypothesis that Hartzel meant to inspire 
disloyalty, it would not change the result, Murphy held: 
[W]hile such iniquitous doctrines may be used under 
certain circumstances as vehicles for the purposeful 
undermining of the morale and loyalty of the armed 
forces and those persons of draft age, they cannot by 
themselves be taken as proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that petitioner had the narrow intent requisite to a 
violation of this statute.886 
He did not explain why this was so, and his interpretation 
directly conflicted with earlier rulings.  Cantwell and Chaplinsky 
indicated that there was no obligation under the First Amendment 
for the government to prove a subjective intent to accomplish the 
illegal end.  Murphy, it should be noted, was construing a statute.  
Nonetheless, his narrowing interpretation seemed distinctly 
friendly to Hartzel’s claim of free expression.  Justice Roberts 
added the fifth concurring vote, saying only that there was not 
enough evidence to convict.887 
What had occurred in the short period between the Holmes 
and Brandeis dissents and the cases of 1931-1944 was recognition 
by the Justices that free expression as a constitutional value carried 
great weight against assertions of the police power.  Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo wrote in 1937 that free speech and free thought 
formed “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom.”888  Achieving consensus on the central role 
of expression in democratic government was a development of 
enormous consequence, even if the generalized praises for the 
blessings of free expression left much to be decided.  Unlike in the 
World War I and Red Scare cases, the Court had become skeptical 
about linking speech to some distant future event.  Speakers would 
not be assumed to intend whatever consequence might conceivably 
flow from their words.  Jury assessments of a speech were no longer 
immune from judicial review.  Doctrinally, the Court had settled on 
the “clear and present danger” standard for speech and press cases, 
but it had morphed in meaning since Schenck to include 
consideration of the imminence of the threat, the seriousness of 
 886. Id. at 687. 
 887. Id. at 689–90. 
 888. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937). 
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the harm caused by the speech and the social value of public 
expression in general. 
One line of speech cases remained constant during the first 
half of the century: those dealing with the rights of public 
employees to engage in political expression.  Congress in 1939 
enacted the Hatch Act,889 which continued the longstanding 
practice of barring federal employees from taking an active part in 
political campaigns and partisan activities during their private 
time.890  Ex Parte Curtis, in 1882, had cleared the way for 
congressional efforts to limit political activity by employees, and the 
Court had continued that trend through the 1940s, when it upheld 
the Hatch Act in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell.891  
Experience had vindicated the assumption of the Hatch Act, that 
enforcing “political neutrality” among government workers 
promoted “efficiency” in the public workplace.892  Congress 
reasonably could have concluded that separating employees from 
partisan political action would “avoid a tendency toward a one-party 
system” and dampen the growth of political machines.893  
Employees retained the right to express themselves in “public or 
private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public 
interest,” so long as they did not direct their “activities toward party 
success.”894  Subsequent cases reinforced this conclusion, even as 
they abandoned the old notion, expressed by Holmes, that public 
employees possess only those speech rights that their employer 
permits. 
Most of the Court’s cases dealing with speech and press 
through the first three decades of the twentieth century involved 
substantive limitations on expression.  During the 1930s and 1940s, 
the Court also turned its attention to the methods by which 
government controlled or regulated speech, usually called “time, 
place or manner” controls on how, when and where speech is 
presented.  This involved a close examination of the means of 
enforcing these restrictions, such as licensing systems, 
administrative censorship and injunctions against expressive 
activities.  Left unimpeded by constitutional constraints, the state 
 889. Act of August 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (current version at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 1501–03 (2000)).   
 890. Id. 
 891. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
 892. Id. at 97. 
 893. Id. at 100. 
 894. Id. 
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could have a profound influence on the ability of speakers to 
communicate with their intended audiences by manipulating these 
rules. 
In 1931, the Court decided one of its most far-reaching First 
Amendment cases on the means by which speech could be limited, 
Near v. Minnesota.895  Writing in Near, Chief Justice Hughes 
reinforced the traditional aversion to prior restraints by refusing to 
allow a state court to enjoin a Minneapolis newspaper, The Saturday 
Press, from publishing future editions that were “malicious, 
scandalous or defamatory.”896  After nine issues of the weekly had 
appeared, a court declared—in an action initiated by the local 
district attorney, Floyd B. Olson—that the periodical was a “public 
nuisance.”897  Its owners were enjoined “perpetually” from 
publishing “any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, 
scandalous or defamatory newspaper, as defined by law.”898  If at any 
time in the future someone claimed that the paper violated the 
injunction, the defendants would be hauled back before a judge to 
defend their article on pain of fine or imprisonment.899  In that 
proceeding, the publisher would have to “satisfy the court that, in 
addition to being true, the matter was published with good motives 
and for justifiable ends.”900 
If ever there was a periodical that deserved censorship, The 
Saturday Press surely qualified.  According to Fred Friendly, a noted 
professor of journalism at Columbia who wrote a book on the case, 
the publisher Jay Near was “[a]nti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, antiblack 
and antilabor.”901  His newspaper amply reflected these sentiments.  
Chief Justice Hughes gave a sanitized version of its contents: “[T]he 
articles charged, in substance, that a Jewish gangster was in control 
of gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in Minneapolis, and 
that law enforcing officers and agencies were not energetically 
performing their duties.”902  Justice Butler’s dissent gave a much 
more realistic depiction by quoting directly from a 1927 article in 
 895. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 896. Id. at 706. 
 897. Id. 
 898. Id. at 702–03, 706. 
 899. See id. at 703. 
 900. Id. at 711–12. 
 901. FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE 
LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS 32 (1981). 
 902. Near, 283 U.S. at 704. 
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The Saturday Press.  Here are some of the choicer pieces: 
There have been too many men in this city and especially 
those in official life, who HAVE been taking orders and 
suggestions from JEW GANGSTERS, therefore WE HAVE Jew 
GANGSTERS, practically ruling Minneapolis. 
Practically every vendor of vile hooch, every owner of a 
moonshine still, every snake-faced gangster and 
[safecracker] in the Twin Cities is a JEW. 
I simply state a fact when I say that ninety per cent of the 
crimes committed against society in this city are 
committed by Jew gangsters.903 
Scurrilous as this scandal sheet was, the Court found the 
injunction to be an unconstitutional prior restraint: “This is of the 
essence of censorship,” Hughes concluded.904  Immunity from prior 
restraints was the “the chief purpose”905 of the First Amendment: 
“liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the 
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not 
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.”906  
Blackstone’s influence lived on, as Hughes quoted his maxim 
against prior restraints.  Only “exceptional” circumstances justify a 
prior restraint such as an injunction.907  One of those would be 
wartime, and here Hughes quoted Holmes’ admonition in Schenck 
that while soldiers fought otherwise allowable speech could be 
suppressed.  “No one would question but that a government might 
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the 
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and 
location of troops.”908  The “troopship exception” is sometimes 
thought of as the sole exclusion from an otherwise total ban on 
prior restraints.  Not so.  Hughes went on to list other exceptions: 
On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency 
may be enforced against obscene publications.  The 
security of the community life may be protected against 
incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force 
of orderly government.  The constitutional guaranty of 
free speech does not ‘protect a man from an injunction 
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force 
 903. Id. at 724 n.1 (Buttler, J., dissenting). 
 904. Id. at 713. 
 905. Id. 
 906. Id. at 716. 
 907. Id. 
 908. Id. 
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. . . . Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the 
extent of authority to prevent publications in order to 
protect private rights according to the principles 
governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of 
equity.909 
These exceptions outlined in Near had the potential to become 
vehicles for suppression of ideas.  For example, one could plausibly 
argue that The Saturday Press might have engendered violence.  The 
last sentence in Hughes’ statement, which mentions private rights, 
would permit injunctions in a seemingly unlimited range of civil 
case involving private parties.  One business might get an 
injunction against a competitor to stop the rival from disparaging 
its business.  As to speech that has “the effect of force,”910 Hughes 
gave the example of a permitted injunction against a labor boycott.  
He also cited Schenck, presumably meaning that Charles Schenck 
might have been enjoined from violating the Espionage Act.  
Incitements to violence or overthrow of the government likewise 
could be stopped by court order.  Obscenity was subject to advance 
restraint, presumably by licensing systems or mail censorship.  And 
these were not the only questions left open by Near.  How much 
evidence was needed to obtain an injunction if one of these 
exceptions was invoked?  Wouldn’t a defendant be denied the right 
to a jury trial in injunction and contempt proceedings, which are 
conducted solely by a judge?  What standards applied to 
administrative licensing systems for speech-related activities?  Why 
were these exceptions on the list, as opposed to others?  Answers to 
these and many other questions concerning prior restraints against 
expression would be given by the Court on numerous occasions in 
subsequent years.  The interesting question to ask is why the Court 
seemed so worried about an injunction against a publication that 
hardly deserved any solicitude.  A reasonable person could fairly 
conclude that the world would have been better off had The 
Saturday Press never existed. 
Unfortunately, the magazine did exist.  Hughes and his 
colleagues had no interest in protecting vile literature as such.  
Rather, their aim was to promote a vigorous press in order to 
maintain vigilance over government: “The fact that for 
approximately one hundred and fifty years there has been almost 
an entire absence of attempts to impose previous restraints upon 
 909. Id. 
 910. Id. 
125
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
898 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers is 
significant of the deep-seated conviction that such restraints would 
violate constitutional right.”911  For all its egregious faults, The 
Saturday Press was “devoted to charges against public officers” 
relating “to the prevalence and protection of crime.”912  In fact, 
District Attorney Olson, the one who brought the injunction 
action, was among those the newspaper criticized for ceding the 
city to mobsters.913  Moreover, gangsters had been active in 
Minneapolis at the time, and some of the most notorious of the lot 
were Jewish.  But the important point was that allowing suppression 
of the newspaper would permit the same treatment for other, more 
responsible critics.  Hughes fondly recalled Madison’s praise for 
the press, written as part of his Virginia Resolution.  It was “to the 
press alone,” Madison wrote, “chequered as it is with abuses,” that 
the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have 
been gained by reason and humanity over error and 
oppression; who reflect that to the same beneficent 
source the United States owe much of the lights which 
conducted them to the ranks of a free and independent 
nation, and which have improved their political system 
into a shape so auspicious to their happiness[.]914 
Hughes contended that the need for a watchful and fearless 
press was even greater now than when Madison wrote: 
[T]he administration of government has become more 
complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and 
corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most 
serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by 
unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the 
fundamental security of life and property by criminal 
alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary 
need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great 
cities.915 
The press had become an indispensable check on 
government⎯an institution essential to the proper and orderly 
functioning of society.916 
 911. Id. at 718. 
 912. Id. at 711. 
 913. Id. at 704. 
 914. Id. at 718 (quoting James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions 
(1799), reprinted in MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 149, at 544. 
 915. Id. at 719–20. 
 916. Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation 
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By the way, there was an interesting denouement to the Near 
story.  Howard Guilford was the editor of The Saturday Press at the 
time the stories appeared that provoked the district attorney to 
seek an injunction.  On September 8, 1934, Guilford was executed 
in his car—gangland-style, by shotgun blasts—one of several 
assassinations of editors in Minneapolis during this period.917  
Olson later was elected governor of Minnesota, running on a 
Farmer-Labor Party platform that included the charge: “Capitalism 
has failed and immediate steps must be taken by the people to 
abolish capitalism in a peaceful and lawful manner . . . .”918 
In protecting the vital role of the press from censorship, 
inevitably the freedom conferred would be abused.  Again Madison 
supplied the answer for Hughes, that “a more serious public evil 
would be caused by authority to prevent publication.”919  Madison 
reasoned that “[s]ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the 
proper use of everything, and in no instance is this more true than 
in that of the press.”920  According to Madison’s account of 
contemporary practices, the states had decided that “it is better to 
leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, 
by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the 
proper fruits.”921  This did not mean that the press or a speaker had 
license to say just anything⎯they could still be held accountable 
after the fact in a criminal or civil proceeding.  Hughes also 
embraced the other aspect of Blackstone’s legacy, that: 
punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the 
press is essential to the protection of the public, and that 
the common-law rules that subject the libeler to 
responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the 
private injury, are not abolished by the protection 
extended in our Constitutions.922 
Malicious libel was a crime in most states, and the Court had 
no problem with its prosecution.  “Public officers, whose character 
and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in the 
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1454 (1987). 
 917. MARDA L. WOODBURY, STOPPING THE PRESSES: THE MURDER OF WALTER W. 
LIGGETT 40 (1998). 
 918. See George W. Bergquist, The Dilemma of the Farmer-Labor Party, 3 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 476, 477 (1939) (quoting Farmer-Labor platform). 
 919. Near, 283 U.S. at 722. 
 920. Id. at 718 (quoting MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 149, at 544). 
 921. Id. (quoting MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 149, at 544). 
 922. Id. at 715. 
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press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under 
libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and not in 
proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and 
periodicals.”923 
Subsequent cases showed that the Court was serious in 
disapproving prior judicial restraints on speech.  A 1945 decision, 
Thomas v. Collins,924 illustrates this fundamental point.  Texas had a 
law requiring union solicitors to register with the state.925  Collins, 
the president of an international union, traveled to Texas for the 
sole purpose of giving a speech as part of an organizing campaign 
for workers at a refinery.926  Unbeknownst to Collins, Texas 
obtained a restraining order that ordered him not to solicit 
members for the union without first registering with the state.927  
Collins delivered his speech anyway, urging plant workers to join 
the union and choose it as their bargaining agent at an upcoming 
election.928  For this, Collins was held in contempt of court, fined, 
and sent to jail for three days.929  A major problem for Collins’ 
defense was the accepted practice of requiring various professions 
to obtain licenses from the state—Texas contended that its law 
mandated nothing more than a simple business license.930  For a 
majority of the Court, however, the restraining order was 
suspicious: it was issued in explicit anticipation of the speech and to 
restrain Thomas from “uttering . . . any language which could be 
taken as solicitation.”931  Most anything Collins might say on behalf 
of the union could be characterized as soliciting prospective 
members.  “The threat of the restraining order, backed by the 
power of contempt, and of arrest for crime, hung over every word.  
A speaker in such circumstances could avoid the words ‘solicit,’ 
‘invite,’ ‘join.’  It would be impossible to avoid the idea.”932  Thus, 
the case came down to this: Texas was demanding that a person 
obtain a license to give a speech.  Justice Wiley Rutledge wrote on 
behalf of the majority that 
 923. Id. at 718–19. 
 924. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 925. Id. at 518–19. 
 926. Id. at 520–21. 
 927. Id. at 521. 
 928. Id, at 522. 
 929. Id. at 523–24. 
 930. Id. at 526. 
 931. Id. at 528. 
 932. Id. at 534. 
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a requirement of registration in order to make a public 
speech would seem generally incompatible with an 
exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly.  
Lawful public assemblies, involving no element of grave 
and immediate danger to an interest the state is entitled 
to protect, are not instruments of harm which require 
previous identification of the speakers.933 
Speech may be controlled through limiting the methods by 
which communication occurs.  Bans on picketing, handbilling, 
doorbelling, or using amplified sound, for example, limit a 
speaker’s access to an audience.  Parade permit systems not only 
preclude spontaneous demonstrations, but may be abused by 
authorities if there are no standards to guide their discretion in 
deciding whether to issue the license.  Special taxes on the press 
might drive media out of business or warn them to toe the line.  
Through a series of cases decided beginning in 1937, the Court 
significantly constrained states and municipalities from banning 
speech activities at public locations such as streets and parks.  It 
also greatly curbed the authority of officials to deny permits for 
public speaking activities. 
On the first point, the Court looked dimly on laws that forbade 
entire modes of communication, such as handbilling or picketing.  
Chief Justice Hughes wrote the opinion for the Court in Lovell v. 
City of Griffin,934 invalidating a city ordinance banning the 
distribution of “literature of any kind . . . without first obtaining 
written permission from the City Manager . . . .”935  Alma Lovell, a 
Jehovah’s Witness, defied the law as she handed out literature 
promoting her religion.  She had refused to obtain the requisite 
permit because, as a tenet of her faith, “she regarded herself as sent 
‘by Jehovah to do His work’ and that such an application would 
have been ‘an act of disobedience to His commandment.’”936  
Taking note of the “broad sweep” of the ordinance,937 which 
literally applied to “the distribution of literature of any kind at any 
time, at any place, and in any manner[,]”938 Hughes held it “invalid 
on its face.”939  He identified the flaw in the system as the same one 
 933. Id. at 539. 
   934.    303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
 935. Id. at 447. 
 936. Id. at 448. 
 937. Id. at 450. 
 938. Id. at 451. 
 939. Id. 
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infecting Near: the law “strikes at the very foundation of the 
freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship.  
The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed 
against the power of the licensor.”940 
Two separate issues were implicated in cases such as Lovell.  
The first was the comprehensive ban on distributing literature and 
canvassing without a permit, and the second concerned the 
limitless discretion given to city officials in approving them.  Lovell 
lumped these separate features of the law together, whereas later 
cases would determine that each was a fatal constitutional flaw.  
The first issue was addressed squarely in a 1939 decision, Schneider 
v. New Jersey,941 which overturned four different city ordinances in as 
many states. In varying ways, the ordinances banned handbilling, 
door-to-door solicitation, and posting signs on public streets.  
Municipal authorities defended these laws as reasonable means to 
maintain order on the streets, prevent fraud in solicitation, and 
discourage littering. 
Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in Schneider did not doubt 
that the first of these justifications was legitimate: cities could enact 
reasonable limits on the time, place, and manner of speech.  “For 
example,” Roberts continued, “a person could not exercise this 
liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a crowded street, 
contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the 
stoppage of all traffic . . . .”942  A total ban, however, excessively 
“diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions.”943  As for the littering caused by discarded 
flyers, the harm to the public from such esthetic insults did not 
outweigh the rights of the handbillers: 
Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning 
and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such 
distribution results from the constitutional protection of 
the freedom of speech and press.  This constitutional 
protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent 
street littering.  There are obvious methods of preventing 
littering.  Amongst these is the punishment of those who 
actually throw papers on the streets. 944 
 940. Id. 
 941. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 942. Id. at 160. 
 943. Id. at 161. 
 944. Id. at 162 (emphasis added). 
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True enough in theory, although it is far easier to stop 
handbillers than to arrest litterers or pick up their rejected papers.  
Littering inevitably accompanies handbilling—unless the police 
assign a cop to every canvasser—and the city will be stuck paying 
the tab for cleaning up the debris.  Implicitly, the Court balanced 
the societal costs of more trash in the streets against the democratic 
values advanced by communicating through handing out literature 
to the public, concluding that “the streets are natural and proper 
places for the dissemination of information and opinion . . . .”945 
Lovell was followed by a pair of 1940 cases that invalidated laws 
prohibiting picketing of businesses in labor disputes,946 which the 
Court said hampered efforts to “enlighten the public on the nature 
and causes of a labor dispute.”947  In one of these cases, Thornhill v. 
Alabama, the State argued that the law was necessary to protect the 
“community from the violence and breaches of the peace, which, it 
asserts, are the concomitants of picketing.”948  That excuse flunked 
the clear-and-present-danger smell test, inasmuch as there was no 
“inherent” reason why labor picketing would provoke a breach of 
the peace, which in any event could be dealt with by arresting those 
who were provoked to violate the law.949  Justice Murphy’s majority 
opinion (only McReynolds dissented) extolled the public purposes 
served by free speech in labor matters, emphasizing that the issues 
being discussed went beyond the economic interests of the 
immediate parties: “Free discussion concerning the conditions in 
industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us 
indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of 
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial 
society.”950  A prime function of the First Amendment was to 
facilitate democratic change, Murphy asserted, so the party 
controlling the government cannot stack the rules about speech in 
order to retard a fair public discussion of the issues.951  “[T]he 
group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on 
peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest 
merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take 
 945. Id. at 163. 
 946. See Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88 (1940). 
 947. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104. 
 948. Id. at 105. 
 949. Id. 
 950. Id. at 103. 
 951. Id. at 104. 
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action inconsistent with its interests.”952  Justice Holmes then 
received posthumous vindication as Justice Murphy paraphrased 
his dissent in Abrams: “Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion 
can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils 
arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the 
merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of 
public opinion.953 
Although labor demonstrations could not be banned outright, 
neither were they immune from sufficiently narrow regulations.  
Violence accompanying picketing was fair game for injunctions, 
because “the Fourteenth Amendment does not make 
unconstitutional the use of the injunction as a means of restricting 
violence.”954  These were “exceptional cases,” nonetheless, and a 
state could not “enjoin peaceful picketing merely because it may 
provoke violence in others.”955  A state also could prohibit 
secondary boycotts by unions, in which the target of the protest was 
not directly involved in the alleged unfair labor practices.  
Picketing in support of an illegal boycott could be proscribed 
because they were furthered illegal restraints on trade.956 
Streets were not the only natural places to espouse one’s views.  
The doorsteps of peoples’ homes also qualified, it seemed.  That 
was the upshot of a 1943 decision, Martin v. City of Struthers,957 in an 
opinion by Justice Black.  The City of Struthers, Ohio, had a law 
forbidding knocking on doors or ringing doorbells in order to 
distribute “handbills, circulars or other advertisements . . . .”958  
 952. Id. 
 953. Id. at 104–05 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting).  See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 
(1941) (holding that State cannot exclusively limit picketing in labor case in which 
the conflict is between an employer and its own employees); Carlson v. California, 
310 U.S. 106 (1940) (striking down a California anti-picketing law on the same day 
Thornhill was decided). 
 954. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 295 (1941). 
 955. Id. at 296. 
 956. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (holding that 
secondary boycotts and related picketing by unions may be banned); Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing in support of secondary 
boycott not protected by First Amendment).  Cf. FTC v. Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 425–28 (1990) (finding agreement by court-
appointed lawyers for indigent defendants to withhold services unless higher fees 
were received was an illegal restraint on trade not protected by First Amendment). 
 957. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
 958. Id. at 142. 
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Again, it was a peripatetic Jehovah’s Witness who challenged the 
law⎯and won.959  Justice Black opened the opinion by invoking 
tradition: 
For centuries it has been a common practice in this and 
other countries for persons not specifically invited to go 
from home to home and knock on doors or ring doorbells 
to communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them 
to political, religious, or other kinds of public meetings.960 
He went on to connect canvassing with democracy: “Of, 
course, as every person acquainted with political life knows, door to 
door campaigning is one of the most accepted techniques of 
seeking popular support . . . . Door to door distribution of circulars 
is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.”961  (Black 
had not forgotten his populist roots as a Senator from Alabama.)  
Freedom of speech “embraces the right to distribute literature and 
necessarily protects the right to receive it.”962  Here were two new 
twists: The recipient of the communication had a right to receive 
the information and was deprived by not getting a knock on the 
door.  “Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever 
he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free 
society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations 
of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.”963  
Beyond that, the “little people”964 needed to use a low-cost means of 
getting themselves heard, for that was part of democracy.  By this 
understanding, the First Amendment had an imperative: to 
facilitate democratic discussion. 
Despite this high-minded thinking, the City of Struthers had 
real concerns.  As an iron and steel manufacturing town, many of 
its residents worked nights and slept days.  Burglars also had been 
known to pose as canvassers to check out if anyone was at home.  
Did these concerns matter?  They were entitled to weight, Justice 
Black answered, “the peace, good order, and comfort of the 
community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place 
and manner of distribution.”965  All of these interests could be 
accommodated by means short of a flat ban: 
 959. Id. 
 960. Id. at 141. 
 961. Id. at 146. 
 962. Id. at 143 (citation omitted). 
 963. Id. at 146–47. 
 964. Id. at 146. 
 965. Id. at 143. 
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The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by 
traditional legal methods, leaving to each householder 
the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as 
visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose 
but that forbidden by the Constitution, [which was] the 
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.966 
Black offered Struthers an alternative that would meet all of its 
objectives: A home dweller could put up a “No Solicitation” sign on 
his door, which the city then could validly enforce with trespass 
laws.967 
Lovell and Martin thus introduced a principal component of 
modern First Amendment analysis.968  When the fundamental right 
of free speech is at stake, the state must pursue available 
alternatives to address its legitimate police-power 
needs⎯alternatives that are less restrictive of speech.  To an extent, 
not clearly defined, the state must bear the burden of assuring that 
speech has an opportunity to be heard. 
The second concern raised in Lovell, standardless 
administrative discretion, was also present in one of the city 
ordinances reviewed in Schneider, which the Court criticized 
because a person’s “liberty to communicate with the residents of 
the town at their homes depends upon the exercise of the officer’s 
discretion.”969  That officials would abuse their discretion to quash 
speech was resoundingly demonstrated by a 1939 case arising from 
Jersey City, New Jersey, Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization.970  Frank Hague had been the Democratic mayor of 
Jersey City since 1917 and he would remain so until retiring in 1947 
to a role of éminence grise.  He was the embodiment of the old-time 
city “boss,” who ruled his political machine with absolute authority.  
Hague also had considerable statewide and even national power 
due to his ability to deliver Democratic votes by hook or crook.  He 
was known to say, “I am the law,” and “I decide.  I do.  Me.”971 
One of the ways Hague maintained discipline was by tightly 
controlling public demonstrations.  A city law required a permit 
 966. Id. at 147. 
 967. See id. at 147–48. 
 968. See id.  See also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
 969. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). 
 970. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 971. RICHARD J. CONNORS, A CYCLE OF POWER: THE CAREER OF JERSEY CITY 
MAYOR FRANK HAGUE 74 (1971); DAYTON D. MCKEAN, THE BOSS: THE HAGUE 
MACHINE IN ACTION 270–71 (1940). 
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from the Director of Public Safety in order to hold any “public 
parades or public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, 
public parks or public buildings of Jersey City . . . .”972  No one 
received a permit if their views conflicted with those of Hague, 
whose ruthlessness against opponents was legendary.  That meant 
that the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was invariably 
refused permits from the city to hold organizing meetings while 
others groups were allowed to do so.  Hague was not anti-labor, as 
he courted unions and workers on other occasions.  But he 
regarded the CIO as rife with Communists.  CIO organizers were 
harassed, arrested, frequently beaten by Jersey City police, and 
unceremoniously thrown out of the county.  Justice Roberts’ 
plurality opinion in Hague condemned the essentially standardless 
permit system as an “instrument of arbitrary suppression of free 
expression of views on national affairs . . . .”973  Subsequent cases 
would emphasize that 
an ordinance which . . . makes the peaceful enjoyment of 
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent 
upon the uncontrolled will of an official⎯as by requiring 
a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in 
the discretion of such official⎯is an unconstitutional 
censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those 
freedoms.974 
Without specifically saying so, Justice Roberts had infused his 
First Amendment analysis with equal protection principles.  
Empowering an official to grant permits without any standards was 
a recipe for differential treatment according to the biases of the 
censor.  Justice Brandeis made this point in his dissent to a 1921 
ruling in which the postmaster was given broad power to determine 
if mailings violated the Espionage Act.  Classifying a mailing as 
violating the Act obliged the sender to pay a rate from eight to 
fifteen times higher than that enjoyed by approved magazines and 
newspapers.975  Justice Brandeis had protested in vain that the 
 972. Hague, 307 U.S. at 502 n.1. 
 973. Id. at 516. 
 974. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).  See also Kunz v. New 
York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951) (stating that “we have consistently condemned 
licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to grant or 
withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public 
places.”); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (holding no standards at all 
for use of public park). 
 975. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 
(1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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arbitrary power given to postal officials denied “equal protection of 
the laws.”976  A 1951 opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Vinson, 
however, invoked equal protection principles to overturn a 
Maryland town’s practice of vesting discretion in a local official as 
to whether a public park could be used for meetings.  Overturning 
this system, which inexplicably had been applied to deny Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ use of the park, the Chief Justice linked the First 
Amendment issues to equal protection: “The right to equal 
protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech 
and religion protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
has a firmer foundation than the whims or personal opinions of a 
local governing body.”977 
A major obstacle for Roberts to overcome was the traditional 
view that a city, as owner of municipal property, could impose any 
conditions it wished for use, including no access whatsoever.  
Roberts challenged the assumption on which this longstanding rule 
had rested, using lines that would appear over and over in later 
cases: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.  Such use of the streets and 
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the 
streets and parks for communication of views on national 
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not 
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in 
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, 
and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must 
not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.978 
Justice Roberts’ homage to the streets and parks as public 
forums since time immemorial would have come as a shock to the 
Wobblies who were arrested for speaking on street corners or to 
the abolitionists who were denied public spaces to meet.  If 
Roberts’ vision was something of a fiction, it nonetheless was one 
that made better theoretical sense than the traditional view that the 
 976. Id. at 432–33. 
 977. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272. 
 978. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515–16. 
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state was the arbitrary master of its property.  People must have 
access to the streets, parks, and other public venues for speech, but 
not simply because these places literally are owned by the people.  
If that were the justification, the majority of the people, acting as 
owners, could vote to block access to opponents, just as a 
homeowner can toss out an unwelcome guest.  The Court’s 
explanation was functional, viewing speech as a means to an end, 
and hence the public commons must remain free for expression 
without regard to content in order to facilitate democratic 
discourse.  Allowing the governing party to control access to 
speaking venues (especially low cost ones) retards political change, 
as Frank Hague’s career attests. 
Cantwell v. Connecticut,979 which we previously surveyed,980 also 
invalidated the state’s requirement that solicitors of money for 
alleged religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes first obtain a 
permit from the Secretary of Public Welfare.  Justice Roberts had 
no doubt “that a state may by general and non-discriminatory 
legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of 
soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon . . . .”981  
Nothing would be wrong with a measure designed to combat fraud 
that “requir[ed] a stranger in the community, before permitting 
him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his 
identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to 
represent.”982  Connecticut would not be amiss in prescribing “the 
time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public 
safety, peace, comfort or convenience.”983  The vice of the law in 
Cantwell lay in its authorizing the Secretary of Public Welfare “to 
withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not a 
religious one.  Such a censorship of religion as the means of 
determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by 
the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within 
the protection of the Fourteenth.”984 
One message in Cantwell was that the Court did not regard 
licensing systems for expressive activities as per se unconstitutional.  
Less than a year later, in Cox v. New Hampshire,985 the Justices 
 979. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 980. See supra notes 805–24 and accompanying text. 
 981. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. 
 982. Id. at 306. 
 983. Id. at 306–07. 
 984. Id. at 305. 
 985. 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
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confirmed that understanding, rejecting pleas that requiring a 
permit to speak would amount to a forbidden prior restraint.  Sixty-
eight Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested for marching throughout 
the business district of Manchester, New Hampshire, without 
having obtained the requisite parade permit required by state law.  
Chief Justice Hughes, in one of his last opinions, upheld the 
regulation, emphasizing that the state’s courts had limited the 
discretion of licensing officials to considerations of the time, place 
and manner of parades.  No evidence had been introduced to show 
that the law was administered discriminatorily.  Permit systems for 
demonstrations of this sort were appropriate uses of the state’s 
police power “to secure convenient use of the streets by other 
travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder.”986  Advance notice 
to authorities gave them an opportunity to arrange appropriate 
policing and “to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or 
processions . . . .”987 
How did Cox square with the Court’s previous holdings 
castigating prior restraints, including injunctions and licensing 
systems?  The key was the absence of any reason to believe that New 
Hampshire was attempting to limit speakers due to the content of 
the message they wished to impart.  Nor did its statute engage in 
overkill by requiring licenses when doing so would serve no 
legitimate purpose, as in Thomas v. Collins.988  And the law did not 
preclude the use of entire forms of expression, as occurred when 
states banned picketing of businesses, handbilling, or door-to-door 
canvassing.  A pair of late 1940s cases illustrates these distinctions.  
In Saia v. New York,989 the Court objected to a law that allowed the 
use of amplified sound in public places unless one obtained a 
permit from the Chief of Police.  In addition to there being no 
standards to guide the Chief’s discretion, the ordinance was “not 
narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-
speakers, or the volume of sound (the decibels) to which they must 
be adjusted.”990  About six months later, however, the Court upheld 
a ban on “loud and raucous noises” emitted from amplifiers on 
 986. Id. at 576. 
 987. Id.  See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); 
Carpenters v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (discussing the allowance of 
restraints on secondary boycotts). 
 988. See supra notes 924–33 and accompanying text. 
 989. 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
 990. Id. at 560. 
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motor vehicles.991  Protecting the “tranquility of [the] community” 
was a proper objective, Justice Reed wrote in a plurality opinion.992  
While it would probably be unconstitutional to ban all sound 
trucks, he allowed, the “[u]nrestrained use throughout a 
municipality of all sound amplifying devices would be 
intolerable.”993  Brushing aside the objection that “loud and 
raucous” was so vague that it conferred discretion on the police, 
Reed took the side of the “unwilling listener,” who was “practically 
helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud 
speakers except through the protection of the municipality.”994 
Another method of restraining the press that came before the 
Court in this period was discriminatory taxation.  The principal 
case, Grosjean v. American Press Co.,995 emerged from Louisiana in the 
1930s.  Senator Huey P. Long, a demagogue if there ever was one, 
became piqued at the larger newspapers in the state for their 
criticisms of his actions, although he supported the smaller presses 
that remained loyal.  At Senator Long’s urging, the legislature 
passed a two percent tax on the gross revenue of newspapers with 
circulations above 20,000, which just happened to include all but 
one of the papers that opposed the Kingfish.  Senator Long 
accused “lying newspapers” of waging a “vicious campaign” against 
him.996  “For each dollar these papers . . . take in, they tell a lie.  
There is no reason why the State of Louisiana should not receive 
two cents for each of these lies.”997  A tax on lies, if it could be 
collected, would no doubt erase the national debt.  Senator Long’s 
plan, however, was recognized immediately as a virtually unveiled 
attack on press opponents to the political establishment.  The 
taxed newspapers sued on the grounds that the exactions violated 
freedom of the press and the Equal Protection Clause.998 
 991. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949). 
 992. Id. at 83. 
 993. Id. at 81. 
 994. Id. at 86–87. 
 995. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
 996. Brief of Appellees at 9, Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233 
(U.S. 1935) (No. 303). 
 997. Id.  (quoting circular written by Senator Long and Governor Oscar K. 
Allen and distributed to state legislators in 1934). 
 998. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 
U.S. 575, 580 (1983) (discussing history of Grosjean); EMERSON, supra note 15, at 
418–19.  See generally RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE KINGFISH AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
HUEY LONG, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PRESS 
FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1996). 
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In striking down the tax, Justice Sutherland recounted the 
bitter objections to newspaper taxes in England and the colonies.999  
Taxes had been used not for revenue, Sutherland asserted, but “to 
suppress the publication of comments and criticisms objectionable 
to the Crown.”1000  Given that history, it was “impossible to believe” 
that discriminatory taxes were consistent with the First 
Amendment.1001  Louisiana’s tax was obviously not a neutral 
revenue device.  The tax “is bad,” Justice Sutherland concluded, 
“because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is 
seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to 
limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled 
in virtue of the constitutional guaranties.”1002  Without mentioning 
Huey Long, it was apparent that the Court was well aware of the 
brazenly seamy scheme behind the tax.  Justice Sutherland used it 
as an occasion once again to link a free press with effective 
government: 
The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the 
country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, 
more light on the public and business affairs of the nation 
than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since 
informed public opinion is the most potent of all 
restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or 
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press 
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.1003 
Grosjean spawned a long line of cases attacking taxes on the 
press or speakers.  As the Court noted in 1983, “the result in 
Grosjean may have been attributable in part to the perception on 
the part of the Court that the State imposed the tax with an intent 
to penalize a selected group of newspapers.”1004  Economic 
regulations and even taxes can be imposed on press organs so long 
as they are part of an overall scheme that is applicable to businesses 
generally.  Although Grosjean did not reach the newspapers’ claim 
that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court’s 
 999. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 245–46. 
 1000. Id. at 246. 
 1001. Id. at 248. 
 1002. Id. at 250. 
 1003. Id.  See also Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1935-36: The 
Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 
1935, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 253, 271–72 (1937) (discussing the contemporary 
awareness of the Louisiana tax's purpose). 
 1004. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 580 (1983). 
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reasoning indicated its importance to First Amendment reasoning.  
Had this been any other kind of business, a differential tax based 
on production would be unexceptional.  Because First Amendment 
considerations are in play, the rules changed.  The differential tax 
had “the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing 
the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.”1005 
Taxes on expressive behavior were also found improper 
despite the absence of discriminatory purpose.  A 1943 case, 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,1006 invalidated a flat tax on anyone wishing 
to sell merchandise door-to-door.  The law was applied to itinerant 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who tried to sell religious literature house-to-
house in an effort to win converts.1007  These sales, Justice Douglas 
explained in his majority opinion, were “‘merely incidental and 
collateral’ to their ‘main object which was to preach and publicize 
the doctrines of their order.’”1008  They were preaching, and 
“spreading one’s religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through 
distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations 
is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to 
constitutional protection as the more orthodox types.”1009  A flat tax 
on these activities violated the stricture that “[a] state may not 
impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal 
constitution.”1010  Justice Douglas was drawing a fine distinction 
here.  Prior cases established that license fees could accompany 
parade permits, “as a regulatory measure to defray the expense” of 
policing the activities in question.1011 
By the end of the 1940s, the Court had in place a methodology 
for analyzing First Amendment cases that would guide 
developments for the remainder of the century.  Basically, it 
 1005. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251.  See also Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 581 
(explaining allowable economic regulation of the press); Ark. Writers’ Project, 
Inc. v. Ragland Comm’r of Revenue of Ark., 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (citing other 
press taxation cases). 
 1006. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
 1007. Id. 
 1008. Id. at 112 (quoting State v. Mead, 300 N.W. 523, 524 (1941)). 
 1009. Id. at 110. 
 1010. Id. at 113. 
 1011. Id. at 116.  See also Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) 
(invalidating licensing tax for distribution of printed matter); Largent v. Texas, 
318 U.S. 418 (1943) (holding that the state cannot prohibit distributing handbills 
for a religious activity solely because the handbills invite the purchase of religious 
books or solicit funds for religious purposes); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 
(1943) (holding the same).  But see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 568, 576–77 
(1941) (upholding license fee for parade). 
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divided speech issues into two types.  One issue was whether the 
state could ban a particular expression or method of expression 
because it presented a clear and present danger.1012  That test had 
been refined to require that the danger be at once serious and 
immediate.  In assessing these factors, the Court also took into 
account the importance of the expression to public understanding, 
especially about political questions.  On several occasions it 
announced that speech and press occupied a “preferred position” 
in American society.1013  At the same time, building upon historical 
assumptions about appropriate uses of the police powers, the Court 
declared that specific types of speech were entirely outside the 
protection of the First Amendment.1014  In Chaplinsky, Justice 
Murphy noted that there were 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.1015 
Why were these types of speech entirely outside the First 
Amendment’s ambit of protection?  Justice Murphy explained that 
“such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”1016  By contrast, speech that related 
to issues of public importance, such as politics, economics and 
industrial relations, received the full protection of the clear and 
present danger test.1017  Unquestionably this was a value judgment, 
although one faithful to historical practice.1018 
The second issue dealt with the methods of regulating speech, 
including expression that could not be banned outright without 
 1012. See supra notes 805–24 (discussing Cantwell and the clear-and-present-
danger test). 
 1013. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575 (1944) 
(discussing speech as being in a “preferred position”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). 
 1014. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109–10. 
 1015. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 1016. Id. at 572. 
 1017. See id. at 571–72. 
 1018. See id. at 572. 
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violating the First Amendment.1019  Speech was subject to various 
controls that furthered community values while allowing outlets for 
public expression.1020  Rules that dictated the time, place and 
manner of speech could pass judicial examination provided they 
were administered in ways that precluded official censorship of 
ideas and were not excessively prohibitory.1021  “The preferred 
position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty for 
all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens 
to comfort and convenience,” Justice Reed wrote.1022  Prior 
restraints were strongly disfavored when they took the form of 
suppressing the content of speech, as in Thomas v. Collins.1023  Again, 
this idea accorded with long accepted practice.1024 
Consequently, the major development that occurred between 
the end of the Red Scare in the 1920s and the close of the 1940s 
was a refinement and tightening of the clear and present danger 
standard.  The Court acknowledged explicitly that it was 
abandoning the “bad tendency” guideline that had served since the 
beginning of the Republic.  It accepted both Justice Holmes’ 
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas and his specific rules on the 
immediacy and seriousness of the danger.  If the Court now had a 
guiding philosophy, it was that of Justices Holmes and Brandeis: 
offensive speech must be combated not with repression but 
rebuttal.  Only if dialogue was impossible because of emergency 
circumstances would it be constitutional for authorities to sanction 
speech.  Almost all of the cases that championed this philosophy 
involved political speech, and the Court customarily spoke of free 
speech and press as being essential to democracy and orderly 
government.  Justice Stone, in the Carolene Products footnote 
discussed earlier, stated that “presumption of constitutionality” 
ordinarily afforded to legislation did not apply to restraints upon 
the political speech, “interferences with political organizations,” 
and “prohibition of peaceable assembly.”1025  In a concurring 
opinion in Hague the following year, Justice Stone added: “No more 
grave and important issue can be brought to this Court than that of 
 1019. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 94 (1949). 
 1020. Id. 
 1021. See id. at 81–83. 
 1022. Id. at 88. 
 1023. Id. at 94 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 530 (1945)). 
 1024. Id. at 88. 
 1025. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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freedom of speech and assembly, which the due process clause 
guarantees to all persons regardless of their citizenship . . . .”1026 
Far more important than developments in technical rules 
regarding free expression was the Court’s recognition of the 
positive values associated with free speech.  A case that closed out 
the decade of the 1940s illustrates this fact in a dramatic way.  
Arthur Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest and controversial 
anti-Semitic extremist, had been invited to speak at a meeting in 
Chicago on February 7, 1946 sponsored by the “Christian Veterans 
of America,” a group enthusiastic about Terminiello’s beliefs.1027  
Speaking on the theme of “Christ or Chaos—Christian Nationalism 
or World Communism—Which?”1028  he warned of “a conspiratorial 
threat to Christian America from Russia, Communism, the New 
Deal, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Zionism.”1029  Some 800 people were 
packed into Chicago’s West End Women’s Club to hear 
Terminiello speak while “a howling mob” of several hundred die-
hard opponents worked themselves into a froth outside. 1030  A 
number of Terminiello’s foes managed to get inside to stir up 
trouble.1031  Eventually the crowd outdoors reached an estimated 
1,000 people, completely occupying a city block.1032  Justice 
Jackson’s dissent gives a more vivid description of the melee than 
the bland recital in Justice Douglas’ majority opinion: 
Those inside the hall could hear the loud noises and hear 
those on the outside yell, ‘Fascists, Hitlers!’ and curse 
words like ‘damn Fascists.’  Bricks were thrown through 
the windowpanes before and during the speaking.  About 
28 windows were broken. . . . [B]ottles, stink bombs and 
brickbats were thrown.  Police were unable to control the 
mob which kept breaking the windows at the meeting 
hall, drowning out the speaker’s voice at times and 
breaking in through the back door of the auditorium.  
 1026. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 524 (1939) (Stone, J., 
concurring). 
 1027. City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 74 N.E.2d 45, 46 (1947). 
 1028. Id. at 47. 
 1029. Patrick Schmidt, “The Dilemma to a Free People”: Justice Robert Jackson, Walter 
Bagehot, and the Creation of a Conservative Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 517, 519 
(2002). 
 1030. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 16 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
 1031. Id. 
 1032. Id. 
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About 17 of the group outside were arrested by the 
police.1033 
Terminiello did not back down, instead hurling his own 
epithets at the rioters, calling them “slimy scum,” “probably” 
foreigners, and comparing them to snakes and bedbugs.1034  “Those 
mobs are chanting; that is the caveman’s chant,” Terminiello 
shouted.1035  His speech was aggressively anti-Semitic, provoking 
some in the crowd to make vile remarks about Jews.1036  His listeners 
in the hall reacted warmly, “stirred . . . not only to cheer and 
applaud but to expressions of immediate anger, unrest and 
alarm.”1037 
Terminiello was charged with violating a Chicago ordinance 
that provided: “All persons who shall make, aid, countenance, or 
assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of 
the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, shall be 
deemed guilty of disorderly conduct.”1038  At his trial, the judge 
instructed the jury that “breach of the peace” meant behavior that 
“stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition 
of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or . . . molests the inhabitants in 
the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.”1039  Given that 
instruction, it was understandable why the jury found Terminiello 
guilty.  Reversing the conviction, Justice Douglas based his opinion 
upon a premise that sounded in Justice Brandeis’ Whitney dissent: 
“The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends 
on free discussion.  As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge . . . it 
is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that 
government remains responsive to the will of the people and 
peaceful change is effected.”1040  He added what may have been a 
dig at Terminiello himself, that it is “[t]he right to speak freely and 
to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the 
chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”1041  
These principles were violated at their core by the jury instruction. 
 1033. Id. 
 1034. Id. at 26. 
 1035. Id. at 21. 
 1036. Id. at 22. 
 1037. Id. 
 1038. Id. at 2 n.1 (majority opinion).  See CHICAGO, ILL. , REV. CODE ch. 193, § 
1(1) (1939). 
 1039. Id. at 3. 
 1040. Id. at 4. (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). 
 1041. Id. 
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[A] function of free speech under our system of 
government is to invite dispute.  It may indeed best serve 
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even 
stirs people to anger.  Speech is often provocative and 
challenging.  It may strike at prejudices and 
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it 
presses for acceptance of an idea.  That is why freedom of 
speech, though not absolute, [citing Chaplinsky] is 
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, 
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger 
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.1042 
What accounts for such an abrupt change of heart by the 
Court in only a generation?  Changes in the Court’s personnel 
naturally make up part of the explanation, but only a part, because 
the Justices began to turn away from the approach they used 
during World War I and the Red Scare well before a majority of the 
Court consisted of Roosevelt appointees.  Certainly, in retrospect, 
some of them regretted the Court’s role in the harsh treatment of 
mostly innocuous individuals.  More broadly, these cases were 
decided amidst a sustained effort since the beginning of the 
century to protect individual autonomy against state action.  As 
argued earlier, after repudiating Lochner, there was all the more 
reason to invigorate the political processes that maintain the 
responsiveness of government to the people.1043  Carolene Products 
had laid down that line: the Court would defer to legislative 
decisions only if the system of expression permitted free exchange 
of ideas.1044 
All of the First Amendment cases considered so far have 
sprung from efforts by government to suppress speech or at least 
channel it so as to minimize its socially disruptive effects.  One last 
decision from this period involved the opposite problem—
government forcing people to affirm things that they personally 
reject.1045  Seemingly unrelated to repressive regulations, compelled 
speech strikes deeply into the libertarian heart of the First 
Amendment.  The issue was the compulsory pledge of allegiance to 
the flag in public schools, which many states either required or 
 1042. Id.  
 1043. See pp. 859–60. 
 1044. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 1045. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
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permitted.  Nonconforming students were punished by suspensions 
and expulsions; their parents could be fined or jailed.  Initially, in 
1940, the Court upheld the flag salutes, with Justice Frankfurter 
concluding that the mandatory exercise promoted “national 
cohesion,” which he said was “the basis of national security.”1046  
Those complaining about the flag salute were Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
who regarded the recitation as the worship of a “graven image” 
contrary to Biblical command.1047  Exempting these few dissenters 
“might cast doubts in the minds of the other children which would 
themselves weaken the effect of the exercise.”1048  Three years later, 
the Court repudiated its first flag salute decision; again on the 
complaint of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Justice Jackson, who had joined 
the Court in the interim, wrote the opinion in West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette.1049  Justice Frankfurter, who had commanded a 
nearly unanimous Court during the first round, wrote the 
dissenting opinion.1050 
Justice Jackson began his Barnette opinion by observing that the 
case was not following the pattern of the Court’s previous First 
Amendment cases.1051  In the usual speech case, the question is 
whether “the individual’s right to speak his own mind” creates a 
clear and present risk of “grave and immediate danger.”1052  Here 
the state produced no evidence that a clear and present danger was 
presented by students “remaining passive during a flag salute 
ritual.”1053  Instead, West Virginia forced students to affirm “a belief 
and an attitude of mind.”1054  Such compulsion was futile, as history 
had repeatedly demonstrated, Justice Jackson asserted.1055  “Those 
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves 
exterminating dissenters.  Compulsory unification of opinion 
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”1056  This was a 
debatable proposition.  At least in the short term (which can last 
lifetimes), plenty of societies in the past century have nurtured 
nationalistic fervor through inculcating devotion to symbols and 
 1046. Id. at 595. 
 1047. Id. at 592. 
 1048. Id. at 600. 
 1049. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 1050. Id. at 646. 
 1051. See id. at 630. 
 1052. Id. at 634, 639. 
 1053. Id. at 633–34. 
 1054. Id. at 633. 
 1055. Id. at 641. 
 1056. Id. 
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flags, as well as reverence for specific leaders.  The utility of the 
salute to inculcating patriotism, however, was not Justice Jackson’s 
main point; which was to disallow entirely the idea of government-
mandated affirmations of belief.  In one of the most memorable 
lines in the Court’s history, and certainly among Justice Jackson’s 
best (which is saying something), he challenged the premise that 
government may prescribe what people must believe: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.  If there are any 
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not 
now occur to us.1057 
Volumes are packed into these two sentences.  At once, he 
repudiated the political systems that dominated the world for 
millennia while distinguishing the American commitment to 
individualism from totalitarian systems left and right.  Americans 
were entitled to denounce their nation, so long as they obeyed its 
laws in acting.  At bottom, this was a statement that went beyond 
freedom of speech to the core assumption of individuality that 
underlies the Constitution.  The principles of the Bill of Rights, 
Justice Jackson stated, “grew in soil which also produced a 
philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his 
liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental 
restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few 
controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s affairs.”1058  
Translating that concept of rights to a modern world of extensive 
government controls over the people was a daunting task for the 
Court, Justice Jackson agreed; even so, he reverted to the individual 
as the irreducible and uncontestable source of opinion on 
everything great and small.1059 
IV. THE SECOND RED SCARE: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE COLD WAR 
With the onset of the Cold War after World War II, federal and 
state governments took a series of steps to contain domestic 
Communism, often curtailing the speech rights of leftists in the 
 1057. Id. at 642. 
 1058. Id. at 639–40. 
 1059. Id. at 639. 
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process.  In reality, as legal historian William Wiecek recounts, 
“[t]he first and second Red Scares were not discrete, disconnected 
events.  Rather, they were phases on a continuum.”1060  Congress, 
state governments and anti-communist private and civic 
organizations remained active throughout this period.1061  In 1938, 
the Hatch Act barred from federal employment those who 
belonged to “any political party or organization which advocates 
the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the 
United States.”1062  Appropriations bills routinely contained clauses 
denying funding to anyone advocating the violent overthrow of the 
government or who belonged to a group that did.1063  With the 
signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in 1939, which 
lasted until Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, official 
scrutiny of American Communism once again intensified.1064  
Congressional investigations of Communists, which had been going 
on for years, swelled in the late 1930s, eventually becoming the 
bailiwick of the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
(HUAC).1065  FBI investigations of the party under director J. Edgar 
Hoover multiplied as dossiers on thousands of suspected 
Communists were compiled.1066  Nevertheless, American 
Communism arguably reached its zenith during the 1930s, as the 
party generally supported President Roosevelt’s policies while the 
Depression offered the dismal economic conditions that made 
radical solutions attractive to many.  By some estimates, the party 
had around 100,000 members by that decade’s end and it was 
actively participating in electoral politics.1067  In 1936, the party’s 
candidate for President, Earl Browder, appeared on the ballot in 
thirty-five states and received over 80,000 votes.1068 
 1060. Wiecek, supra note 496, at 406. 
 1061. See id. 
 1062. Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 410, 
§ 9A, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939). 
 1063. Wiecek, supra note 496, at 401. 
 1064. See Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom 
of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7 (1991); see also JOSEPH R. 
STAROBIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISM IN CRISIS, 1943-1957 23–24 (1972). 
 1065. Rohr, supra note 1064, at 7. 
 1066. Id. at 7. 
 1067. Id. at 6. 
 1068. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 159 
(1937).  But see, Wiecek, supra note 496, at 392–429 (discussing legislative and 
investigative efforts against Communists during the late 1930s and 1940s). 
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Congress passed the Smith Act in 1940, making it illegal to 
“willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, 
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any 
government in the United States by force or violence, or by the 
assassination of any officer of such government.”1069  Justice John 
Marshall Harlan later explained that the law’s “prototype was the 
New York Criminal Anarchy Act.”1070  States likewise passed sedition 
acts and brought their own prosecutions.  Another law enacted by 
Congress in 1940 required that organizations planning to 
overthrow the government first register with the government, an 
unlikely scenario—but failing to register carried serious criminal 
penalties.1071  To rid unions of Communists (in which the party had 
made substantial gains), a section of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 
obliged union officials to declare each year that they were not 
members of the party.1072  Refusal to sign cost the official’s union 
the benefits of the National Labor Relations Act.  Sustaining this 
provision in a 1950 case, Chief Justice Vinson emphasized the 
Communist Party’s use of strikes for political purposes: “Congress 
might reasonably find . . . that Communists, unlike members of 
other political parties . . . represent a continuing danger of 
disruptive political strikes when they hold positions of union 
leadership.”1073  By executive order in 1947, President Truman 
purged “disloyal persons” from the federal employment, which 
expressly included Communists, and required loyalty investigations 
of applicants and employees.1074 
Under the far-reaching Internal Security Act of 1950 
(McCarran Act), a Subversive Activities Control Board was created 
to investigate Communist organizations and require them to 
register with the federal government.1075  Membership in a 
Communist group led to a loss of numerous privileges, including 
federal employment, work in defense industries, and a U.S. 
passport.1076  Communist organizations, whether registered 
 1069. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, §§ 2–3, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000)). 
 1070. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 309 (1957). 
 1071. Voorhis Act, ch. 897, §§ 1–4, 54 Stat. 1201–04 (1940) (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 2386 (2000)). 
 1072. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 9, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
 1073. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950). 
 1074. Exec. Order No. 9,835, 3 C.F.R. 129 (2008). 
 1075. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 7, 64 Stat. 987 (1950). 
 1076. See Rohr, supra note 1064, at 24–26. 
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voluntarily or involuntarily, were to divulge their finances, funding 
sources, location of printing presses, and membership lists; they 
were ineligible for tax-exempt status and their mailings had to 
contain a notice that it came from a “Communist organization.”1077  
The Attorney General was directed to keep a public list of 
Communist groups and their members.1078  Another provision of 
the McCarran Act made it “unlawful for any person knowingly to 
combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any 
act which would substantially contribute to the establishment 
within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship.”1079  Title II of 
the act, known as the Emergency Detention Act of 1950,1080 allowed 
the Attorney General during time of invasion, war or insurrection 
to detain any person who “probably” would engage in espionage or 
sabotage for the duration of the emergency.1081  An FBI Security 
Index of persons to be arrested in the event of national emergency 
included 26,000 names in 1955.1082  Congress actually appropriated 
money in 1952 for six detention camps, including re-opening the 
former Japanese-American internment camp at Tule Lake, 
California.1083  As in the first Red Scare, immigration laws were a pri-
mary instrument for ridding the country of radicals.  Under the 
McCarran Act, Communist aliens could be excluded, denied 
naturalization, and deported.1084 
Finally, in the Communist Control Act of 1954, Congress 
vowed that “the Communist Party should be outlawed”;1085 formally 
declaring that Communists were not a legitimate political party.  
They functioned in secrecy, and what was most damning, “the 
policies and programs of the Communists Party are secretly 
prescribed for it by the foreign leaders of the world Communist 
 1077. Id. at 22–24. 
 1078. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §§ 6–11, 64 Stat. 991 (1950). 
 1079. Id. § 4a. 
 1080. Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, Tit. II, § 101(6), 64 
Stat. 1019–20 (1950). 
 1081. Id. § 103 (a). 
 1082. See Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, § 9, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (describing 
Attorney General’s list); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 671, at 323–24 (describing the FBI 
Security Index and plans for detention centers); Rohr, supra note 1064, at 14–15 
(describing anti-communist immigration laws). 
 1083. Wiecek, supra note 496, at 427. 
 1084. See Rohr, supra note 1064, at 14–15. 
 1085. Communist Control Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 637, ch. 886, § 2, 68 Stat. 
775 (1954). 
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movement.”1086  Technically, the party was not illegal, but it would 
receive none of the “the rights, privileges, and immunities” of other 
“legal bodies.”1087  Apparently this was intended in part to deny the 
party a place on the ballot, which followed the lead of many states 
that already had excluded the party from elections.  Congress’ 
actions went well beyond this purpose; the party became a stranger 
to the laws⎯it was literally “outlawed.”1088 
Communist and Socialist speakers at public events often 
provoked confrontations of the sort that the Court had been dealt 
with in Cantwell v. Connecticut1089 and Terminiello v. Chicago.1090  Only 
now, the Justices’ enthusiasm for protecting unpopular street 
orators waned.  Irving Feiner, a college student and member of the 
Young Progressives of America, was giving a soapbox speech with 
an amplifier at a street corner in a racially mixed section of 
Syracuse, New York.1091  It was early evening in 1949, and about 
seventy-five people gathered to hear him as he encouraged listeners 
to attend a speech on the subject of civil rights that night by a 
prominent lawyer.1092  Feiner harshly criticized the mayor’s earlier 
denial of a permit for a speech by the same lawyer.1093  Referring to 
the mayor as “a champagne-sipping bum,” Feiner asserted that the 
official did “not speak for the negro people.”1094  President Truman 
also received the appellation “bum,” and Feiner castigated the 
American Legion as “a Nazi Gestapo.”1095  Possibly it was Feiner’s 
“loud, high-pitched voice” that annoyed the crowd, but in any event 
he “stirred up a little excitement,” as there were “angry mutterings, 
pushing, shoving and milling around and restlessness.”1096  Or 
perhaps it was Feiner’s message, in which he asserted that African-
Americans “don’t have equal rights and they should rise up in arms 
and fight for them.”1097  At that point, one man informed a police 
 1086. Id. 
 1087. Id. § 3, at 776. 
 1088. Rohr, supra note 1064, at 15. 
 1089.     310 U.S. 296 (1940)  
 1090. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 1091. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316 (1951). 
 1092. Id. at 317. 
 1093. Id. 
 1094. Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 1095. Id. 
 1096. Id. at 317. 
 1097. Id. at 324 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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officer on the scene that “if they did not take that ‘S. . .O. . .B. . .’ 
off the box, he would.”1098 
After three requests from the police to desist speaking, Feiner 
was arrested and eventually convicted of disorderly conduct (he was 
also expelled from Syracuse University because of the incident).1099  
Chief Justice Vinson’s 6–3 decision affirming the conviction 
purported to examine the evidence from the trial closely.  As 
Vinson saw it, Feiner was not found guilty for what he had said⎯“it 
was the reaction which it actually engendered” that landed him in 
the slammer for thirty days.1100  Vinson then recited Cantwell’s line 
that coercive state power would prevail over free speech claims if 
there were “clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference 
with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to 
public safety, peace, or order.”1101  Feiner, the majority thought, had 
exceeded “the bounds of argument or persuasion and 
undertake[n] incitement to riot.”1102  The young man’s “deliberate 
defiance of the police officers” only made matters worse.1103  
Moreover, deference had to be given to “the considered judgment 
of three New York courts approving the means which the police, 
faced with a crisis, used in the exercise of their power and duty to 
preserve peace and order.”1104 
Feiner raised one of the most basic questions in First 
Amendment law: Given a potentially violent conflict between a 
speaker and an audience, should the police protect the speaker 
from the crowd or arrest the speaker?  Justice Black, whose views 
were shared by Justices Douglas and Minton, urged in dissent that 
the police had a duty to guard Feiner’s “right to talk, even to the 
extent of arresting the man who threatened to interfere.  Instead, 
they shirked that duty and acted only to suppress the right to 
speak.”1105  Opponents of a speaker need only raise a ruckus, and 
“as a practical matter, minority speakers can be silenced in any 
city.”1106 
 1098. Id. 
 1099. Id. at 316. 
 1100. Id. at 320. 
 1101. Id. 
 1102. Id. at 321. 
 1103. Id. 
 1104. Id. 
 1105. Id. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 1106. Id. at 328. 
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How could the Court reconcile its holding with Terminiello and 
Cantwell?  Hadn’t the former proclaimed that free speech “may 
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even 
stirs people to anger.”1107  In Cantwell, immediately after the “clear 
and present danger” quotation used in Feiner, the Court had added: 
“Equally obvious is it that a state may not unduly suppress free 
communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of 
conserving desirable conditions.”1108 
What about the pushing and shoving in Feiner’s audience?  
Justice Black pointed out that “[i]t is neither unusual nor 
unexpected that some people at public street meetings mutter, mill 
about, push, shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker.”1109  
Cantwell’s listeners had been “highly offended” as well, and 
physical threats were made against him.1110  When Justice Roberts 
reviewed the precedents in his Cantwell opinion, he concluded that 
“the provocative language which [has been] held to amount to a 
breach of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive 
remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”1111  That was not true of 
Irving Feiner’s remarks.  Did Feiner have a “truculent bearing,” or 
show “intentional discourtesy,” which Cantwell mentioned as 
factors?1112  Without a tape recording, it is impossible to know for 
sure what happened, but should a speaker’s truculence be the 
measure?  Since there has never been a truculence-meter on the 
market, the outcomes of cases under the Feiner approach will vary 
according to the sensibilities of the judge or jury.  Regardless of 
whether the results are more or less consistent among the cases, 
why shouldn’t the First Amendment protect a speech that is 
“ferocious,” “scathingly harsh,” or “belligerent”⎯all meanings of 
“truculent”? 
State governments also took active efforts to remove 
Communists from public employment, especially in education.  
Affirming that the states could do so, Adler v. Board of Education in 
1952 allowed New York to discharge teachers who advocated the 
forcible overthrow of the government or belonged to an 
 1107. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
 1108. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
 1109. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 325–26 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 1110. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309. 
 1111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 1112. Id. at 310. 
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organization that the state found to have such a goal.1113  Earlier 
cases from 1951 had determined that government employees and 
candidates for government office could be required to swear that 
they did not advocate violent overthrow of the government and 
that they had not been involved with subversive organizations.1114  In 
the case of the employee, the Court at least implied that the 
outcome would have been different if the city involved used the 
oath to the detriment of an employee who had joined a subversive 
group “innocent of its purpose,” or who had severed ties with the 
organization.1115  But in Adler, less than a year later, Justice Minton’s 
majority opinion took a page from Holmes in positing that “[i]f 
they do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to 
retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.”1116  
Regarding the teachers’ complaint that they might not know of the 
organization’s illegal purposes or support them, Minton replied 
curtly that the state could reasonably infer from membership that 
the person supported its ends.1117  “From time immemorial, one’s 
reputation has been determined in part by the company he 
keeps,”1118 Minton wrote, to which Justice Douglas replied in dissent 
that this assumption was rooted in “a principle repugnant to our 
society—guilt by association.”1119 
In Wieman v. Updegraff,1120 the Court retreated somewhat from 
its stiff posture in Adler and struck down a loyalty oath demanded of 
all Oklahoma public employees.  Oklahoma’s oath covered all the 
bases⎯employees had to swear to a laundry list of assertions, such 
as that they would “bear true faith and allegiance to the 
Constitution;”1121 that for the last five years they had not been 
members of any kind of Communist association or a member of 
 1113. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). 
 1114. Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 716 (1951) (holding that a city 
could require its employees by affidavit to disclose their past or present 
membership in the Communist Party or Communist Political Association); 
Gerende v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56, 56–57 (1951) (per curiam) 
(“A candidate need only make oath that he is not a person who is engaged ‘in one 
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence,’ 
and that he is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an 
attempt.”). 
 1115. Garner, 341 U.S. at 723. 
 1116. Alder, 342 U.S. at 492. 
 1117. Id. at 495. 
 1118. Id. at 493. 
 1119. Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 1120. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
 1121. Id. at 185 n.1. 
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any group on the Attorney General’s list of subversive 
organizations, or a group advocating violent overthrow of the 
government; that the person would not “advocate revolution,” or 
violence, sedition or treason, against the Government; and that the 
employee would not become a member of such a group.1122  Justice 
Clark’s opinion displayed unusual sensitivity⎯for that era⎯toward 
the public employees impacted by these laws: “There can be no 
dispute about the consequences visited upon a person excluded 
from public employment on disloyalty grounds.  In the view of the 
community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a badge 
of infamy.”1123  Membership could have been “innocent” or the 
employee may have been “unaware of its activities and purposes.”1124  
Adler was distinguished by Clark on a wholly specious ground.  
Supposedly, he claimed, Adler placed great emphasis on the 
assertion that “the New York courts had construed the statute to 
require knowledge of organizational purpose before the regulation 
could apply.”1125  Adler had held no such thing, and in fact it said 
just the opposite—that the legislature could infer support of the 
organization’s ends from membership alone.1126  Be that as it may, 
after Wieman, mere membership in a subversive group could not be 
the basis for losing one’s job. 
Another interesting feature of Wieman was its departure from 
Adler’s assumption that employees could be forced to abide by the 
loyalty program as a condition of their employment.  Justice Clark 
insisted that Adler had been misunderstood.  To posit from the 
employee’s lack of a right to a job that any form of loyalty oath 
could be required tended to “obscure the issue.”1127  Since Adler had 
been quite clear on this point, Clark may have meant that Minton’s 
opinion had not thought through all of the ramifications of its 
reasoning.  Obviously, there were conditions that government 
could not place on employment: “Congress could not ‘enact a 
regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be 
appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall 
attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.’”1128  Having 
 1122. Id. 
 1123. Id. at 190–91. 
 1124. Id. at 190. 
 1125. Id. at 189. 
 1126. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 494–95 (1952). 
 1127. Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191. 
 1128. Id. at 191–92, (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 
(1947)). 
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highlighted this interesting issue, Clark quickly added that the 
Court was not considering “whether an abstract right to public 
employment exists.”1129  Yet he enunciated an important right for 
government employees: a “public servant” could not be excluded 
from employment by a law that was “patently arbitrary or 
discriminatory.”1130  This constituted a critical development: it 
repudiated the old Holmesian dictate that public employees took 
their jobs on whatever conditions were imposed by the state.1131  By 
1956, Justice Clark wrote for the Court that “[t]o state that a person 
does not have a constitutional right to government employment is 
only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, and 
nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper authorities.”1132  
Nevertheless, the bottom line of the early public employee loyalty 
cases remained: public employees could be forced out of their jobs 
for past or current Communist associations, provided they knew 
the purpose of the organization.  Knowing membership in any such 
group or engaging in subversive advocacy were proper grounds for 
refusal of employment of dismissal.  Loyalty oaths or questioning of 
employees could be used to search for evidence of rebellious 
attitudes. 
To demand a loyalty oath of someone, the government needed 
to show a legitimate purpose.  When public employees were 
involved, “[t]he principal aim of those statutes was not to penalize 
political beliefs but to deny positions to persons supposed to be 
dangerous because the position might be misused to the detriment 
of the public.”1133  Absent that justification, there would be no basis 
for extracting an oath.  Justice Brennan established this principle 
in a 1958 decision, Speiser v. Randall.1134  California had created a 
property tax exemption for veterans, provided that they signed an 
oath swearing that they did not advocate the overthrow of the 
government by force.1135  Characterizing the denial of an exemption 
as a penalty, “the same as if the State were to fine them for this 
 1129. Id. at 191. 
 1130. Id. at 192. 
 1131. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892) 
(Holmes stating that city could impose conditions on holding office as long as 
reasonable). 
 1132. Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956). 
 1133. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958). 
 1134. Id. at 513. 
 1135. Id. at 517. 
157
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
930 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
speech,”1136 Brennan contrasted California’s requirement with 
employee loyalty oaths, which served the legitimate purpose of 
avoiding misuse of the position “to the detriment of the public.”1137  
California had no such justification, and appeared to be basing tax 
liability simply on “the expression of political ideas.”1138  
Compounding the deterrent to expression, the actual 
determination of the veteran’s loyalty was not conclusively 
established by the oath: “it is clear that the declaration may be 
accepted or rejected on the basis of incompetent information or no 
information at all.”1139  Placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer 
“violated the requirements of due process,” and the “short-cut 
procedure” of requiring an oath “must inevitably result in 
suppressing protected speech.”1140  California maintained that the 
tax exemption would only be denied to those engaging in criminal 
advocacy.  Without disputing that California could so limit its 
exemptions, Brennan held that due process required that the state 
bear the burden of proof on the criminality of a taxpayer’s 
speech.1141 
Most of this elaborate anti-Communist apparatus had only a 
relatively minor effect on the party, even if it did ruin thousands of 
careers of loyal Americans in its course.  True-blue Communists 
usually had no scruples against signing loyalty oaths, which left the 
requirement mainly as a noose for conscientious civil libertarians 
and a deterrent to becoming involved in progressive causes.  But 
the Smith Act (“the Act”) was another story, as it had devastating 
consequences for the U.S. Communist Party and like groups.1142  
Only a few prosecutions under the Act had taken place during 
World War II.1143  However, the beginning of the Cold War brought 
a renewed focus on Communist activities, with politicians of all 
stripes tripping over each other to avoid being tarred as “soft on 
Communism.”  From the perspective of more than a half century 
later, much of this fervor seems opportunistic and at times 
 1136. Id. at 518. 
 1137. Id. at 527. 
 1138. Id. 
 1139. Id. at 528. 
 1140. Id. at 529. 
 1141. Id. at 528–29. 
 1142. See MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 190 (1977). 
 1143. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 671, at 268–71.  See, e.g., Dunne v. United 
States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943) (Smith Act 
prosecution against members of Minnesota Socialist Workers Party). 
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paranoid.  Nevertheless, considering the actions of the Soviet 
Union in rapidly transforming Eastern Europe into client states, 
along with that country’s own confrontational rhetoric, the alarm 
was at least understandable.  By 1948, the U.S. Communist Party 
boasted of having 60,000 members; it ran candidates in elections, 
published newspapers, and was thoroughly infused into many labor 
unions.1144  On the other hand, it had lost tens of thousands of 
members since the war began.1145  A decade later, with its national 
leaders convicted and the organization thoroughly infiltrated by 
the FBI, coupled with the Soviet Union’s own revelations of 
Stalinist abuses, and sobered by the Soviet rout of the Hungarian 
revolt in 1956, American leftists abandoned the party in droves.1146 
During 1948, Smith Act indictments were lodged against the 
upper echelon of the U.S. Communist Party’s leadership in United 
States v. Dennis (Eugene Dennis was the General Secretary of the 
party).1147  They were charged with conspiring to advocate the 
overthrow of the government by force through the formation of 
the Communist Party.  Note carefully the wording of that charge.  
None of the defendants was accused of actually acting to overthrow 
the government—their crime was conspiring to advocate that course 
of action at some indefinite point in the future.1148  Trial in the case 
consumed nine months and produced a 16,000-page transcript.1149  
According to the court of appeals, “[t]he record discloses a judge, 
sorely tried for many months of turmoil, constantly provoked by 
useless bickering, exposed to offensive slights and insults, harried 
with interminable repetition.”1150  By one informed account of the 
trial, “the prosecution relied mainly on articles, pamphlets, and 
books—especially on Marx and Engels’ The Communist Manifesto 
(1848), Lenin’s State and Revolution (1917), Stalin’s Fundamentals 
of Leninism (1929) and Program of the Communist International 
(1928).”1151  What account of the trial is he referring to?  Not in the 
Court of Appeals or in the USSC cases.  The bulk of this evidence 
was “quite dated, and the government could offer no proof that 
American Communists were about to translate into action any of 
 1144. See Rohr, supra note 1064, at 29; Wiecek, supra note 496, at 403. 
 1145. Id. 
 1146. Id.  See also Starobin, supra note 1064, at 113–14. 
 1147. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 1148. Id. at 544–45. 
 1149. Id. at 497. 
 1150. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 226 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 1151. BELKNAP, supra note 1142, at 82–83. 
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the ideas it contained.  Nevertheless, literature was the heart of the 
prosecution’s case.”1152  Instructing the jury, the district judge 
informed them that to be guilty the defendants must have engaged 
in “the teaching and advocacy of action for the accomplishment of 
that purpose, by language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to 
incite persons to . . . cause the overthrow or destruction of the 
Government of the United States by force and violence as speedily 
as circumstances would permit.”1153  Merely teaching the “abstract 
doctrine of overthrowing or destroying organized government by 
unlawful means” was lawful.1154 
The eleven defendants tried in Dennis were convicted on 
October 14, 1949, “and all of them but one was sentenced to five 
years in prison and a $10,000 fine.”1155  As one observer noted, 
“1949 was surely not a year in which Americans were particularly 
inclined to take a benign view of domestic Communism.”1156  
During 1949, the People’s Republic of China was established, the 
Soviets exploded their first atomic weapon, NATO was formed to 
combat Soviet expansionism, and the perjury trial of Alger Hiss 
convinced many that Communists had infiltrated the highest levels 
of power in the United States.1157  The following year was just as 
bleak.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard argument in the 
Dennis case one day before North Korea invaded South Korea, and 
only months after Senator Joseph P. McCarthy had announced that 
he possessed a list of over two hundred “known” communists 
“making policy” in the State Department (a list that never saw the 
light of day.)1158  A little more than a month following oral 
argument in the court of appeals, and supposedly after an extensive 
study of the mammoth record, the convictions were upheld in an 
opinion by Judge Learned Hand.1159  Hand himself believed the 
prosecutions were a political mistake, as he wrote to an 
 1152. Id.  at 215. 
 1153. United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 511–12 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., 
plurality opinion). 
 1154. Id. at 511. 
 1155. Rohr, supra note 1064, at 51. 
 1156. Id. 
 1157. Id. 
 1158. Joseph P. McCarthy, Address at Republican Women’s Club of Ohio 
County, Wheeling, West Virginia (Feb. 9, 1950).  See also THOMAS C. REEVES, THE 
LIFE AND TIMES OF JOE MCCARTHY : A BIOGRAPHY (1983); Francis Coker, Book Review, 
McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and its Meaning, 17 J. POLITICS 113, 115 (1955) 
(McCarthy had no such names and there never was a list). 
 1159. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 201 (2d Cir. 1950). 
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acquaintance afterwards: “Personally I should never have 
prosecuted those birds. . . .  So far as all this will do anything, it will 
encourage the faithful and maybe help the [Party’s] Committee on 
Propaganda.”1160  From his opinion, however, you would never know 
that he had reservations about the matter. 
Judge Hand spent only a few paragraphs relating the facts to 
the Smith Act charges.  Concerning the Communist Party, he 
found them a dangerous lot: 
The American Communist Party, of which the defendants 
are the controlling spirits, is a highly articulated, well 
contrived, far spread organization, numbering thousands 
of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined, many of 
whom are infused with a passionate Utopian faith that is 
to redeem mankind.  It has its Founder, its apostles, its 
sacred texts⎯perhaps even its martyrs.  It seeks converts 
far and wide by an extensive system of schooling, 
demanding of all an inflexible doctrinal orthodoxy.  The 
violent capture of all existing governments is one article 
of the creed of that faith, which abjures the possibility of 
success by lawful means. . . .  The jury has found that the 
conspirators will strike as soon as success seems possible, 
and obviously, no one in his senses would strike sooner.1161 
Holding a “passionate Utopian faith” would put these 
defendants in the same company as Thoreau or even Woodrow 
Wilson.  It was the advocacy of “violent capture of all existing 
governments,” and their willingness to strike when the time was 
opportune that distinguished Communists from philosophers and 
dreamers.  Referring to world events such as the Berlin blockade of 
1948-49 and the increasing political power of Communists in 
Western Europe, Hand thought the “probable danger” could not 
have been more acute: “Any border fray, any diplomatic incident, 
any difference in construction of the modus vivendi⎯such as the 
Berlin blockade we have just mentioned⎯might prove a spark in 
the tinder-box, and lead to war.”1162 
Five months after the Second Circuit handed down its decision 
in Dennis, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case.  
Before the decision was announced, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg 
were convicted and sentenced to death for passing atomic secrets 
 1160. Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter (June 8, 1951), quoted in GERALD 
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND 603 (1994). 
 1161. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212–13. 
 1162. Id. at 213. 
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to the Soviet Union.1163  The Rosenbergs were executed on June 19, 
1953.1164  When the Court accepted Dennis for review, it expressly 
refused to examine the sufficiency of the evidence, which meant 
the Justices would not question the finding that the defendants 
“did in fact advocate the overthrow of the Government by force 
and violence.”1165  All that the Court would do was review the 
constitutionality of the Smith Act and whether the jury had been 
properly instructed.  When the Court announced its decision 
upholding the convictions in June 1951, no opinion commanded a 
majority, and their differences revealed deep rifts among the 
Justices on applying the First Amendment.  Nevertheless, six 
members of the Court held that Smith Act was not an 
unconstitutional form of sedition law.1166 
Chief Justice Vinson spoke for the largest bloc, which included 
Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton.1167  Vinson started by describing 
the Communist Party with language similar to Hand’s, affirming 
that “the general goal of the Party, was, during the period in 
question, to achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by 
force and violence.”1168  The government surely could act to prevent 
this eventuality: “Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the 
argument that there is a ‘right’ to rebellion against dictatorial 
governments is without force where the existing structure of the 
government provides for peaceful and orderly change.”1169  The 
plurality agreed that the prosecution must pass the clear and 
present danger test, conceding that “[a]lthough no case 
subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the 
majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that 
subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis 
rationale.”1170  Here, Vinson meant that “even though the 
legislature had designated certain speech as criminal, this could 
not prevent the defendant from showing that there was no danger 
that the substantive evil would be brought about.”1171  Qualifying 
 1163. Peter E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of 
Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1624–25 (1977). 
 1164. Id. 
 1165. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., plurality 
opinion). 
 1166. Id. at 516. 
 1167. Id. 
 1168. Id. at 498. 
 1169. Id. at 501. 
 1170. Id. at 507. 
 1171. Id. 
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that statement, Vinson added that clear and present danger did not 
“mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the 
putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the 
signal is awaited.”1172  A doomed-from-the-start revolution could still 
cause much injury.1173 
Learned Hand’s opinion for the court of appeals had 
convinced Vinson to endorse his controversial definition of clear 
and present danger: “‘In each case [courts] must ask whether the 
gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such 
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’”1174  
Vinson gave no reason for “adopt[ing] this statement of the 
rule.”1175  Hand’s own explanation of this formula had been brief 
and unsupported by precedent.  He wrote that “We have purposely 
substituted ‘improbability’ for ‘remoteness,’ because that must be 
the right interpretation.”1176  Hand explained, “Given the same 
probability, it would be wholly irrational to condone future evils 
which we should prevent if they were immediate.”1177  To accept 
such a construction would require the court to accept “indifference 
to those who come after us.  It is only because a substantial 
intervening period between the utterance and its realization may 
check its effect and change its importance, that its immediacy is 
important.”1178  Hand⎯and Vinson⎯had ignored the Court’s then-
current interpretation of clear and present danger, which was that 
there must be both a “grave and immediate danger” to justify 
suppressing speech.1179  Under Hand’s formula, an extremely 
serious evil⎯such as the fall of the national government to 
rebellion⎯would justify suppression of speech that only remotely 
threatens that result.  Vinson remarked that “this is the ultimate 
 1172. Id. at 509. 
 1173. Id.  “Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even 
though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the 
revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.”  Id.  
 1174. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 
1950)). 
 1175. Id.  “[I]t is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this 
time.”  Id. 
 1176. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212. 
 1177. Id. 
 1178. Id. 
 1179. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (“But 
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship . . . are susceptible of 
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state 
may lawfully protect.”). 
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value of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure 
from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordinate 
value can be protected.”1180 
 Vinson was following Holmes and Brandeis, as well as recent 
precedent, in explaining the immediacy requirement as a 
commitment to allowing counter-speech to defuse the harm.  But 
once the harm was found to be grave and immediate, talk of 
probabilities became too abstract to be practical, and outside the 
ken of most judges anyway.  Frankfurter wrote in his own 
concurring opinion, possibly in response to Vinson: “To make 
validity of legislation depend on judicial reading of events still in 
the womb of time⎯a forecast, that is, of the outcome of forces at 
best appreciated only with knowledge of the topmost secrets of 
nations⎯is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its 
equipment.”1181 
Much of Vinson’s reasoning expressly depended on his 
understanding of world events.  Confronting the United States at 
that time was a state of affairs far removed from “[t]he situation 
with which Justices Holmes and Brandeis were concerned in Gitlow 
[which] was a comparatively isolated event, bearing little relation in 
their minds to any substantial threat to the safety of the 
community.”1182  By comparison, the Communist Party represented 
by the Dennis defendants presented a real menace, as its leaders 
had constructed “an apparatus designed and dedicated to the 
overthrow of the Government, in the context of world crisis after 
crisis.”1183  This notion, that the Communist Party represented a 
fundamentally different threat to society than the early twentieth-
century anarchists and socialists, was a theme picked up by the 
concurring opinions of Frankfurter and Jackson.1184  They also 
agreed with Vinson that, as Frankfurter wrote, the Court must “take 
judicial notice that the Communist doctrines which these 
defendants have conspired to advocate are in the ascendency in 
powerful nations who cannot be acquitted of unfriendliness to the 
institutions of this country.”1185  Frankfurter went a step further, 
contending that it was Congress’s role to notice and act on such 
 1180. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509 (Vinson, C.J., plurality opinion). 
 1181. Id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 1182. Id. at 510. 
 1183. Id. 
 1184. See text accompanying notes 1185, 1187–1201. 
 1185. Id. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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events, even though the Smith Act was already eleven years old, and 
much had happened in the interim.1186 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion was driven by his 
fixation with judicial restraint and deference to the political 
processes.  Rejecting reliance on “dogmas too inflexible for the 
non-Euclidian problems to be solved,”1187 Frankfurter called for a 
“candid and informed weighing of the competing interests”1188 of 
national security and free expression.  Such balancing was “the 
business of legislatures,” not the judiciary.1189 
It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of 
interests which this case presents were the primary 
responsibility for reconciling it ours.  Congress has 
determined that the danger created by advocacy of 
overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction on freedom of 
speech.  The determination was made after due 
deliberation, and the seriousness of the congressional 
purpose is attested by the volume of legislation passed to 
effectuate the same ends.1190 
Only if the legislative conclusion were “outside the pale of fair 
judgment,” would the Court be justified in intervening, Frankfurter 
concluded.1191  Frankfurter candidly acknowledged that it was “self-
delusion” to think that civil liberties would not be short-changed in 
the process.1192  Nabbing Communists inevitably risked 
incriminating “loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the 
reforms these defendants advance.  It is a sobering fact that in 
sustaining the convictions before us we can hardly escape 
restriction on the interchange of ideas.”1193  Undoubtedly, 
legislatures would overreach, he admitted.  Considering the danger 
posed by the Communist Party, however, it was a risk worth taking 
for Frankfurter: “The defendants have been convicted of 
conspiring to organize a party of persons who advocate the 
overthrow of the Government by force and violence. . . . On any 
 1186. Id. 
 1187. Id. at 525. 
 1188. Id. 
 1189. Id. at 540. 
 1190. Id. at 550–51. 
 1191. Id. at 540. 
 1192. Id. at 549. 
 1193. Id. 
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scale of values which we have hitherto recognized, speech of this 
sort ranks low.”1194 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence entirely rejected the use of the 
clear and present approach to the activities of the Communist 
Party, which “realistically is a state within a state, an authoritarian 
dictatorship within a republic.”1195  Communists had “no scruples 
against sabotage, terrorism, assassination, or mob disorder.”1196  He 
would have reserved the clear and present danger standard for 
situations in which the judicial process had the competence “to 
gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary materials for 
decision whether it is a clear and present danger of substantive evil 
or a harmless letting off of steam.”1197  Implicitly agreeing with 
Frankfurter that the Communist movement called for the primacy 
of legislative judgment, he chided his colleagues who “seem to me 
to discuss anything under the sun except the law of conspiracy.”1198  
Congress “is not forbidden to put down force or violence, it is not 
forbidden to punish its teaching or advocacy, and the end being 
punishable, there is no doubt of the power to punish conspiracy for 
the purpose.”1199  Unquestionably, the Communist Party was “a 
well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy”  devoted to an illegal 
ambition.1200  As a conspiracy, it could be punished without proof of 
any overt steps toward violence.  “The basic rationale of the law of 
conspiracy,” he emphasized, was “that a conspiracy may be an evil 
in itself, independently of any other evil it seeks to accomplish.”1201 
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in Dennis.  (Justice Clark, 
who had been Attorney General during the prosecutions, did not 
participate in the case.)  Black emphasized that the defendants had 
not attempted to overthrow the government, nor had they been 
charged with “saying anything or writing anything designed to 
overthrow the Government.”1202  All they had done, it seems, was 
agree “to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later 
date.”1203  Black refused to accept Congress’ judgment without 
 1194. Id. at 544–45. 
 1195. Id. at 577 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 1196. Id. at 564. 
 1197. Id. at 568. 
 1198. Id. at 572. 
 1199. Id. at 575. 
 1200. Id. at 568. 
 1201. Id. at 573. 
 1202. Id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 1203. Id. 
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independent proof produced by the government at trial.  He stated 
that deferring to the legislature “waters down the First Amendment 
so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to 
Congress.”1204  Douglas took a similar line—that there was no 
evidence of actions in preparation for revolution, such as “teaching 
the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President, the 
filching of documents from public files, the planting of bombs, the 
art of street warfare, and the like.”1205  Their actions amounted to 
organizing people “to teach and themselves teach the 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine,” using the classic texts of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin.1206  This was pure speech, and as such it could 
only be punished upon a showing of a clear and present danger, 
which at the very least meant that “[t]here must be some 
immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is allowed.”1207 
The three sets of Justices—the Vinson plurality, the 
Frankfurter and Jackson concurrences, and the Black and Douglas 
dissents—disagreed on fundamental premises.  Nevertheless, a 
majority of the Court concurred that mere advocacy of insurrection 
could be punished, regardless of its remoteness.  For the dissenters, 
the American experience with Communism proved that the 
marketplace of ideas worked.  Douglas was most insistent on this 
point: “Communism has been so thoroughly exposed in this 
country that it has been crippled as a political force.  Free speech 
has destroyed it as an effective political party.”1208  In America, 
Communists were “miserable merchants of unwanted ideas; their 
wares remain unsold.  The fact that their ideas are abhorrent does 
not make them powerful.”1209 
Although the fractured Court in Dennis thoroughly confused 
the Court’s theoretical basis for upholding seditious speech 
convictions, the outcome at least signaled to the government that 
the Smith Act was constitutional.  Since a successful prosecution 
apparently could be obtained by proof of teaching and advocating 
the Marxist canon, there were hundreds, if not thousands, of 
potential targets.1210  Across the country, the government began 
Smith Act proceedings against more than a hundred of the 
 1204. Id. at 580. 
 1205. Id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 1206. Id. at 582. 
 1207. Id. at 585. 
 1208. Id. at 588. 
 1209. Id. at 589. 
 1210. See Rohr, supra note 1064, at 19–20 (discussing post-Dennis prosecutions). 
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Communist Party’s second tier of leadership.  Most were found 
guilty.  But then the Court reviewed and reversed the convictions of 
fourteen party officials in the 1957 case, Yates v. United States.1211  
Following a four-month trial, the defendants had been convicted of 
violating the Smith Act and sentenced to five years in the 
penitentiary on top of $10,000 fines.1212  Unlike Dennis, the Court 
parsed the 14,000-page record to determine if the evidence was 
adequate to support the convictions.1213 
Justice Harlan, who had replaced Jackson on the Court in 
1955, wrote the majority opinion in Yates.  Technically, his opinion 
only clarified the statutory requirements of the Smith Act.  Harlan’s 
interpretation assumed, nonetheless, that Congress did not intend 
to “disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked,” 
implying that the Court’s ruling marked the boundaries of what 
legislation could accomplish consistent with the First 
Amendment.1214  The heart of the Yates decision was a revisionist 
restatement of Dennis’ constitutional holding: 
The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination 
of a group in preparation for future violent action, as well 
as exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy found to 
be directed to ‘action for the accomplishment’ of forcible 
overthrow, to violence as ‘a rule or principle of action,’ 
and employing ‘language of incitement,’ is not 
constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient 
size and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards 
action, and other circumstances are such as reasonably to 
justify apprehension that action will occur.1215 
Advocacy proscribed by the Act did not consist “of preaching 
abstractly the forcible overthrow of the Government.”1216  Rather, 
“The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is 
addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, 
rather than merely to believe in something.”1217  Mere membership 
in the party or even being an officer of the organization did not 
prove the requisite intent to overthrow.  After reviewing the 
 1211. 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States 437 U.S. 1 (1978) 
(adopting a new double-jeopardy rule). 
 1212. Id. at 302–03, 341. 
 1213. Id. at 327–28 n.34. 
 1214. Id. at 319. 
 1215. Id. at 321 (citation omitted). 
 1216. Id. at 324. 
 1217. Id. at 324–25. 
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evidence using this standard, the majority ordered immediate 
acquittals for five defendants and new trials for the rest.1218 
Did Yates accurately report the “essence” of the holding in 
Dennis?  Justice Clark, in his dissent in Yates, professed that “I have 
read this statement over and over but do not seem to grasp its 
meaning for I see no resemblance between it and what the 
respected Chief Justice wrote in Dennis, nor do I find any such 
theory in the concurring opinions.”1219  The command of the 
Harlan restatement of Dennis, to look for “language of incitement,” 
resembled Learned Hand’s brief-lived rule in Masses Publishing Co. 
v. Patten1220 far more than it did anything written by those voting to 
uphold the convictions in Dennis.  With Harlan’s formulation, it is 
doubtful whether the Dennis defendants could have been 
convicted.  Justice Black, in dissent, thought that there were no real 
differences between the two sets of accused Communists, as did 
Justice Tom C. Clark in his dissent.  Both groups “served in the 
same army and were engaged in the same mission.  The convictions 
here were based upon evidence closely paralleling that adduced in 
Dennis . . . .”1221  Justice Clark thought that “[t]he conspiracy 
charged here is the same as in Dennis, except that here it is geared 
to California conditions . . . .”1222 
After Yates, it was not a crime under the Smith Act to organize 
or teach classes on the superiority of communism or the imperative 
of revolution.  To convict, there must be advocacy of action within 
the context of an organization sufficiently capable of 
accomplishing violence.  Whether this distinction is meaningful 
and workable has been doubted.  Martin Redish has argued that 
“attempting to distinguish between one who favors the ultimate 
overthrow of the government in the ‘abstract’ and one who illegally 
advocates overthrow at some undetermined future time rivals the 
inquiry into the number of angels dancing on a pin’s head for 
absurdity.”1223  It may have been absurd, but the government 
regarded the new formulation as a decisive blow against use of the 
Smith Act to curb advocacy of communism.  Charges were 
 1218. Id. at 331. 
 1219. Id. at 350 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 1220. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 
(2d Cir. 1917). 
 1221. Yates, 354 U.S. at 345 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 1222. Id. at 344. 
 1223. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In 
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1196 (1982). 
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dismissed against all of the defendants remaining in Yates.  Judge 
Richard H. Chambers, who had been on the Ninth Circuit panel 
that approved the original convictions, commented as such 
afterwards: “One may as well recognize that the Yates decision 
leaves the Smith Act, as to any further prosecution under it, a 
virtual shambles . . . .”1224 
The era of Smith Act prosecutions had come to an end as far 
as the Communist Party was concerned.  Nevertheless, Yates, 
despite tempering Dennis, was a good deal less protective of speech 
than the First Amendment doctrines articulated by the Court in the 
1940s.  In addition to the point made by Professor Redish, the 
other striking aspect of Yates was its apparent abandonment of the 
need to prove an immediate danger from the defendants’ speech 
activities.  With Harlan’s test, a conviction could be sustained for 
“indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action,” 
in addition to “exhortation to immediate action.”1225  No time limit 
was placed on how far in the future the action needed to be.  For 
that matter, “indoctrination” was defined no more specifically than 
urging someone “to do something, now or in the future.”1226  Yates 
did emphasize a point that the World War I and Red Scare cases 
had neglected: the organization in question must be “of sufficient 
size and cohesiveness,” as well as “sufficiently oriented towards 
action” to make it reasonable to apprehend an attempt to 
overthrow the government.1227  These were not the “puny 
anonymities” of Abrams.  Because the government abandoned 
Smith Act prosecutions after Yates, it remains a mystery whether the 
rule Justice Harlan stated is valid only for large-scale conspiracies 
threatening the existence of the government.  Two years later, 
Harlan wrote for the Court that it had “consistently refused to view 
the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, and has upheld 
federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem which in a 
different context would certainly have raised constitutional issues 
of the gravest character.”1228  Outside the Communist Party cases, 
the Court’s subsequent holdings on political speech usually have 
protected individuals who advocate violent solutions to political 
and social ills.  Before turning to those decisions, the remainder of 
 1224. Fujimoto v. United States, 251 F.2d 342, 342 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 1225. Yates, 354 U.S. at 321. 
 1226. Id. at 325. 
 1227. Id. at 321. 
 1228. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 128 (1959). 
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the story regarding the government’s attempt to suppress the 
Communist Party remains to be told. 
The day Yates was decided, June 17, 1957, was quickly dubbed 
Red Monday by newspapers that were obsessed with the launch of 
the Soviet Sputnik satellite less than two weeks earlier.1229  Three 
other cases decided that day were critical of governmental 
investigations into the loyalty of Americans, especially public 
employees.1230  Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the Court in two 
of the cases involving legislative investigations, one by HUAC and 
the other a state inquiry.  Chief Justice Warren used both occasions 
to denounce what he unmistakably thought had been excessive zeal 
in pursuing Communists and their sympathizers through open-
ended legislative investigation. 
One of these cases, Sweezy v. New Hampshire,1231 arose after the 
legislature empowered the state Attorney General to act as a one-
person investigation committee charged with determining if there 
were “subversive persons . . . presently located within this state.”1232  
Paul Sweezy, a college professor at the University of New 
Hampshire, was the subject of one of these probes, during which 
the Attorney General asked him detailed questions about “his 
career and personal life.”1233  Sweezy answered most of the 
questions, candidly stating that he was a “classical Marxist” and a 
“socialist,” though he denied ever having been a member of the 
Communist Party or that he believed in violent revolution.1234  
Sweezy declined to answer questions about the contents of his 
university lectures and what he knew about the New Hampshire 
Progressive Party or its members.1235  In reversing Sweezy’s 
conviction for his refusal to cooperate, Chief Justice Warren’s 
plurality opinion openly assailed the damage that a government 
investigation could do to a person’s life and career.  The Chief 
 1229. ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY 
1 (1999).  “Then came June 17, 1957, a day he [J. Edgar Hoover] called ‘Red 
Monday’—not because of the red-hot weather, but because, as he saw it, that day 
the United States Supreme Court handed down four decisions favoring the 
‘Reds.’”  Id. 
 1230. See Int’l Bros. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 
178 (1957). 
 1231. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 1232. Id. at 236–37. 
 1233. Id. at 257 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 1234. Id. at 238, 243. 
 1235. Id. at 241, 243–44, 248. 
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Justice was especially adamant that the state legislature had not 
justified its use of the Attorney General as a roving commission “in 
effect to screen the citizenry of New Hampshire” for disloyalty.1236  
“Merely to summon a witness and compel him, against his will, to 
disclose the nature of his past expressions and associations in [sic] 
a measure of governmental interference in these matters.”1237  
Besides, regardless of the outcome, the “stain of the stamp of 
disloyalty” is “deep,” veritably “a badge of infamy.”1238  Sweezy had 
constitutional rights, Chief Justice Warren reminded New 
Hampshire: “We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion 
of petitioner’s liberties in the areas of academic freedom and 
political expression⎯areas in which government should be 
extremely reticent to tread.”1239  No prior opinion, except for a 
dissent by Justice Douglas,1240 had recognized academic freedom as 
an independent constitutional value.  In a sweeping rebuke of the 
state, the Chief Justice concluded in what amounted to an advisory 
opinion that “[w]e do not now conceive of any circumstance 
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these 
fields.”1241 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
Harlan, ultimately reached the same conclusion as Chief Justice 
Warren.  But Justice Frankfurter emphasized the need for a 
deliberate balancing of the respective interests of the individual 
and the state.  At the same time, the former Harvard Law School 
professor let loose a tirade about academic freedom: 
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from 
governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a 
university, such justification for compelling a witness to 
discuss the contents of his lecture appears grossly 
inadequate.  Particularly is this so where the witness has 
sworn that neither in the lecture nor at any other time did 
he ever advocate overthrowing the Government by force 
and violence.1242 
 1236. Id. at 253. 
 1237. Id. at 250. 
 1238. Id. at 248. 
 1239. Id. at 250. 
 1240. See Adler v. Bd. of Ed. of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 508–11 (1952) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting), abrogated by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of New 
York, 385 U.S. 589, 593–95 (1967). 
 1241. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251. 
 1242. Id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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Was this the same Frankfurter who in Dennis urged the Court 
to give outright deference to legislative judgments?1243  In Sweezy, 
after conceding that the Attorney General was acting in the name 
of the legislature, Frankfurter concluded that the balance between 
personal liberties and legislative prerogatives fell well on the side of 
the individual.1244  “To be sure,” he acknowledged, “striking the 
balance implies the exercise of judgment” and “[t]his is the 
inescapable judicial task in giving substantive content, legally 
enforced, to the Due Process Clause, and it is a task ultimately 
committed to this Court.”1245 
A third Red Monday decision, Watkins v. United States,1246 gave 
Chief Justice Warren a forum for delivering a stern rebuke of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee’s investigations, 
accompanied by a lengthy recitation of famous parliamentary 
abuses in British history that were well known to eighteenth-century 
Americans.1247  Parliament’s ill treatment of John Wilkes received a 
whole paragraph.1248  John Watkins was a labor union official who 
had refused to answer some of the questions propounded to him by 
an HUAC subcommittee.1249  For that, Watkins was convicted of 
contempt of Congress.1250  Even the Attorney General agreed that 
Watkins had given a “complete and candid statement of his past 
political associations and activities.”1251  Watkins denied being a 
Communist, but admitted that he had come into contact with 
members of the party in his union dealings.  Where he balked at 
answering and became contemptuous in the eyes of Congress was 
in declaring whether specific individuals were Communists.1252  
These questions had been routine in hundreds of inquiries by the 
HUAC over the years.  Now Chief Justice Warren cast doubt on the 
very legitimacy of the Committee. 
Chief Justice Warren began by stating a premise the 
government had conceded, “There is no general authority to 
expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in 
 1243. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525–26, 551–52 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 1244. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266–67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 1245. Id. 
 1246. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
 1247. Id. at 188–192. 
 1248. Id. at 190–91. 
 1249. Id. at 182. 
 1250. Id. at 181–82. 
 1251. Id. at 184 (quoting Brief for Respondent). 
 1252. Id. at 231 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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terms of the functions of the Congress.”1253  Congress, he reminded 
the assembly across the street, was neither “a law enforcement or 
trial agency.  These are functions of the executive and judicial 
departments of government.  No inquiry is an end in itself; it must 
be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the 
Congress.”1254  Legislative inquiries conducted solely “for the 
personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those 
investigated are indefensible”1255 Warren admonished.  
Furthermore, “there is no congressional power to expose for the 
sake of exposure.”1256  One wonders if Chief Justice Warren was 
thinking of Senator Joseph McCarthy, who died the previous 
month, less than three years since he was censured by the Senate 
for his abusive investigations.  Analyzing HUAC’s charge from 
Congress, Chief Justice Warren found it to be of “confusing 
breadth.”1257  Congress had instructed the HUAC to report on “un-
American propaganda activities in the United States,” and “all 
other questions in relation thereto.”1258  “No one,” Chief Justice 
Warren insisted, “could reasonably deduce from the charter the 
kind of investigation that the Committee was directed to make.”1259  
With “slight or non-existent” oversight by Congress, “[t]he 
Committee is allowed, in essence, to define its own authority, to 
choose the direction and focus of its activities.”1260  And choose 
broadly it had.  HUAC’s “confusing breadth is amply illustrated by 
the innumerable and diverse questions into which the Committee 
has inquired under this charter since 1938.”1261 
HUAC, Chief Justice Warren continued, was “a new kind of 
congressional inquiry unknown in prior periods of American 
history. . . . This new phase of legislative inquiry involved a broad-
scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens.”1262  
Watkins had “marshalled an impressive array of evidence” from 
HUAC’s prior work to support the suspicion that the Committee 
“was engaged in a program of exposure for the sake of 
 1253. Id. at 187. 
 1254. Id. 
 1255. Id. 
 1256. Id. at 200. 
 1257. Id. at 209. 
 1258. Id. at 201–02. 
 1259. Id. at 204. 
 1260. Id. at 203–05. 
 1261. Id. at 209. 
 1262. Id. at 195. 
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exposure.”1263  Prying into private lives could have enormous costs, 
Chief Justice Warren wrote, amplifying his remarks from Sweezy: 
And when those forced revelations concern matters that 
are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the 
general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may 
be disastrous.  This effect is even more harsh when it is 
past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed 
and judged by current standards rather than those 
contemporary with the matters exposed.  Nor does the 
witness alone suffer the consequences.  Those who are 
identified by witnesses and thereby placed in the same 
glare of publicity are equally subject to public stigma, 
scorn and obloquy.  Beyond that, there is the more subtle 
and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere 
to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and 
associations in order to avoid a similar fate at some future 
time.1264 
If a congressional committee has an “excessively broad 
charter,” as HUAC did, this “places the courts in an untenable 
position if they are to strike a balance between the public need for 
a particular interrogation and the right of citizens to carry on their 
affairs free from unnecessary governmental interference.”1265  When 
Watkins requested that the subcommittee chairman spell out the 
purpose of the inquiry, the chairman replied that it was 
“investigating ‘subversion and subversive propaganda.’”1266  By the 
Chief Justice’s reckoning, this “was woefully inadequate to convey 
sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions to the 
subject under inquiry.”1267  According to the statute used to convict 
Watkins, a question had to be “pertinent” to the Committee’s 
legitimate purposes or the witness could refuse to answer with 
impunity.1268  That was enough to void the conviction without 
reaching the First Amendment since it was impossible for a court to 
know if the queries that Watkins declined to answer were pertinent 
to HUAC’s mission.1269  It is informative, nonetheless, to notice how 
broadly Warren condemned the Committee.  The specific details 
 1263. Id. at 199. 
 1264. Id. at 197–98. 
 1265. Id. at 205–06. 
 1266. Id. at 214. 
 1267. Id. at 215. 
 1268. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1938) (establishing part of the standard of criminality for 
contempt of Congress as the pertinency of the questions to the witness). 
 1269. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 214–15. 
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recounted in the opinion damned the Committee as dangerously 
out of control.  For example, the government contended that the 
Committee called on Watkins as part of a probe of “Communist 
infiltration in labor” unions.1270  Warren thought the evidence 
raised “strong . . . doubt[s] that the subject revolved about labor 
matters.”1271  Most of the witnesses the Committee questioned “had 
no connection with labor at all.”1272  Mentioning this point was 
unnecessary to resolving Watkin’s case.  As in Sweezy, the Chief 
Justice’s rant against HUAC appeared to be more for the sake of 
publicly rebuking out-of-control legislative investigations than to 
establish a firm constitutional principle.1273  Later decisions, we shall 
see, sustained HUAC’s authority to demand that witnesses testify 
about their own or others’ Communist affiliations. 
The fourth ruling announced on Red Monday, like the first 
three, did not expressly rely on the First Amendment, but did 
reprove the government’s notorious loyalty program.  John Stewart 
Service, an “old China hand” in the Foreign Service, came under 
suspicion of the authorities when he disclosed classified documents 
to a left-leaning magazine in 1945.1274  Service did so in the time-
honored tradition of influencing public policy through leaks to 
journalists, but nevertheless, it was imprudent and he got caught.1275  
A grand jury refused to indict Service, and he was reinstated in the 
State Department, but that did not end his troubles.1276  Joe 
McCarthy began his own investigation and accused Service of being 
a major figure in the supposed ring of Communists at the State 
Department.  Senator McCarthy declared on the Senate floor in 
1950 that the State Department was infested by “individuals who 
are loyal to the ideals and designs of Communism rather than 
those of the free, God-fearing half of the world.”1277  Service was one 
of those whom he specifically identified, notwithstanding that nine 
loyalty boards from 1945–1951 had cleared Service.  However, in 
 1270. Id. at 212. 
 1271. Id. at 213. 
 1272. Id. 
 1273. See also Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961) (finding questions 
asked of HUAC witness were not pertinent to announced purpose of committee’s 
investigation). 
 1274. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). 
 1275. Id. 
 1276. Id. at 365. 
 1277. Joseph McCarthy, quoted in Michael T. Kaufman, John Paton Davies, 
Diplomat Who Ran Afoul of McCarthy Over China, Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
1999, at B10. 
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April 1951, Truman issued a new executive order on discharging 
disloyal federal employees.1278  Previously, employees could be 
discharged if there were “reasonable grounds” to believe they were 
disloyal.1279  The new standard effectively reversed the burden of 
proof: an employee was to be fired if there was “reasonable doubt” 
as to disloyalty.1280  A fresh review of Service’s case by the Civil 
Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board concluded that there 
were such doubts about Service, based solely on his leak of 
documents in 1945.1281  McCarthy brought a great deal of pressure 
on the State Department to fire the experienced diplomat.  Service 
was discharged despite the State Department’s admission that it 
had no evidence to establish he was a Communist or affiliated with 
any subversive organization.1282 
Six years later, the Court overturned Service’s firing.  Justice 
Harlan’s opinion avoided constitutional considerations and rested 
on the State Department’s failure to follow its own internal 
procedures in the case.  Service regained his position at State, 
retiring some years later from a minor post at the Liverpool 
consulate, a once promising career ruined by McCarthy’s 
meddling.  That closed a sad chapter that had seen the purging of 
the State Department’s China Desk, removing the longtime 
veterans with accumulated knowledge of Far Eastern affairs at a 
time when expertise on that region was critically needed.1283 
Red Monday notwithstanding, for several years thereafter the 
Court upheld a variety of laws mandating registration of 
Communist organizations, signing loyalty oaths, and requiring 
sworn testimony before legislative or administrative investigating 
committees about involvement in the Communist Party or similar 
organizations.  HUAC prevailed in convincing the Court that 
witnesses could be asked whether they or others were or had been 
members of the party.  In other cases, states were allowed to deny 
bar membership to prospective attorneys if the applicants refused 
 1278. Exec. Order No. 10,241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (Apr. 28, 1951). 
 1279. Exec. Order No. 9,835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947). 
 1280. Exec. Order No. 10,241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (Apr. 28, 1951). 
 1281. Service, 354 U.S. at 366–67. 
 1282. Id. at 367 n.8. 
 1283. See generally HARVEY KLEHR & RONALD RADOSH, THE AMERASIA SPY CASE: 
PRELUDE TO MCCARTHYISM (1996) (relaying the story of John Stewart Service).  See 
also John Kifner, John Service, a Purged ‘China Hand,’ Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
1999, at B11 (discussing the historical events surrounding John Stewart Service’s 
life). 
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to reveal past Communist connections.  These rulings came despite 
an earlier decision that mere past membership in the Communist 
Party was not a sufficient ground to exclude an otherwise qualified 
person from the practice of law.  Justice Black had written for the 
Court that it “cannot automatically be inferred that all members 
shared” the ends of the groups to which they belonged.1284  
However, failure to provide information to the bar was another 
matter, the Court held in two 1961 cases, because obstinacy 
obstructed the bar’s ability to follow leads as to the applicant’s 
character.1285  Likewise, the refusal of a subway conductor to answer 
whether he was a Communist Party member was considered by the 
Court in a 1958 decision to be a sufficient basis for firing the 
employee.1286  In his majority opinion, Justice Harlan reasoned that 
the conductor had not been penalized for associating with 
Communists.  Rather, his “lack of frankness” raised a “doubt” about 
the man’s “trust and reliability,” no different than “if he had 
refused to give any other information about himself which might 
be relevant to his employment.”1287 
Three rulings issued on the same day in June 1961 produced a 
mixed result for the party, but overall demonstrated that Yates did 
 1284. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957).  
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California & the Comm. of Bar Exam’rs of 
California, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (holding that past Communist membership is 
not enough to exclude a person from the bar). 
 1285. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1961) (holding that Illinois could 
constitutionally adopt a court-made rule preventing applicants from admission to 
the practice of law for refusing to answer questions regarding Communist Party 
affiliation); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California & the Comm. of Bar Exam’rs of 
California, 366 U.S. 36, 1009–10 (1961) (holding that admission to the practice of 
law could be denied to applicant who refused to answer questions about 
Communist Party membership). 
 1286. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 476 (1958) (interpreting the court of 
appeals’ opinion as indicating that “a finding of doubtful trust and reliability could 
justifiably be based on appellant’s lack of frankness.”). 
 1287. Id. at 476.  For other cases on compulsory disclosure of Communist 
associations, see Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961) (holding that 
witness was not immune from conviction for refusing to answer questions asked by 
HUAC); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (upholding contempt 
conviction for defendant’s refusal to answer any questions asked of him by 
HUAC); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (upholding conviction 
for refusing to answer questions at a HUAC hearing about Communist 
involvement); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (agreeing that state could 
force witness to identify guests and speakers at a Communist-affiliated summer 
camp); Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) 
(upholding dismissal of a teacher for refusing to answer questions about 
Communist associations). 
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not spell constitutional immunity for the party or its members.  In 
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,1288 the Court 
approved an order requiring the party to register as a “Communist-
action organization,” meaning that it was found to be “substantially 
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or 
foreign organization controlling the world Communist 
movement.”1289  Individual party members also were compelled to 
register.  Registration, as indicated earlier, had serious 
consequences for both the organization and its members.  Justice 
Frankfurter’s 5-4 majority decision had to distinguish several pesky 
precedents involving more sympathetic groups.  One of these, 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,1290 decided in 1958, sustained 
the right of the Alabama chapter of the civil rights organization to 
refuse giving the state a member list as part of an inquiry into 
whether the NAACP needed to register as an out-of-state 
corporation.  To hold for the NAACP, the Court first explicitly 
recognized “that freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”1291  Among other 
purposes, group association served the vital purpose of enhancing 
advocacy “of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones.”1292  Revelation of members’ identities had in 
the past led “to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of 
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”1293  
Communists faced the same types of retaliation, but nonetheless 
the registration order for them was held valid.  Elucidating the 
difference between the NAACP’s situation and the Communist 
Party’s, Frankfurter noted that Alabama had offered no serious 
justifications for the NAACP membership disclosure, whereas the 
federal act “compels the registration of organized groups which 
have been made the instruments of a long-continued, systematic, 
disciplined activity directed by a foreign power and purposing to 
overthrow existing government in this country.”1294  True to his 
 1288. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
 1289. Id. at 8. 
 1290. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 1291. Id. at 460. 
 1292. Id. 
 1293. Id. at 462. 
 1294. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 105 
(1961). 
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personal philosophy of judicial restraint, Frankfurter would not 
question Congress’ judgment here any more so than he had in 
Dennis⎯“the legislative determination must be respected.”1295 
A second case decided that day (June 5, 1961) gave the Court’s 
stamp of approval to the membership section of the Smith Act, 
which made it illegal to belong to a group advocating the forcible 
overthrow of the government.  Scales v. United States1296 presented 
the saga of Junius Irving Scales, the scion of a prominent North 
Carolina family who became a Communist during his university 
days at Chapel Hill.  (His parents should have known better than to 
name him Junius, the pen name of the late eighteenth-century 
British radical writer who had flouted the press laws of his day.)  
Scales was an idealistic young man, who like many at the time took 
deep offense at the persistence of poverty and racism, particularly 
in the South, and became convinced that capitalism impeded 
progress toward equality.  Scales quickly ascended through the 
Party ranks, becoming its coordinator for labor and civil rights 
issues in several Southern states.  Eventually, Scales went 
underground to avoid FBI surveillance.  Following his arrest in 
1954 for being a member of the Party, some seven years of Scales’ 
life were consumed by legal proceedings that culminated in his 
conviction and imprisonment.  During the pendency of the 
proceeding, Scales himself broke with the Party after Khrushchev 
revealed Stalin’s atrocities in 1956.  As Scales wrote in his memoir: 
Stalin⎯my revered symbol of the infallibility of 
Communism, the builder of socialism in one country, the 
rock of Stalingrad, the wise, kindly man with the keen 
sense of humor at whose death I had wept just three years 
before⎯Stalin, on the admission of his former idolators, 
had been a murderous, power-hungry monster!1297 
Nevertheless, the government pursued Scales doggedly 
through two trials and two Supreme Court appeals, and eventually 
a six-year sentence was affirmed solely for Scales’ membership in 
the party.  A public outcry by various notorieties, including an 
editorial by the New York Times calling him “a misguided idealist,”1298 
urged his release.  “There is something un-American in having 
 1295. Id. at 97. 
 1296. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).   
 1297. JUNIUS IRVING SCALES & RICHARD NICKSON, CAUSE AT HEART: A FORMER 
COMMUNIST REMEMBERS (1987). 
 1298. Ari L. Goldman, Junius Scales, Communist Sent to U.S. Prison, Dies at 82, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at C23. 
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even one political prisoner in the United States,” the Times 
editorialized.1299  President Kennedy commuted Scales’ sentence 
after fifteen months.1300  Scales left the penitentiary with a keen 
desire for obscurity⎯he spent the next twenty years as a 
proofreader for the Times.1301 
In upholding Scales’ conviction, Justice Harlan—the author of 
Yates—quickly dispatched Scales’ First Amendment objections.  
Dennis had “settled” the issue that the party was not engaged in 
“constitutionally protected speech,” and a “combination to 
promote such advocacy” was not a form of association entitled to 
First Amendment protection.1302  Key to the distinction between 
Yates and Scales, Harlan explained, was the statute’s requirement 
that the “defendant ‘specifically intend(s) to accomplish (the aims 
of the organization) by resort to violence.’”1303  This was a critical 
requirement, for it meant that “the member for whom the 
organization is a vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims 
and policies does not fall within the ban of the statute: he lacks the 
requisite specific intent ‘to bring about the overthrow of the 
government as speedily as circumstances would permit.’”1304  Junius 
Scales did not personally benefit from this proviso, as there was 
ample proof that he had worked assiduously to accomplish the 
Party’s illegal ends.  Nevertheless, the decision effectively 
minimized the importance of the membership clause.  If a 
conviction could be obtained only by proof that the defendant 
actually had violated the advocacy section of the Smith Act or some 
other statute dealing with insurrection, then the membership ban 
served no independent purpose.  Underscoring that point, a third 
case decided that day, Noto v. United States,1305 reversed a conviction 
under the Smith Act’s membership clause for lack of evidence that 
the defendant had engaged in subversive advocacy.1306  Justice 
Harlan concluded that the government’s case “bears much of the 
infirmity that we found in the Yates record, and requires us to 
conclude that the evidence of illegal Party advocacy was insufficient 
 1299. Id. 
 1300. Id.  See also SCALES & NICKSON, supra note 1297 (discussing Scales’ life). 
 1301. Goldman, supra note 1298. 
 1302. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961). 
 1303. Id. at 229 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)). 
 1304. Id. at 229–30. 
 1305. 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
 1306.     Id. at 299. 
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to support this conviction.”1307  No other prosecutions were brought 
under the membership clause after Scales and Noto. 
The Yates-Scales-Noto line of cases was largely based on statutory 
interpretation, but cases later in the 1960s treated their principles 
as mandated by the First Amendment.  Organizations could have 
both legal and illegal goals, Harlan noted in his Scales opinion.1308  
Enforcing “a blanket prohibition of association”1309 with such a dual-
purpose group, Scales found, and later cases repeated, “would pose 
‘a real danger that legitimate political expression or association 
would be impaired.’”1310  To impose a penalty based on association 
with an organization, the state must prove⎯as a constitutional 
minimum⎯that a person’s membership was “accompanied by a 
specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the organization.”1311  
Repeating a line from Cantwell in a 1966 case, the Court reiterated 
the essential point that “[a] statute touching those protected rights 
must be ‘narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as 
constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of 
the State.’”1312 
For example, in a 1967 decision, United States v. Robel,1313 the 
Court scrutinized the Internal Security Act’s prohibition against 
employment of members of “Communist-action organizations” in 
any “defense facility.”  Eugene Robel had been a machinist at a 
Seattle shipyard for ten years, all the while an out-of-the-closet 
Communist Party member.1314  Because of his membership, Robel 
should have resigned after the Secretary of Defense designated the 
shipyard as a “defense facility” in 1962.1315  In a 5-4 decision with 
Chief Justice Warren writing for the majority, the Court found 
Robel’s criminal indictment for failing to quit as fatally defective.1316  
At first glance, this result seems a startling conclusion (the 
dissenters certainly thought so).  One might reasonably think that a 
person belonging to an organization dedicated to overthrowing the 
government would be an unacceptable security risk at a defense 
 1307. Id. at 291. 
 1308. Scales, 367 U.S. at 229. 
 1309. Id. 
 1310. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15 (1966). 
 1311. Id. at 16. 
 1312. Id. at 18 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). 
 1313. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). 
 1314. Id. at n.10. 
 1315. Id. at 260. 
 1316. Id. at 260–61. 
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establishment.  But Warren refused to accept at face value the 
government’s assertion of “national defense”1317 as a justification for 
a law that “cut deeply into the right of association.”1318  His point 
was not to dismiss the Government’s concerns for sabotage and 
espionage, which were “not insubstantial.”1319  Rather, he faulted 
the statute for its imprecision, by “indiscriminately trapping 
membership which can be constitutionally punished and 
membership which cannot be so proscribed.”1320  Regardless of the 
law’s legitimate purpose, it “quite literally establishes guilt by 
association alone, without any need to establish that an individual’s 
association poses the threat feared by the Government in 
proscribing it.”1321  The law’s broad “net”1322 would snare the 
employee who was an “inactive or passive member” of the tainted 
organization; it reached someone who was “unaware of the 
organization’s unlawful aims,” or who disagreed with them.1323 Not 
only that, the ban was comprehensive, encompassing all 
employment within a defense facility regardless of whether the 
individual held “a nonsensitive position.”1324  With a memorable 
line, Warren concluded this about the law: “It would indeed be 
ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the 
subversion of one of those liberties—the freedom of association—
which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”1325 
As the 1960s unfolded, claims of associational rights 
increasingly came before the Court and in a variety of contexts, 
each requiring a different weighing of personal liberties against 
assertions of national security.  More and more, the Warren Court 
found that the freedom to associate had been unduly undermined 
by measures designed to discourage membership in radical 
organizations.  For example, in a 1960 case, Shelton v. Tucker,1326 
Arkansas demanded that all schoolteachers and college professors 
in the state list the names and addresses of every organization that 
they had belonged to or contributed to in the previous five years.  
 1317. Id. at 264. 
 1318. Id. 
 1319. Id. 
 1320. Id. at 266. 
 1321. Id. at 265. 
 1322. Id. 
 1323. Id. at 266. 
 1324. Id. 
 1325. Id. at 264. 
 1326. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
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Such a “completely unlimited”1327 inquiry created an “atmosphere 
of suspicion and distrust”1328 under which “[s]cholarship cannot 
flourish,”1329 Justice Stewart wrote for the Court in defense of 
academic freedom.  A teacher would have to disclose her church, 
political party and every cause to which she had contributed.  To 
top it off, the state did not guarantee the confidentiality of the 
disclosures.  Arkansas surely had a strong interest in the 
qualifications of its teachers, Stewart allowed, but the disclosure law 
“[went] far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the 
State’s legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its 
teachers.”1330  What the state could lawfully do was pose more finely-
tuned questions to teachers, such as whether they belonged to 
specific groups, how many organizations they belonged to, and the 
amount of time consumed by these activities.  The important point 
was that government must accomplish even legitimate purposes by 
using means that imposed the least restrictions on speech.1331  
Finding that alternative ways existed to get the same result with 
fewer burdens on expression raised the suspicion that the state’s 
real purpose was to stifle communication. 
By the early 1970s, the era of loyalty oaths and legislative or bar 
association investigations into Communist groups largely came to a 
close.  Two decisions in 1971 rebuffed state rulings that denied bar 
membership based on the applicants’ refusal to state whether they 
belonged to an organization seeking the violent overthrow of the 
government.1332  Justice Black’s plurality opinion in one of these 
cases regarded these inquiries as intolerable, as they forced the 
applicant “to make a guess as to whether any organization to which 
she ever belonged ‘advocates overthrow of the United States 
Government by force or violence.’”1333  Drawing upon prior rulings, 
Black concluded that a state was prohibited from “excluding a 
person from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a 
member of a particular political organization or because he holds 
certain beliefs.”1334  That being true, the First Amendment likewise 
 1327. Id. at 488. 
 1328. Id. at 487 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). 
 1329. Id.  
 1330. Id. at 490. 
 1331. See id. at 488. 
 1332. Application of Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 
U.S. 1 (1971). 
 1333. Baird, 401 U.S. at 5. 
 1334. Id. at 6. 
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did not countenance “[b]road and sweeping state inquiries into 
these protected areas,”1335 which inevitably “discourage[d] citizens 
from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.”1336 
A third case, decided on the same day as the other two bar 
applications cases, however, upheld a New York requirement that 
applicants for the state bar certify that he or she believes in “the 
form of the government of the United States and is loyal to such 
government . . . .”1337  In addition, applicants must tell whether they 
belonged to a group that taught or advocated1338 that the 
government would be overthrown by illegal means, and if the 
answer was positive, whether they had “the specific intent to further 
the aims of such organization . . . .”1339  None of the plaintiffs in the 
case had yet been subjected to these provisions⎯theirs was a class 
action comprised of people who were “seeking or planning to seek 
admission to practice law in New York.”1340  The first of the 
requirements, Justice Potter Stewart wrote for a 5-4 majority, had 
been interpreted narrowly by the state to “mean no more than 
willingness to take the constitutional oath and ability to do so in 
good faith.”1341  As to the question about organizations, it was 
“precisely tailored to conform to the relevant decisions of [the] 
Court.”1342  It was “well settled that Bar examiners may ask about 
Communist affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry into the 
nature of the association and may exclude an applicant for refusal 
to answer.”1343  To this he added a curious point: no one had ever 
been denied admission to the New York Bar “because of his answers 
to these or any similar questions, or because of his refusal to answer 
them.”1344  The plaintiffs had contended that “by its very existence” 
New York’s system for ferreting out disloyal lawyers “works a 
‘chilling effect’ upon the free exercise of the rights of speech and 
association of students who must anticipate having to meet its 
 1335. Id. 
 1336. Id.  See also Stolar, 401 U.S. at 23 ("[S]tate could not require applicant to 
state whether he has been or is member of [an] organization that advocates 
overthrow of government of United States by force."). 
 1337. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 
154, 155 (1971). 
 1338. Id. at 164. 
 1339. Id. at 165. 
 1340. Id. at 157. 
 1341. Id. at 163. 
 1342. Id. at 165. 
 1343. Id. at 165–66. 
 1344. Id. at 165. 
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requirements.”1345  Justice Stewart in effect told them to thaw 
out⎯New York had “shown every willingness to keep their 
investigations within constitutionally permissible limits.”1346 
A little more than a year later, the Court took up its last 
significant employee loyalty-oath case, Cole v. Richardson.1347  
Massachusetts insisted that all public employees sign the following 
oath as a condition of employment: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and 
defend the Constitution of the United States of America 
and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the 
government of the United States of America or of this 
Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional method.1348 
An employee at a state hospital refused to sign, asserting that 
the oath was unconstitutional.1349  Not so, Chief Justice Burger 
replied for the majority.1350  Before reaching the oath in question, 
Burger reviewed and categorized the Court’s prior holdings on the 
subject.1351  “We have made clear,” he started, “that neither federal 
nor state government may condition employment on taking oaths 
that impinge on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments respectively, as for example those relating to political 
beliefs.”1352  Public employees could not be forced as a condition of 
employment to swear that they had not or would not engage “in 
protected speech activities such as the following: criticizing 
institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that 
approves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and 
supporting candidates for political office.”1353  By the same token, a 
public sector job could not be conditioned on past of future 
associations with others that were constitutionally protected.1354  
Here, Chief Justice Burger tied the legality of membership oaths to 
the Court’s decisions on the First Amendment constraints against 
punishing a person for merely belonging to a group: “protected 
 1345. Id. at 159. 
 1346. Id. at 167. 
 1347. 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
 1348. Id. at 677–78. 
 1349. Id. at 678. 
 1350. Id. at 687. 
 1351. Id. at 680. 
 1352. Id. at 680. 
 1353. Id. 
 1354. Id. 
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activities include membership in organizations having illegal 
purposes unless one knows of the purpose and shares a specific 
intent to promote the illegal purpose.”1355 
Applying these doctrines to the Massachusetts oath, Chief 
Justice Burger’s opinion found no constitutional violations.  In 
doing so, he explicitly noted “[a]n underlying, seldom articulated 
concern running throughout these cases” about oaths.1356  This was 
the difference between oaths that involved past actions by the 
employee and those “addressed to the future, promising 
constitutional support in broad terms.”1357  Those in the first 
category had “often required individuals to reach back into their 
past to recall minor, sometimes innocent, activities.  They put the 
government into ‘the censorial business of investigating, 
scrutinizing, interpreting, and then penalizing or approving the 
political viewpoints’ and past activities of individuals.”1358  Public 
employees could not be terminated solely for refusing to swear that 
they had not previously engaged in disloyal acts.1359  Due process 
demanded in those cases that the government hold “a hearing, 
showing evidence of disloyalty, and allowing the employee an 
opportunity to respond might the State develop a permissible basis 
for concluding that the employee was to be discharged.”1360  That 
was in contrast to the instant situation, in which the employee had 
been asked to commit herself to future loyalty.1361  The first clause of 
the oath (“uphold and defend the Constitution”)1362 was no 
different in substance from the oaths specified in the Constitution 
for the President and members of Congress.  “Although in theory 
the First Amendment might have invalidated those provisions,” 
Chief Justice Burger added, “approval of the amendment by the 
 1355. Id. 
 1356. Id. at 681. 
 1357. Id. 
 1358. Id. (quoting Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. 
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 192 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 1359. Id. at 686 (citing Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960) and Connell v. 
Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971)). 
 1360. Id. at 686. 
 1361. Compare Nostrand, 362 U.S. at 474 (requiring “every public employee to 
subscribe to an oath that he is ‘not a subversive person or a member of the 
Communist Party or any subversive organization . . . .’”), with Cole v. Richardson, 
405 U.S. 676, 677 (1972)(requiring subscription to an oath stating “‘I will uphold 
and defend the Constitution of the United States of America . . . and that I will 
oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States . . . .’”) (emphasis 
added). 
 1362. Cole, 405 U.S. at 677. 
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same individuals who had included the oaths in the Constitution 
suggested strongly that they were consistent.”1363  As in similar oaths 
the Court had upheld, it was nothing more than an 
“acknowledgment of a willingness to abide by ‘constitutional 
processes of government,’”1364 which he thought was not too much 
to ask of a public employee.  “Since there is no constitutionally 
protected right to overthrow a government by force, violence, or 
illegal or unconstitutional means, no constitutional right is 
infringed by an oath to abide by the constitutional system in the 
future.”1365 
The second clause in the Massachusetts oath (“I will oppose 
the overthrow of the government”) was “essentially the same as the 
first,” Chief Justice Burger thought.1366  He would not “presume” 
that this “impose[s] obligations of specific, positive action on oath 
takers.”1367  If the state were to demand specific acts from the 
oathsayer, this “would raise serious questions whether the oath was 
so vague as to amount to a denial of due process.”1368  But no one 
had ever been prosecuted for perjury on account of failing to live 
up to this promise, and if there was “a record of actual prosecutions 
or harassment through threatened prosecutions, we might be faced 
with a different question.”1369  Massachusetts had thus won a Pyrrhic 
victory.  Chief Justice Burger’s caveats had left the oath, and ones 
like it, so innocuous that they amounted to nothing more than a 
general agreement by the employee to abide by the Constitution. 
Two years later, in 1974, the Court decided its last loyalty oath 
case to date.  Unlike the prior cases, which had dealt with oaths to 
obtain public employment, bar admission and tax exemptions, 
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb1370 involved elections.  
Indiana had an election law that demanded all political parties 
seeking a spot on the ballot to submit an oath swearing that the 
 1363. Id. at 682. 
 1364. Id. (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135 (1966)). 
 1365. Id. at 686.  See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 
(1971)(invalidating an employee oath that required affiants to swear that they did 
“not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the 
State of Florida by force or violence.”  This violated the rule “proscribing summary 
dismissal from public employment without hearing or inquiry required by due 
process.”). 
 1366. Id. at 683. 
 1367. Id. at 684. 
 1368. Id. at 684–85. 
 1369. Id. at 685. 
 1370. 414 U.S. 441 (1974). 
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organization did not advocate the overthrow of the government by 
force.1371  A twist on this scheme was that a political party also had to 
insert a plank in its platform specifically disavowing such a 
revolutionary intent.1372  Justice Brennan’s majority opinion found 
the same flaw in the Hoosier statute that had sunk other loyalty 
oaths⎯it was “not limited to advocacy of action,”1373 and therefore 
interfered with associational rights.  In this instance, the constitu-
tional failing was exacerbated by the law’s application to the 
franchise, because “free and unimpaired” voting was “preservative 
of other basic civil and political rights.”1374 
As the Court wound up the era of subversive activity cases, its 
explanation of both older decisions and the methodology used in 
the newer ones would have important ramifications far beyond 
radical organizations.  Theories that had been developed for 
entirely different areas of the law were fashioned into First 
Amendment doctrines.  Whitcomb, for example, relied in part on 
cases dealing with voting rights to buttress its conclusion about 
political association.1375  A moment ago we reviewed another 
example in Shelton v. Tucker.1376  There the methodology employed, 
pinpointing a less restrictive alternative⎯which had originated as a 
tool in equal protection analysis⎯would be applied to a range of 
First Amendment cases having nothing to do with compulsory 
disclosures of information.1377  Two other examples are the 
doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness.  An overbroad law would 
be one that in some respects regulated expression in a 
constitutional manner, but at the same time potentially proscribed 
protected speech.  As the Court said in Shelton, 
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate 
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means 
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when 
the end can be more narrowly achieved.  The breadth of 
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less 
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.1378 
 1371. Id. at 442–43. 
 1372. Id. at 443 n.1 (construing IND. CODE § 29-3812 (1969)). 
 1373. Id. at 447. 
 1374. Id. at 450 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). 
 1375. See id. 
 1376. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
 1377. Id. at 493–94. 
 1378. Id. at 488. 
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An overbroad law is completely invalid, even if it might have 
some constitutional usages, as the Court will not “leave standing a 
statute patently capable of many unconstitutional applications, 
threatening those who validly exercise their rights of free 
expression with the expense and inconvenience of criminal 
prosecution.”1379  Robel was an instance of a law suffering the “fatal 
defect of overbreadth,” inasmuch as it sought “to bar employment 
both for association which may be proscribed and for association 
which may not be proscribed consistently with First Amendment 
rights.”1380  A law could be doubly flawed by being both excessively 
vague and overbroad.  Shelton fell into that category, although the 
Court did not use the yet-to-be-minted term “overbreadth.”  At 
once the Arkansas law had an indefinite scope while at the same 
time it had enough clearly plausible (yet unconstitutional) 
applications to render it incurably overbroad.1381 
By interring a statute for not being “narrowly drawn,” the 
Justices need not—and usually do not—have to decide whether the 
particular speech or associational activities involved in the case 
would be subject to sanction under a properly drafted statute.  For 
example, consider Aptheker v. Secretary of State,1382 a 1964 case that 
resolved whether the law forbidding Communist Party members 
from applying for or using a U.S. passport was constitutional.  The 
dispute arose when the government refused to issue passports to 
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and Herbert E. Aptheker, two highly visible 
Communists who made no secret of their party affiliations.1383  
Flynn had been convicted under the Smith Act in the “second 
wave” of prosecutions after Dennis v. United States and spent more 
than two years in prison as a result.1384  (She did not get the benefit 
of Yates’ revisionism because her sentence was completed by the 
time it was decided.)  In 1961, she became chair of the national 
 1379. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). 
 1380. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967). 
 1381. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960).  See also, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1967) (striking New York law requiring removal 
of teachers for “seditious utterances” because “the possible scope of ‘seditious’ 
utterances or acts has virtually no limit.”); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 55 
(1967) (striking teacher oath as overbroad that required swearing, “I am not 
engaged in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the Government of 
the United States, or the State of Maryland, or any political subdivision of either of 
them, by force or violence.”). 
 1382. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
 1383. See id. at 504. 
 1384. Id. at 524 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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committee of the U.S. Communist Party.1385  Aptheker was a noted 
Marxist historian⎯a recognized expert on Afro-American 
history⎯and editor of the American Communist Party’s theoretical 
journal.1386  The FBI considered Aptheker “the most dangerous 
communist in the United States,”1387 which at least shows that the 
Feds appreciated the power of ideas.  Both eventually obtained 
their passports after the Court found the statute unconstitutional 
on its face.1388  (Flynn used her new passport to visit Moscow, where 
she died, proving that success is sometimes a mixed blessing.  But 
the Soviets did give her a state funeral in appreciation of her 
prodigious efforts on behalf of communism, so the trip was not 
entirely a bust.)  Two rights were at risk by the passport 
denials⎯the right to travel and the right to associate with others 
for political purposes.1389  Justice Arthur J. Goldberg upheld both 
rights by finding that the flat travel ban for all party members swept 
“unnecessarily broadly.”1390  It reached members of “Communist-
action”1391 organizations who were unaware of its ultimate 
objectives.  Furthermore, the prohibition was indiscriminate, 
barring exit to Communists for all purposes, even “to visit a sick 
relative, to receive medical treatment, or for any other wholly 
innocent purpose.”1392  Aptheker would be unable to travel abroad 
to study rare manuscripts; he was forbidden to do so “regardless of 
the security-sensitivity of the areas in which he wishes to travel.”1393  
And the law left significant gaps if it really was intended to protect 
national security⎯Communists were free to travel without a 
passport anywhere in the Western hemisphere except Cuba.1394  By 
declaring the statute overbroad, the Court took care of the 
immediate controversy without identifying the circumstances under 
 1385. Id. at 515. 
 1386. Id. 
 1387. Clayborne Carson, African-American History Loses Three Past Masters, 31 
Organization of American Historians Newsletter, May 2003, at 20. 
 1388. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 517. 
 1389. Id. at 507. 
 1390. Id. at 508. 
 1391. Id. at 509. 
 1392. Id. at 511. 
 1393. Id. at 512. 
 1394. Id. at 507. 
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which a Communist could be forced to remain in the United 
States.1395 
Overbreadth became a victim of its own usefulness for those 
attacking statutes restricting speech.  Under this doctrine, a litigant 
is allowed challenge a statute as overbroad in its potential 
application to others not before the Court, even though the law 
could be constitutionally applied in the instant case.  In a 1973 
ruling, Broadrick v. Oklahoma,1396 a slim majority held that the 
overbreadth must be both “real” and “substantial as well, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”1397  The terms 
“real” and “substantial” can fairly be described as themselves 
indeterminate, which not surprisingly explains why subsequent 
overbreadth cases are so hard to reconcile with one another.  
Justice White’s Broadrick opinion admitted as much, saying that it 
“remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law 
may properly be held void on its face.”1398 
The unmistakable signal from Broadrick was that overbreadth 
was a “last resort,”1399 to be used “sparingly,”1400 especially “where 
conduct and not merely speech is involved . . . .”1401  At least three 
reasons explain why.  First, in successfully invoking overbreadth, a 
person whose activities undeniably were illegal and not 
constitutionally protected escapes liability.  Second, the Justices are 
speculating as to how the law would be applied in other situations, 
and as a rule they prefer to wait for concrete facts so as to better 
understand the implications of their rulings.  Finally, a finding of 
overbreadth kills the statute entirely, leaving the state in the lurch, 
and giving legislators few clues as to how to construct a 
constitutional statute.  For all these reasons, the Court has 
“generally disfavored” obliterating a law totally and prefers to judge 
a statute’s constitutionality “as applied” to the particular 
challenger.1402  Broadrick’s downside, as Justice Brennan’s dissent 
argued, is that leaving a defective law in place will have a “chilling 
 1395. On Flynn’s earlier Smith Act conviction, see United States v. Flynn, 103 F. 
Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff’d, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 
909 (1955). 
 1396. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
 1397. Id. at 615. 
 1398. Id. (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971)). 
 1399. Id. at 613. 
 1400. Id. 
 1401. Id. at 615. 
 1402. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990). 
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effect” on others.1403  While others can always bring their own 
claims, this is costly and time-consuming. 
Excessive vagueness proved to be the undoing of a number of 
laws relating to free expression that the Court reviewed the 1960s 
and later, although the concept appeared as early as 1931 in the 
“red flag” case, Stromberg v. State of California.1404  Vagueness is 
generally unacceptable in criminal laws as a matter of due process, 
and applies in non-speech contexts as well as First Amendment 
cases.1405  People are entitled to sufficient notice of a law’s strictures 
so that they may avoid violating it.  Furthermore, ambiguous laws 
may be wielded selectively against those who for one reason or 
another have irked the authorities.  For that reason, vagueness is 
especially incompatible with First Amendment values.  Uncertain 
meanings lead those affected to “‘steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone’ than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked.”1406  Consequently, “stricter standards of permissible 
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially 
inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at 
his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the 
loser.”1407  Vagueness in loyalty oaths had been of “especially great” 
concern to the Court, Chief Justice Burger wrote in Cole, “because 
uncertainty as to an oath’s meaning may deter individuals from 
engaging in constitutionally protected activity conceivably within 
the scope of the oath.”1408 
Formally speaking, the test for vagueness in a statute with First 
Amendment implications is the same as that for any criminal 
statute: “a law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of 
law.”1409  Unfortunately, and surely ironically, the standard for 
ascertaining vagueness is itself vague, with the result that the scores 
of cases deciding whether statutes are unduly indefinite cannot 
readily be reconciled with one another.  A few examples will at least 
illustrate the Court’s methodology for ascertaining vagueness. 
 1403. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 1404. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 1405. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964). 
 1406. Id. at 372 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 1407. Smith v. State of California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (quoted in Cramp v. 
Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, Fla., 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)). 
 1408. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 681 (1972). 
 1409. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 367. 
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Florida had a law in 1961 that directed all state employees to 
sign an oath swearing among other things that they had not and 
would not “lend . . . aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to 
the Communist Party.”1410  A unanimous Court in Cramp 
determined that these words were “extraordinary” in their 
ambiguity.1411  Justice Stewart came to this conclusion by imagining 
possible ways in which the law could be interpreted.1412  What if an 
employee simply had voted for a Communist candidate in an 
election?1413  Or defended the constitutional rights of a 
Communist?1414  Or supported a cause that was also being advanced 
by the Communist Party?1415  “Could a lawyer who had ever 
represented the Communist Party or its members swear with either 
confidence or honesty that he had never knowingly lent his 
‘counsel’ to the Party?”1416  These may seem like absurd possibilities, 
Stewart granted, but that was a testament to the haziness of the 
oath’s language.1417  “With such vagaries . . . ,” Stewart maintained, 
“it is not unrealistic to suggest that the compulsion of this oath 
provision might weigh most heavily upon those whose 
conscientious scruples were the most sensitive.”1418  Worse yet, a 
perjury prosecution possibly awaited any signer whose actions were 
later found to have aided the Communist Party in some fashion.1419  
Relying on the good faith of prosecutors was unacceptable: “[i]t 
would be blinking reality not to acknowledge that there are some 
among us always ready to affix a Communist label upon those 
whose ideas they violently oppose.  And experience teaches that 
prosecutors too are human.”1420 
Baggett v. Bullitt,1421 decided in 1964, involved two oaths that 
teachers in Washington State 
were obliged to sign as a condition of employment.  In 
one of these, the teacher pledged to: support the 
constitution and laws of the United States of America and 
 1410. Cramp, 368 U.S. at 279. 
 1411. Id. at 286. 
 1412. Id. 
 1413. Id. 
 1414. Id. 
 1415. Id. 
 1416. Id. 
 1417. Id. 
 1418. Id. 
 1419. Id. 
 1420. Id. at 286–87. 
 1421. 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
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of the State of Washington, and will by precept and 
example promote respect for the flag and the institutions 
of the United States of America and the State of 
Washington, reverence for law and order and undivided 
allegiance to the government of the United States.1422 
A second oath, applicable to all Washington state employees, 
had the individual swear that he or she was not a “subversive 
person” within the meaning of state law.1423  A subversive person, in 
turn, was defined as “any person who commits, attempts to commit, 
or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by 
any means any person to commit, attempt to commit . . . any act 
[designed] to overthrow, destroy or alter . . . the [present] 
constitutional form of government . . . by revolution, force, or 
violence.”1424  No employee could be a member of a “subversive 
organization,” knowing its illegal purposes.1425  The Communist 
Party earned the special notice from the legislature, which declared 
it to be such an organization.1426  Some of the plaintiffs were 
professors at the University of Washington, and they may very well 
have had Communist students in their classes.1427  The professors 
were prescient in that within a few years their classes included 
radical leftists who belonged to groups that fell within 
Washington’s definition of a subversive person. 
Justice White’s majority opinion sided with the employees, 
agreeing that teachers might construe the oaths in entirely 
different ways.1428  Many of the same hypothetical applications of 
the Florida law in Cramp also were plausible interpretations of the 
Washington oaths.1429  University professors had even more to worry 
about in this regard than other state workers. 
Persons required to swear they understand this oath may 
quite reasonably conclude that any person who aids the 
Communist Party or teaches or advises known members of 
the Party is a subversive person because such teaching or 
 1422. Id. at 361–62. 
 1423. Id. at 362. 
 1424. Id. 
 1425. Id. 
 1426. Id. at 363. 
 1427. Id. at 361. 
 1428. Id. at 371. 
 1429. Id. at 368. 
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advice may now or at some future date aid the activities of 
the Party.1430 
Could a professor attend a conference at which scholars from 
Communist countries attended?  Or have a professional 
conversation with such a person?  And so on.  Washington 
prohibited aiding a “revolution” to change “the constitutional form 
of the government of the United States, or of the state of 
Washington, or any political subdivision of either of them.”1431  
Since a “revolution” could be nonviolent, White posed another 
series of hypotheticals: “[w]ould, therefore, any organization or any 
person supporting, advocating or teaching peaceful but far-
reaching constitutional amendments be engaged in subversive 
activity?  Could one support the repeal of the Twenty-second 
Amendment or participation by this country in a world 
government?”1432 
The flag portion of the oath fared no better.  “The range of 
activities which are or might be deemed inconsistent with the 
required promise is very wide indeed,”1433 White stated as he again 
raised a series of possible interpretations.  “Even criticism of the 
design or color scheme of the state flag or unfavorable comparison 
of it with that of a sister State or foreign country could be deemed 
disrespectful and therefore violative of the oath.”1434  “And,” White 
said with a just a touch of sarcasm, “what are ‘institutions’ for the 
purposes of this oath?”1435  More hypotheticals followed.  “The oath 
may prevent a professor from criticizing his state judicial system or 
the Supreme Court or the institution of judicial review.  Or it might 
be deemed to proscribe advocating the abolition, for example, of 
the Civil Rights Commission, the House Committee on Un-
American Activities, or foreign aid.”1436 
Dozens of other speech-related vagueness cases could be cited 
at this point.  They are a frustrating lot to reconcile, as statutory 
ambiguity lies largely in the eye of the beholder.  What did the 
Massachusetts law in Cole mean by “uphold and defend the 
Constitution,”1437 and how was a teacher there to understand the 
 1430. Id. at 367–68. 
 1431. Id. at 362. 
 1432. Id. at 370. 
 1433. Id. at 371. 
 1434. Id. 
 1435. Id. 
 1436. Id. 
 1437. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 678 (1972). 
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duty to “oppose the overthrow of the government”?1438  Chief Justice 
Burger would not “presume” that this language imposed specific 
obligations,1439 even though in Cramp and Baggett the Court 
regarded similarly indefinite language as bad for its “potential 
deterrence of constitutionally protected conduct,”1440 by causing 
teachers to “‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ than if the 
boundaries of forbidden areas were clearly marked.”1441  When this 
concern was raised in Cole, Chief Justice Burger replied that no one 
should be worried about the “prophecy of dire consequences . . . 
‘while this Court sits.’”1442  That phrase⎯“while this Court 
sits”⎯originated in a Holmes dissent to a tax decision,1443 and 
became one of Chief Justice Burger’s favorite judicial quotations.  
As majestic as it sounds, the Court scarcely has time to rule on 
more than a minute portion of potentially unconstitutional laws.  
Favoring “as applied” attacks against facial challenges to a law’s 
clarity has the same shortcoming that limits on the use of 
overbreadth produce⎯leaving a law on the books that will put the 
speech of others not before the Court on ice.  On the other hand, 
facial invalidation for vagueness has most of the same drawbacks as 
can occur when a law is annulled for overbreadth. 
• 
Before leaving our study of the second Red Scare, a case from 
1964 must be introduced, even though it has nothing to do with 
Communists or subversive speech.  Up until that point, the Court 
had never formally interred the notion that government could 
punish seditious libels against officials, as had occurred under the 
Sedition Act of 1798.  It would do so in New York Times v. Sullivan,1444 
a libel suit brought by one L.B. Sullivan, the commissioner of 
police in Montgomery, Alabama.1445  His beef was over a full-page ad 
in the Times taken out by civil rights advocates to publicize their 
cause and raise funds.1446  The thrust of the ad’s appeal was that “an 
 1438. Id. at 692. 
 1439. Id. at 684. 
 1440. Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, Fla., 368 U.S. 278, 
283 (1961). 
 1441. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958)). 
 1442. Cole, 405 U.S. at 686. 
 1443. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 1444. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 1445. Id. at 256. 
 1446. Id. 
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unprecedented wave of terror” had been launched by unnamed 
officials in the South against protesters.1447  To support this 
allegation, the ad contained a list of specific incidents, most of 
which were accurate or at worst mild exaggerations.1448  A few, 
regrettably, were false.  For example, it mentioned that Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. had been arrested seven times on frivolous 
charges; the actual number was four.1449  Police were accused of 
“ringing” the campus of a black college in Montgomery,1450 when in 
actuality they were merely “deployed near the campus in large 
numbers on three occasions” in connection with protests.1451  
Authorities supposedly padlocked the student cafeteria “in an 
attempt to starve them into submission,” which never occurred.1452  
Dr. King’s home had been bombed twice, as the ad alleged, but this 
occurred before Sullivan became commissioner, and in any event 
the police claimed to have investigated these crimes vigorously.1453  
Perjury charges were pending against King, as the ad said (he was 
later acquitted), yet Sullivan had nothing to do with his 
indictment.1454  Students were said to have sang ‘My Country, ‘Tis of 
Thee’ on the state capitol steps, when in fact it was the National 
Anthem.1455 
At the demand of the Alabama governor, the Times later 
printed a retraction of the mistakes.1456  A Montgomery jury 
nevertheless awarded Sullivan $500,000 against the newspaper and 
four black clergymen whose names appeared in the ad as 
endorsers.1457  Sullivan introduced no evidence at trial that he had 
suffered monetary losses from the falsehoods, possibly because only 
394 copies of the Times edition containing the ad had been sold in 
Alabama—thirty-five total in Montgomery.1458  It made no 
difference under Alabama law, which allowed recovery of 
“presumed” “general” damages that could be calculated as the jury 
 1447. Id. 
 1448. Id. at 256–59. 
 1449. Id. at 259. 
 1450. Id. 
 1451. Id. 
 1452. Id. at 257. 
 1453. Id. at 259. 
 1454. Id. 
 1455. Id. at 258–59. 
 1456. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 47 (Ala. 1962). 
 1457. Id. at 28. 
 1458. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 (1964). 
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saw fit.1459  Punitive damages also could be awarded in that state on 
a showing of actual malice by the libeler, which meant something 
more egregious than “mere negligence or carelessness,”1460 but not 
necessarily an actual intent to harm or even recklessness on the 
defendants’ part.1461  Alabama’s highest court affirmed the verdict, 
finding that malice could be inferred against the Times because it 
possessed information in its own files proving the ad’s 
falsehoods.1462  Nor was the amount of the award objectionable, 
because in Alabama “[t]here is no legal measure of damages in 
cases of this character.”1463 
In overturning the Alabama judgment, Justice Brennan’s 
opinion discarded the traditional rule that defamation was utterly 
unprotected by the First Amendment.1464  That aspect of Sullivan 
will be considered in more detail later.  For now, the important 
aspect of the case is its repudiation of the concept of seditious libel.  
Referring to the Sedition Act of 1798, Justice Brennan observed 
that while it “was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its 
validity has carried the day in the court of history.”1465  Citing 
Jefferson’s pardoning of those convicted under it, dissenting 
opinions from Holmes, Brandeis and Jackson, along with two 
commentators, Justice Brennan concluded that “[t]hese views 
reflect a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint it 
imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.”1466  In effect, Alabama had 
resurrected the Sedition Act, by approving a huge libel judgment 
that was based on assertions about official suppression of civil rights 
activism.  Nowhere in the ad was there “even an oblique reference” 
to Sullivan.1467  Brennan rejected the idea “that an otherwise 
impersonal attack on governmental operations [could be punished 
under the guise of] a libel of an official responsible for those 
operations.”1468  It could not, because “‘prosecutions for libel on 
 1459. Id. at 262. 
 1460. Id. 
 1461. Id. 
 1462. Id. at 286. 
 1463. Id. at 264 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 50 (Ala. 
1962)). 
 1464. See id. at 270–72 (describing the history of judicial refusal to recognize 
certain First Amendment guarantees). 
 1465. Id. at 276. 
 1466. Id. 
 1467. Id. at 289. 
 1468. Id. (alteration in original). 
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government have [no] place in the American system of 
jurisprudence.’”1469  During the Court’s next term, Sullivan was 
extended to criminal libel prosecutions, requiring proof of actual 
malice to sustain a conviction for criticism of a public official.1470 
Sullivan offers an appropriate coda to this discussion of free 
speech during the second Red scare.  Brennan took it as an 
occasion to extol the value of “‘the opportunity for free political 
discussion’”1471 to democratic government, and quoted Brandeis’ 
concurring opinion in Whitney on the importance of unrestrained 
discussion about public affairs.1472  “Thus,” Brennan concluded, “we 
consider this case against the background of a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”1473 
Brennan was writing in 1964, and by then the arena for free 
speech debates had shifted to another great struggle, the fight 
against Jim Crow in the South, soon to be followed by the 
controversy surrounding America’s escalating involvement in 
Vietnam.  New York Times v. Sullivan was decided as images of 
nonviolent demonstrations being beaten and jailed in Birmingham 
flickered across the nation’s TV screens.  By then, the Court had 
considerably modified Dennis to lower the risk that criticism of 
government could be taken as subversive advocacy.  Free speech 
came at a price, whether to society or individuals, and that cost had 
to be weighed against the benefits of unbridled expression.  But 
now the die was cast for “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”1474 
clashes of opinions about public affairs. 
V. AFFIRMING THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC PROTEST: FREE EXPRESSION 
DURING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA AND THE VIETNAM WAR 
So far in relating the story of the First Amendment in the 
twentieth century, we have focused largely on cases dealing with 
 1469. Id. at 291 (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 601, 139 
N.E. 86, 88 (1923)). 
 1470. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (holding that Sullivan 
applied to cases of criminal libel). 
 1471. Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
 1472. Id. at 269–70. 
 1473. Id. at 270. 
 1474. Id. 
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one form or another of “subversive speech,” the major exception 
being New York Times v. Sullivan.  These were the types of cases that 
produced the foundation of free speech law during more than half 
the twentieth century.  From the beginning of the 1960s to the 
early 1970s, the Court’s attention shifted to a host of issues that 
arising from prosecutions of civil rights and anti-Vietnam War 
protesters.  A large percentage of the First Amendment decisions 
on free expression that arose from these two nearly simultaneous 
struggles involved public protests that were suppressed because the 
authorities claimed some serious harm would flow from permitting 
the demonstrations.  By the end of the period, the Court’s 
constitutional handiwork had established a broad right of the 
populace to demonstrate in public places, despite the 
extraordinary offense that the protesters gave to defenders of the 
status quo, and notwithstanding the possibility that violence could 
erupt from the clash of opinions on the streets.  To accomplish 
this, the Court polished up rulings from earlier decades and made 
aggressive use of the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. 
Never forget as you read about the constitutional doctrines 
that unfolded and morphed in these years that they were among 
the most tumultuous times for the United States as a society.  The 
1960s and early 1970s stand as one of the major transitional periods 
of the nation.  Americans born after 1960, which is most of the U.S. 
population, often think of those years as having something dimly to 
do with hippies and Vietnam, and a genre of music called Golden 
Oldies.  While it is difficult to define the essence of the change, its 
profundity goes well beyond youthful rejection of mainstream 
society.  Americans began the long and painful process of 
fundamentally altering rigid social, religious, racial, ethnic, gender, 
and political hierarchies, a process that continues today.  Along 
with that, expression was amplified by the power of mass media—
especially television—which combined with the commercial market 
for information and produced a powerful vehicle for broad cultural 
change.  The medium was proclaimed to be the message⎯an 
oversold concept to be sure, yet with the oversize kernel of truth 
that what is said may be profoundly shaped by the form in which it 
is transmitted.  Few images were more powerful in influencing the 
national attitudes than the pictures and film broadcast nationally of 
civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham during April-May 1963.  It 
took a hardened heart not to be offended by nonviolent protesters 
being slammed against walls from the force of fire hoses, set upon 
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with police dogs and clubbed by baton-wielding cops, all under the 
direction of Birmingham’s overtly racist police chief, T. Eugene 
“Bull” Connor.  Whatever else, this was not the way of the future if 
the South wished to become a modern society, a reality that people 
North and South perceived with varying degrees of quickness.  
Vietnam was a variation on this phenomenon.  Graphic color 
photos of gravely wounded soldiers and stacks of body bags became 
routine features of nightly news broadcasts, as were the scenes of 
enormous protest rallies at home. 
Nonviolence was the watchword of the civil rights movement, 
as it was for most anti-Vietnam activists.  A central tactic of many 
civil rights and anti-war protesters throughout more than a decade 
of agitation was the sit-in.  Dissidents would assemble in some place 
that was a symbol of their remonstrance, such as a segregated lunch 
counter or bus station, and remain there passively until arrested.  
At times the immediate objective was to fill the jails to capacity, 
which took a page from the IWW’s game plan some sixty years 
earlier.  “If cursed, do not curse back.  If pushed, do not push back.  
If struck, do not strike back, but evidence love and goodwill at all 
times.”1475  That advice came from the Montgomery Improvement 
Association, signed by its president, Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
on the occasion of the successful boycott of the city’s buses in 1956.  
Lamentably, wholesale rioting eventually erupted in key American 
cities as a consequence of impatience with the pace of change and 
the seeming intractability of the Vietnam War.  Those kinds of 
uprisings, such as the Los Angeles riots of 1965, produced few 
serious free speech issues.  Nonviolent protests did, in legions.  By 
demonstrating nonviolently, the followers of Rev. King and other 
leaders of the cause gave authorities few plausible excuses for 
breaking up demonstrations.  Frequently, nonviolent protesters 
were charged with the common law crimes of “breach of the 
peace,” “disorderly conduct,” or refusal to obey a police officer’s 
order to leave a protest area.  These laws, invariably vague, 
overbroad and applied with a discriminating eye by officials, were 
easy opening targets for members of the Court sympathetic with 
either the causes advocated or with the idea that a wide scope 
should be given to public protest.  They were easy targets, however, 
 1475. Montgomery Improvement Association, “Integrated Bus Suggestions” 
(flyer), Dec. 19, 1956 (original copy located in Inez Jessie Baskin Papers, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, Alabama). 
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because the doctrinal bases for overturning the actions of Southern 
authorities had been established a generation earlier. 
Our investigation starts with two cases in the 1961 Term of the 
Court, each involving Louisiana’s law against “disturbing the 
peace.”  Garner v. Louisiana,1476 decided in 1961, reversed 
convictions arising out of three separate incidents.  In each one, 
black students from Southern University in Baton Rouge were 
convicted for refusing to leave whites-only lunch counters in stores 
and a bus station.  Louisiana courts had interpreted the statute to 
require proof that the defendants engaged in “outwardly boisterous 
or unruly conduct,”1477 or that the arrest was necessary “to prevent 
an imminent public commotion.”1478  Reversing all of the judg-
ments, Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion determined that 
“the convictions in these cases are so totally devoid of evidentiary 
support as to render them unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”1479  All of the protesters 
were studiously well behaved.  In one of the cases, typical of the 
others, Warren noted that the demonstrators “not only made no 
speeches, they did not even speak to anyone except to order food; 
they carried no placards, and did nothing, beyond their mere 
presence at the lunch counter, to attract attention to themselves or 
to others.”1480  A few months later, the Court similarly overturned 
the convictions of four blacks who had the audacity to enter the 
whites-only waiting area of the bus depot in Shreveport, Louisiana, 
for the purpose of taking a trip to Mississippi.1481  They had been 
arrested for disturbing the peace after refusing to leave on orders 
of the police.1482  For good measure, the police arrested two other 
blacks in a car outside who had brought the other four to the 
station.1483  “There was no evidence of violence.  The record shows 
that the petitioners were quiet, orderly, and polite.”1484  The trial 
judge had found, however, “that the mere presence of Negroes in a 
white waiting room was likely to give rise to a breach of the 
 1476. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
 1477. Id. at 169. 
 1478. Id. 
 1479. Id. at 163. 
 1480. Id. at 170. 
 1481. Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962). 
 1482. Id. at 155. 
 1483. Id. 
 1484. Id. 
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peace,”1485  which unfortunately could have been true.  But given 
that the Court had held previously that blacks possessed a federal 
right to travel interstate using desegregated facilities, “violating a 
custom that segregated people in waiting rooms according to their 
race” could not be the basis for a conviction.1486  Implicitly, the 
Court also suggested that the simple possibility of an adverse 
reaction by racists was not enough to justify demanding that a 
person leave a place where they are lawfully entitled to be. 
Technically, these were not First Amendment decisions; 
rather, they relied on theory that the Due Process Clause did not 
tolerate penalizing individuals when there was no proof whatsoever 
that they had violated the law in question.  Nonetheless, the 
implications for free expression were evident, just as they had been 
when the Court used the same technique in Fiske v. Kansas.1487  And 
the Court well understood the relation, as evidenced by a 1965 
decision, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,1488 in which the Rev. Fred 
Shuttlesworth was convicted for doing nothing more than standing 
on the sidewalk in front of a department store.  Shuttlesworth, a 
fiery Baptist minister and one of the founders of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was “notorious,” as the 
arresting officer testified, for being one of the most important and 
fearless leaders of the civil rights movement.1489  He was arrested 
countless times, beaten savagely by police, fire hosed, and his home 
was bombed repeatedly.1490  Before the decade of the ‘60s ended, 
the reverend would be convicted dozens of times for defying 
segregation in general and Bull Connor in particular;1491 his name 
appeared regularly in the captions of the Court’s cases (among 
others, he was a defendant in New York Times v. Sullivan).  One gets 
the impression, though, that this time even Shuttlesworth was 
dumbfounded by the order of a policeman to “clear the sidewalk 
and not obstruct it for the pedestrians.”1492  Originally he had been 
 1485. Id. 
 1486. Id. at 156. 
 1487. 274 U.S. 380 (1927) 
 1488. 382 U.S. 87 (1965). 
 1489. Id. at 102. 
 1490. David B. Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth, and Walker: The Events 
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 650–55 
(1995). 
 1491. Id.  See also ANDREW M. MANIS, A FIRE YOU CAN'T PUT OUT: THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS LIFE OF BIRMINGHAM'S REVEREND FRED SHUTTLESWORTH 34, 181, 233, 272, 
274, 279, 308, 350, 357, 433–34 (1999). 
 1492. Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 89. 
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with ten to twelve other African-Americans, but the rest dispersed 
on the officer’s order, leaving Shuttlesworth standing alone.1493  
“You mean to say we can’t stand here on the sidewalk?”1494 he asked 
incredulously, just before being lead off to jail and a sentence of six 
months “at hard labor.”1495 
Reversing Shuttlesworth’s conviction, Justice Stewart wrote that 
“[t]here was thus no evidence whatever in the record to support 
the petitioner’s conviction under this ordinance.”1496  
Shuttlesworth’s victory also determined that a portion of the statute 
under which he was convicted was fatally defective.  As it was 
written, a “person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham 
only at the whim of any police officer of that city.  The 
constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration.  
[W]ith its ever-present potential for arbitrarily suppressing First 
Amendment liberties, [the] law bears the hallmark of a police 
state.”1497  In fact, as Justice Abe Fortas’ concurrence highlighted, 
the official explanation for the arrest was a “facade,” a pure 
“fiction.”1498  Everyone in Birmingham knew that Shuttlesworth was 
leading an ongoing boycott of the city’s stores that discriminated 
against blacks.1499  “Shuttlesworth’s walk on April 4, 1962, started 
during a recess in a federal court civil rights trial in which he was 
involved,” Fortas related.1500  “The trial had been publicized.”1501 
Other decisions during that fateful decade used the same 
technique of overturning convictions on the basis that civil rights 
protesters had done nothing wrong other than confront the 
tradition of segregation by insisting on the same rights as whites.  A 
1963 case, Wright v. Georgia, reversed the convictions of six young 
black men whose crime consisted of “peacefully playing basketball 
in a public park in Savannah, Georgia, on the early afternoon of 
Monday, January 23, 1961.”1502  They were shooting hoops at a park 
reserved for whites, and the group was arrested after declining to 
obey a police officer’s order to leave.1503  As the arresting officer 
 1493. Id. 
 1494. Id. 
 1495. Id. at 88. 
 1496. Id. at 95. 
 1497. Id. at 90–91. 
 1498. Id. at 101 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
 1499. Id. at 101–02. 
 1500. Id. at n.4. 
 1501. Id. 
 1502. 373 U.S. 284, 285 (1963). 
 1503. Id. at 285–86. 
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admitted, “they wasn’t [sic] disturbing anything,” but he arrested 
them anyway: first, “because they were negroes,”1504 and second, “to 
keep down trouble, which looked like to me might start⎯there 
were five or six cars driving around the park at the time, white 
people.”1505  Chief Justice Warren methodically shredded these 
excuses.  To begin, segregated public parks were unconstitutional, 
so the race of the defendants could not be a basis for the arrests.1506  
Since they had a right to be on the basketball courts, they could 
ignore the officer’s order to move on: “Obviously, however, one 
cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer 
if that command is itself violative of the Constitution.”1507  
Regarding the fear of confrontation with whites, there was no 
evidence of any trouble brewing—the number of cars traveling 
nearby was the normal traffic pattern.1508  Finally, “the possibility of 
disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place 
if they otherwise have a constitutional right (founded upon the 
Equal Protection Clause) to be present.”1509 
Warren employed this otherwise simple case, one not involving 
free expression (unless basketball counts as such) to establish two 
central propositions that would be important for First Amendment 
cases involving civil rights protesters.  One was that a person could 
ignore an unlawful order from a police officer.  Police had no 
constitutional authority to order people to leave a public place that 
they were using consistent with its purpose.  A second, and much 
more complex assertion, was that the mere “possibility of 
disorder”1510 could not justify an arrest.  This left open some hard 
questions for later cases to resolve.  Would the situation be 
different if a confrontation with whites occurred, even if the 
protesters were themselves entirely nonviolent and uttered no 
“fighting words”?  What if a riot was about to occur and the police 
could not contain the crowd—can they arrest a small number of 
protesters provoking the mob?  These beguiling questions, we shall 
see, would be before the Court time and again throughout the 
1960s and beyond. 
 1504. Id. at 286. 
 1505. Id. at 292. 
 1506. Id.  See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 89 (1965). 
 1507. Wright, 373 U.S. at 291–92; see also Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 91. 
 1508. Wright, 373 U.S. at 292–93. 
 1509. Id. at 293. 
 1510. Id. 
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In late February 1963, the Court issued its first important First 
Amendment decision arising from the Southern civil rights 
protests.  Edwards v. South Carolina1511 arose from a rally at the state 
capitol in 1961.  Several hundred people poured out of the Zion 
Baptist Church in Columbia and marched to the South Carolina 
State House.  Their purpose was to demonstrate and present a 
remonstrance against segregation “to the citizens of South 
Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina.”1512  
Initially, police permitted them to enter the capitol grounds, which 
were open to the public, where they marched one or two abreast 
carrying signs “bearing such messages as ‘I am proud to be a 
Negro’ and ‘Down with segregation,’”1513 and “‘You may jail our 
bodies but not our souls.’”1514  Police officials later admitted that the 
marchers were never disorderly; they were “well demeaned” and 
even “well dressed.”1515  No traffic, either vehicular or pedestrian, 
was obstructed.1516  Two or three hundred onlookers watched the 
procession, but there was “no evidence at all of any threatening 
remarks, hostile gestures, or offensive language on the part of any 
member of the crowd.”1517  In any event, the police acknowledged 
that there was “ample” police protection present to control any 
confrontation, had one occurred, which it had not.1518  After a half 
hour or more, police ordered the marchers to leave within fifteen 
minutes or face arrest.1519  One of the group’s leaders responded 
with a “religious harangue,” as the City Manager termed it, and the 
remainder began “loudly singing ‘The Star Spangled Banner’ and 
other patriotic and religious songs, while stamping their feet and 
clapping their hands.”1520  After fifteen minutes passed, they all were 
arrested and jailed on charges of breach of the peace.1521  
Eventually, sentences “ranging from “a $10 fine or five days in jail, 
to a $100 fine or 30 days in jail” were handed out to all.1522 
 1511. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
 1512. Id. at 230. 
 1513. Id. at 231. 
 1514. Id. at 240 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 1515. Id. at n.3 (majority opinion). 
 1516. Id. at 231–32. 
 1517. Id. at 231. 
 1518. Id. at n.7. 
 1519. Id. at 233. 
 1520. Id. 
 1521. Id. 
 1522. Id. at 234. 
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Overturning every conviction, Justice Stewart’s nearly 
unanimous opinion eschewed reliance on the “no evidence” 
approach of earlier cases, despite the fact that the state agreed the 
demonstrators were orderly, which made it hard to understand how 
they could be convicted had state law been applied properly.  
Instead, he went straight to the heart of the First Amendment, 
which did “not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful 
expression of unpopular views.”1523  Rather than relying on the 
conclusions of the South Carolina courts, Justice Stewart conducted 
an “independent examination of the whole record,”1524 before 
concluding that the peaceful assembly was a “far cry from the 
situation in Feiner v. New York,”1525 the 1951 case in which a Socialist 
speaker was convicted of disorderly conduct because (as Stewart 
described the facts) he had incited a crowd to near riot.1526  The 
divergence of the facts from Feiner thus presented a stark question 
of whether the citizenry had the right to assemble at their state 
capitol and protest.  “The circumstances in this case reflect an 
exercise of these basic constitutional rights in their most pristine 
and classic form,” Stewart wrote, emphasizing that “[t]hey 
peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government and there 
peaceably expressed their grievances ‘to the citizens of South 
Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina.’”1527  
Stewart reached back to a statement from Chief Justice Hughes in 
Stromberg, where the Chief Justice extolled the indispensability of 
“the opportunity for free political discussion” to democracy and 
maintenance of the rule of law.1528  It made no difference that 
people were offended by what was said.  Quoting Justice Douglas’ 
Terminiello opinion, Stewart admonished that freedom of speech 
was intended to “invite dispute,” and “may indeed best serve its 
high purpose” by provoking “a condition of unrest,” “dissatisfaction 
with conditions as they are,” or “even . . . anger.”1529  “Speech,” 
Douglas had written and Stewart now quoted, “is often provocative 
and challenging.”1530  Still left unresolved, however, was the 
 1523. Id. at 237. 
 1524. Id. at 235. 
 1525. Id. at 236. 
 1526. Id. 
 1527. Id. at 235. 
 1528. Id. at 238 (quoting Stromberg v. Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
 1529. Id.  at 237 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)). 
 1530. Id. 
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definition of the line between merely offensive speech (protected) 
and “incitement to riot” (unprotected).1531 
An “independent examination”1532 of the record was one of the 
hallmarks of strict scrutiny—it prevented states from hiding behind 
usually unreviewable fact finding by trial courts.  With civil rights 
protests, the Court would sometimes view films of the events and 
decide for themselves in a kind of official judicial instant replay.  
That happened in Cox v. Louisiana,1533 a 1965 decision that reviewed 
a protest organized by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 
Baton Rouge on December 14, 1961.  The target of the 
demonstration, as authorities knew in advance, was the courthouse 
where twenty-three of the demonstrators’ classmates had been 
jailed the day before for picketing stores with segregated lunch 
counters.1534  Up to two thousand students from the traditionally 
black Southern University walked in the rain five miles from 
campus to the old state capitol (police had arrested their bus 
drivers⎯a nice touch), and then proceeded the few blocks to the 
courthouse, taking care to occupy only half the sidewalk.1535 
Cox wound up assuming charge of the demonstration by 
default because all the other CORE leaders had been arrested.  He 
paced along the line of marchers, communicating with police, 
urging the marchers to remain orderly and turn the other cheek if 
attacked, “that if anyone spit on them, they would not spit back on 
the person that did it.”1536  At the courthouse, the police first told 
them to go back “whence they came,” but then the chief of police 
instructed Cox to confine the protest to one side of the courthouse, 
which he did.1537  Some pulled out protest signs from under their 
coats, sang patriotic and freedom songs, pledged allegiance to the 
flag, prayed, clapped and listened to a speech.1538  From inside the 
jail, their incarcerated compatriots could be heard singing in 
response, which the crowd “greeted with cheers and applause.”1539  
Up to this point, everyone was “perfectly orderly,” save for some 
 1531. See also Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964) (per curiam) 
(reversing, on authority of Edwards, convictions for refusing to end a “peaceful, 
orderly fashion in front of the City Hall to protest segregation”). 
 1532. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235. 
 1533. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
 1534. Id. at 538. 
 1535. Id. at 539. 
 1536. Id. at 542. 
 1537. Id. at 540. 
 1538. Id. at 542. 
 1539. Id. 
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grumblers and mutterers in a crowd of several hundred whites that 
gathered nearby.1540  Trouble started when Cox announced, “All 
right.  It’s lunch time.  Let’s go eat.”1541  He urged the crowd to fan 
out and seek service at segregated lunch counters throughout the 
downtown.  The police chief got very upset, picked up a 
microphone, declared them to be disturbing the peace and 
ordered everyone to disperse “immediately,” which they had been 
about to do anyway.1542  Moments later the demonstrators were 
routed by tear-gas and advancing police.1543  None of them was 
arrested that day.1544  But on the next day, Cox was taken into 
custody and later convicted of “disturbing the peace, obstructing 
public passages, and picketing before a courthouse.”1545  He 
received a total of one year and nine months in jail.1546 
Justice Goldberg wrote the opinion for the Court overturning 
Cox’s convictions.1547  Turning first to the breach of the peace 
charge, he found the facts to be constitutionally indistinguishable 
from Edwards⎯“our independent examination of the record . . . 
shows no conduct which the State had a right to prohibit as a 
breach of the peace.”1548  Watching the events caught by the camera 
“reveals that the students, though they undoubtedly cheered and 
clapped, were well-behaved throughout.”1549  Never were they 
“hostile, aggressive, or unfriendly.”1550  Even the police conceded 
that it was only when Cox announced, “Let’s go eat,” that they 
sensed trouble, the source of which was the white crowd of 100 to 
300 who were separated from the students by seventy-five to eighty 
armed police.1551  The onlookers may have grumbled and jeered, 
but no one “threatened violence.”1552  That was enough to reverse 
the convictions as violations of the First Amendment, but Goldberg 
took the unusual step of voiding the entire breach of the peace 
statute because it was “unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad 
 1540. Id. at 546 (internal quote omitted). 
 1541. Id. at 542. 
 1542. Id. at 543. 
 1543. Id. at 544. 
 1544. Id. 
 1545. Id. at 538. 
 1546. Id. 
 1547. Id. 
 1548. Id. at 545.  The Justices had viewed the news film.  Id.   
 1549. Id. at 547. 
 1550. Id. 
 1551. Id. at 543. 
 1552. Id. at 550. 
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scope.”1553  As interpreted by the Louisiana courts, the law made it 
illegal “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to 
interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet.”1554  That definition permitted 
“persons to be punished merely for peacefully expressing 
unpopular views,”1555 for as Terminiello had held, creating unrest was 
a “high purpose” of the First Amendment.1556 
Cox also was convicted of obstructing a public sidewalk, which 
admittedly the students had done under his overall direction.  
Local authorities had every right to keep public ways open, and 
free speech did “not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to 
express may address a group at any public place and at any time.”1557  
For example, “[a] group of demonstrators could not insist upon 
the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private 
building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to 
their exhortations.”1558  Still, a law regulating demonstrations in 
public places must be applied in a “uniform, consistent, and 
nondiscriminatory” fashion and it had not been in Baton Rouge.1559  
“City officials who testified for the State clearly indicated that 
certain meetings and parades are permitted in Baton Rouge, even 
though they have the effect of obstructing traffic, provided prior 
approval is obtained.”1560  No standards had been set by the law to 
guide authorities in permitting public demonstrations, leaving 
them with “completely uncontrolled discretion,”1561 the same vice 
that doomed Mayor Hague’s scheme for maintaining his 
dominance in Jersey City.1562  Laws of that sort posed an “obvious 
danger to the right of a person or group not to be denied equal 
protection of the laws.”1563 
Finally, Goldberg dispatched Cox’s conviction for violating a 
statute against “pickets or parades in or near a building housing a 
 1553. Id. at 551. 
 1554. Id. 
 1555. Id. 
 1556. Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).  Later cases 
held that if a party wins an as-applied challenge to a statute on First Amendment 
grounds, then that person cannot also make a facial attack on the law.  See 
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501–04 (1985). 
 1557. Id. at 554. 
 1558. Id. at 555. 
 1559. Id. 
 1560. Id. 
 1561. Id. at 557. 
 1562. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 1563. Cox, 379 U.S. at 557. 
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court.”1564  To be guilty under state law, a person must have 
intended to obstruct the business of the court or try to influence 
judges, juries, witnesses and officials inside.1565  On its face, the law 
was unobjectionable, as it was “a precise, narrowly drawn regulatory 
statute which proscribes certain specific behavior,”1566 thereby 
serving the important end of assuring the impartial administration 
of justice.  By contrast with Bridges v. California,1567  in which the 
Court had overturned contempt sanctions for “the mere 
publication of a newspaper editorial or a telegram to a Secretary of 
Labor,” according to Cox, demonstrations outside courthouses may 
be “prohibited by a legislative determination based on experience 
that such conduct inherently threatens the judicial process.”1568  
What saved Cox was the fact that “the highest police officials in the 
city” had “affirmatively told” him that the demonstrators could 
convene across the street from the courthouse.1569  “In effect,” 
Goldberg concluded, Cox “was advised that a demonstration at the 
place it was held would not be one ‘near’ the courthouse within the 
terms of the statute.”1570  When the crowd was ordered to disperse, 
the reason was not their proximity to the courthouse, but what the 
police chief regarded as the inflammatory nature of Cox’s 
admonition to head for lunch at segregated establishments.  Just as 
demonstrators may be obliged to confine their protests to “a 
proper time and place,” there was an “equally plain requirement” 
that citizens receive “fair warning as to what is illegal; for regulation 
of conduct that involves freedom of speech and assembly not to be 
so broad in scope as to stifle First Amendment freedoms, which 
‘need breathing space to survive.’”1571 
Goldberg pulled out most of the pro-free speech themes that 
had developed since the 1930s to craft his opinion.  People 
possessed a right to carry out peaceful public demonstrations, 
particularly at seats of power.  Their protests could be regulated, to 
account for public needs such as traffic control or administration 
of justice, but any such controls had to be applied evenly according 
to objective standards.  These must be “precise, narrowly drawn” 
 1564. Id.  at n.4. 
 1565. Id. 
 1566. Id. at 559, 562. 
 1567. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
 1568. Cox, 379 U.S. at 559, 566. 
 1569. Id. at 571. 
 1570. Id. 
 1571. Id. at 574 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
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rules that left no discretion on the part of officials.1572  Vague and 
overbroad statutes or rules were unconstitutional in their entirety—
on their face, that is.  Fair notice must precede arrest.  One could 
ignore an invalid order by police to “move on” or “disperse.”1573 
But there were limits to public demonstrations, still mostly ill 
defined, that could be imposed by narrowly drawn laws aimed at 
maintaining public order.  In 1966, the Court in Adderley v. 
Florida1574 upheld the convictions of civil rights protesters blocking 
access to a courthouse/jail service entrance, in violation of a 
specific law to the contrary.  “The State, no less than a private 
owner of property,” Justice Black wrote, “has power to preserve the 
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”1575  States quickly passed laws to ban specific conduct, 
such as picketing near courthouses and other public buildings, and 
they fine-tuned their ordinances to preclude facial attack.  
Mississippi, for example, enacted an anti-picketing statute on April 
8, 1964 that banned “picketing or mass demonstrations” so as to 
“obstruct or unreasonably interfere” with entrances to public 
buildings and their normal public functions, as well as block 
sidewalks and streets.1576  As written, this law was neither overbroad 
nor excessively vague, the Court found in 1968.  Justice Brennan’s 
opinion for the Court in Cameron v. Johnson upheld the statute 
despite evidence that the law was passed specifically to end 
picketing in connection with a months-long voter registration drive 
in Hattiesburg.1577  Justice Fortas’ dissent gave a telling account: 
The law was signed by the Governor on the same day it 
was passed by the State Legislature, and delivered by 
messenger to waiting law enforcement officials in 
Hattiesburg on the following day.  As soon as the law was 
brought to those officials on April 9, they read it aloud to 
the pickets and asked them to disperse.1578 
 1572. Id. at 562. 
 1573. Id.  See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150 (1969) 
(invalidating parade ordinance that gave officials “virtually unbridled and absolute 
power”). 
 1574. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
 1575. Id. at 47. 
 1576. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 612 n.1 (1968) (quoting MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 2318.5 (Supp. 1966)). 
 1577. Id. at 613. 
 1578. Id. at 625 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
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Regardless, Brennan answered, it was “a valid law dealing with 
conduct subject to regulation so as to vindicate important interests 
of society,”1579 and there was no evidence in the record that the law 
had been applied “in bad faith.”1580 
Defining the circumstances in which a person was entitled to 
protest under this formulation depended on the validity of the 
state’s interest in preventing the demonstration.  Not every asserted 
state interest would be sufficient to override the right to speak.  
Certainly the government could not do so because of the speaker’s 
race or disagreement with the message.  Furthermore, the 
authorities could not quarantine every public place against 
protesters.  These points had been established a generation earlier 
when Justice Roberts wrote that the “streets are natural and proper 
places for the dissemination of information and opinion.”1581  
Preventing littering, unquestionably a legitimate state interest, must 
give way to the right to pass out handbills.  Door-to-door canvassers 
could not be prohibited, despite the predictable annoyance they 
will cause to the public.  Where was the line between those 
government interests sufficient to suppress speech and ones that 
were not heavy enough to tip the balance?  One clue to how this 
question would eventually be answered was the Court’s 
identification of the normal and legitimate uses of public property, 
which in turn defined the limits of state controls.1582  A normal use 
could be for speeches and protests, at least part of the time.  Streets 
may be thoroughfares for vehicles, but they also are traditional 
places for demonstrations, and the authorities must afford access 
under reasonable guidelines.  Eventually the Court would expand 
the list of these constitutionally “quintessential” public forums to 
include public squares and parks, which have purposes other then 
providing venues for political rallies; they have been places where 
public speaking has occurred “by long tradition.”1583  Hague had 
determined that these places were public commons, “immemorially 
. . . held in trust” for the people to use for communication.1584 
 1579. Id. at 617 (majority opinion) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 564 
(1965)). 
 1580. Id. at 620. 
 1581. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
 1582. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (compiling the Court‘s First Amendment public property precedents active 
at that time). 
 1583. Id. 
 1584. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).  In Brown v. 
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There are other legitimate public interests that justify 
restricting speech beyond limits on the time, place, and manner of 
demonstrations.  Some crimes or illegal acts are carried out entirely 
by words and are unprotected because they independently 
constitute crimes (passing a stick-up note to a bank teller or 
engaging in sexual harassment in the workplace).  People are not 
free to break otherwise valid laws, such as these, by claiming they 
are engaged in an expressive activity, not even to advance a 
political end.  The First Amendment does not protect civil 
disobedience.1585  One cannot trespass on private property, rob 
banks or explode bombs to publicize a cause, however compelling.  
Were this not clear before the 1960s, it certainly was after the Court 
decided United States v. O’Brien1586 in 1968.  A little over two years 
earlier, David Paul O’Brien and three other men burned their draft 
cards on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.1587  They 
promptly were assailed by the crowd, which was thwarted in 
pummeling the draft resisters by FBI agents who “ushered” the four 
into the courthouse.1588  (Sometimes it’s handy to have the FBI 
shadowing you.)  They then arrested O’Brien.1589  He was convicted 
under an amendment to the Selective Service Act that made it a 
crime to knowingly destroy or mutilate a draft card.1590 
O’Brien raised two different defenses.  First, he claimed to 
have been engaged in “symbolic speech” worthy of First 
Amendment protection.1591  He argued that the card served no 
Louisiana, the Court reversed convictions for a silent protest by six African-
Americans in a segregated library.  Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966).  
Only Justice Fortas’ three-member plurality, however, squarely held that the 
library was an appropriate venue for the protestors to stand “as monuments of 
protest against the segregation of the library.”  Id. at 139 (Fortas, J., plurality).  
Justice White’s concurrence rested on the ground that the protest “did not depart 
significantly from what normal library use would contemplate.”  Id. at 151 (White 
J., concurring).  Justice Brennan avoided the issue by finding the breach of the 
peace law—the same one involved in Cox v. Louisiana⎯to be unconstitutionally 
overbroad.  See id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
 1585. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (quoting Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (stating that the First 
Amendment does not extend to “speech or writing used as an integral part of 
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute”)). 
 1586. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 1587. Id. at 369. 
 1588. Id. 
 1589. Id. 
 1590. Id. at 370. 
 1591. Id. at 376. 
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purpose once the information it contained was conveyed to the 
registrant (his draft number, classification, etc.).1592  Second, 
Congress apparently had enacted the law specifically to deal with 
the wave of draft card burning protests against the war.1593  Thus, 
the motive of the statute, he alleged, was to suppress a specific 
mode of demonstration against the conflict.1594 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court resoundingly 
rejected both of O’Brien’s arguments.1595  Only Justice Douglas 
dissented, as he wanted to set the case for re-argument on the 
question of the constitutionality of drafting men to serve in an 
undeclared war.1596  Chief Justice Warren opened his opinion by 
grudgingly assuming for purposes of argument that O’Brien’s 
actions had a “communicative element . . . sufficient to bring into 
play the First Amendment.”1597  Yet he had already undermined the 
possibility in the previous sentence: “We cannot accept the view 
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea.”1598  This was obvious and thus 
unhelpful.  Conduct, such as raising a red flag, picketing, 
marching, assembling or just standing, had long been recognized 
to have First Amendment value.1599  What was different about 
putting a match to small pieces of paper about two-by-three inches 
in size?  Chief Justice Warren’s answer emphasized that the 
government had a legitimate reason—unrelated to suppressing 
speech—to deter the “wanton and unrestrained destruction” of 
draft cards.1600 
To reach this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that 
“‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements” might be present “in the 
same course of conduct.”1601  If there is “a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element,” then 
“incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms” may be 
 1592. Id. at 378. 
 1593. Id. at 380. 
 1594. Id. at 376. 
 1595. See id. at 367–386. 
 1596. Id. at 389–91 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 1597. Id. at 376. 
 1598. Id. 
 1599. See James M. McGoldrick, United States v. O’Brien Revisited: Of Burning 
Things, Waving Things, And G-Strings, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 903, 907–909 (2006) 
(cataloguing the history of protected conduct prior to O’Brien). 
 1600. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 380. 
 1601. Id. at 376. 
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tolerated.1602  He then converted that conclusion into a formula that 
would thereafter be known as the “O’Brien test”: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is 
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.1603 
Warren offered no precedent for this conclusion.  As is often 
the case, multi-factor tests like this one leave many details to be 
resolved.  To interpret this constitutional codification, the Court 
eventually would have to elucidate what it meant by the phrases 
“important or substantial,” “unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression,” and “no greater than essential.”1604 
Warren cited all sorts of reasons to show why the government 
might reasonably want to prevent deliberate destruction of draft 
cards.1605  They served various purposes, such as reminding the man 
of his classification, registration number, the address of his draft 
board, and warning him to advise the board if he moved.1606  
O’Brien tried to dodge those arguments by pointing out that the 
law was unnecessary to serve these purposes, as Selective Service 
regulations already required constant “personal possession” of 
one’s draft card.1607  Warren was unimpressed.  These were separate 
offenses, with different elements.  Congress could not have come 
up with a more precise method to “assure the continuing 
availability of issued Selective Service certificates” than by passing “a 
law which prohibits their willful mutilation or destruction.”1608  
Warren’s reasoning here seems suspiciously circular.  Once he 
concluded that Congress’ purpose was to stop intentional 
mutilation of draft cards, it logically followed that the statute served 
precisely that purpose.  But that begs the question: did Congress 
need to ban intentional destruction in order to assure personal 
possession, which was the ostensible goal?  Congress surely could 
 1602. Id. 
 1603. Id. at 377. 
 1604. Id. 
 1605. Id. at 378–80. 
 1606. Id. 
 1607. See id. at 380–81. 
 1608. Id. at 381. 
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have passed a law mandating continuous possession, with the same 
penalties as for mutilation, along with a separate provision 
outlawing the destruction of another’s draft card.  A better 
explanation is one that Warren referred to only obliquely.  
Congress may have thought that intentional destruction was much 
more serious than merely failing to carry the card in one’s wallet.  
Knowingly mutilating a draft card undermined legislative goals 
more than the possession requirement, since it encouraged others 
to do the same, thereby depriving them of the information the 
government wished them to have in their possession.1609 
This last point takes us to the crux of O’Brien.  Considerable 
naiveté would be needed to doubt that the motivating factor in 
Congress’ action was dealing with draft card burners who were 
dramatizing their objections to the war.  In addition to explicit 
statements made on the floor to this effect, the congressional 
committee reports “[made] clear a concern with the ‘defiant’ 
destruction of so-called ‘draft cards’ and with ‘open’ 
encouragement to others to destroy their cards . . . .”1610  Warren 
dismissed these findings as proving nothing more than Congress’ 
judgment “that unrestrained destruction of cards would disrupt the 
smooth functioning of the Selective Service System.”1611  Again, this 
ignored the critical question: Did Congress think that the relatively 
few who torched their cards were likely to bring down the system?  
No, the worry was that others would be encouraged to defy the 
draft.  Congress’ real concern, then, was with the effect of the 
message communicated by O’Brien and others.  That makes it 
seem much more like an incitement case akin to some of the World 
War I prosecutions.1612  Whereas the Court usually demanded proof 
that the prohibited speech was likely to cause an imminent harm, 
and it would scrutinize the evidence to that effect, here Congress 
essentially received total deference.  This resembled the supposedly 
repudiated methodology of Gitlow and Whitney—which deferred to 
legislative determinations that certain utterances or associations 
were “so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of 
substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its 
police power.”1613 
 1609. Id. at 385–86. 
 1610. Id. 
 1611. Id. at 386. 
 1612. See discussion pp. 828–877. 
 1613. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925). 
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The difference between O’Brien and cases such as Gitlow was 
that the Selective Service law did not proscribe specific words; 
instead, it “condemn[ed] only the independent noncommunicative 
impact of conduct within its reach . . . .”1614  On its face, the law was 
neutral with respect to speech, and to the extent it discouraged 
communication, this was an “incidental” effect.1615  Warren refused 
to question Congress’ motives: “It is a familiar principle of 
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”1616  A major reason for this deference was the “hazardous” 
nature of an inquiry into the motives of a multi-member legislative 
body.1617  “What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it,” 
and “the possibility of misreading Congress’ purpose” was all too 
real.1618  Besides, if the Court struck a speech-neutral law due to 
improper motives, Congress could simply re-enact it, accompanied 
by speeches that gave nothing but acceptable justifications for the 
law. 
If that line of reasoning seems persuasive, contrast O’Brien with 
the Court’s handling of facially neutral laws that have an adverse 
impact on minority groups.  As we know, in order to attack such a 
law successfully, the complainant must show that it was passed 
“because of” a desire to harm the minority, and not merely that 
such was the inevitable consequence of the law.1619  That necessarily 
involves piercing the legislative veil to prove that “a discriminatory 
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision . . . .”1620  
Although this is an arduous burden, it can be accomplished.  In 
Hunter v. Underwood,1621  decided seven years after O’Brien, the Court 
(per Justice Rehnquist) invalidated an Alabama constitutional 
provision that disenfranchised people who committed crimes of 
“moral turpitude.”1622 Abundant evidence in the legislative record 
 1614. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1966). 
 1615. Id. at 376–77. 
 1616. Id. at 383. 
 1617. Id. 
 1618. Id. at 384. 
 1619. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (quoting Pers. Admin. of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 1620. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 
(1977). 
 1621. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
 1622.    Id. at 223.   
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proved that a major purpose of its enactment was to disenfranchise 
African-Americans, who tended to be convicted of crimes fitting 
Alabama’s definition of moral turpitude (vagrancy, for example).1623  
Justice Rehnquist conceded that the law was facially neutral 
regarding race, but still it could not be applied neutrally because of 
its tainted origin.1624  He flicked off the state’s argument that 
despite its pernicious origins, the law validly identified an 
appropriate category of criminals not deserving the right to vote.  
“Without deciding whether [the law] would be valid if enacted 
today without any impermissible motivation, we simply observe that 
its original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate 
against blacks on account of race and the section continues to this 
day to have that effect.”1625  Why wasn’t O’Brien given the same 
right to question the motive of Congress?  Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Hunter actually quoted O’Brien on the hazards of discerning 
legislative intent, but dismissed concern because the state had 
“essentially conceded” that race was a motivating factor for 
enacting the “moral turpitude” exclusion.1626 
In other cases decided after O’Brien, the Court ruled that 
public employees have a liberty interest in free speech.  
Nontenured employees could not be terminated or disciplined “in 
retaliation for his exercise of the constitutional right of free 
speech.”1627  Proving a retaliatory motive necessitates an inquiry into 
the intent of the persons who made the decision, which may 
involve figuring out the subjective motivations of a multi-member 
body such as a school board.  In light of these later cases, O’Brien 
cannot be taken as completely precluding the invalidation of a 
facially neutral law whose passage was motivated by a desire to 
suppress speech.  Likewise, a neutral law (say one authorizing the 
nonrenewal of teacher contracts) cannot be applied out of a desire 
to punish speech activities.1628 
O’Brien left numerous questions open, but it did accomplish an 
important heuristic purpose by laying out a blueprint for analyzing 
speech cases in which the expression involves some kind of 
conduct.  Either the regulation is related to expression (such as a 
 1623. Id. at 227. 
 1624. Id. at 231–33. 
 1625. Id. at 233. 
 1626. Id. at 228–30. 
 1627. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972). 
 1628. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1977). 
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ban on obscene movies or a requirement that one get a parade 
permit to demonstrate) or it is not, meaning that the purpose of 
the law has some other legitimate purpose aside from suppressing 
expression (for example, ordinary criminal laws, such as those 
against trespass, destruction of another’s property or fraud).  If the 
law does not target expression, it will pass review so long as the 
government’s purpose is “important” and it is “no greater than 
essential.”  Through a series of rulings in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the Court addressed both of the situations just outlined: 
cases in which laws were related to expression and their opposite.  
By far, most of the decisions dealt with the former: statutes 
designed either to suppress certain forms of expression or channel 
speech through time, place, and manner rules.  Many laws of this 
type were found unconstitutional.  But with regard to statutes that 
on their face were unrelated to expression (the O’Brien situation), 
not once has the Court struck such a law on the ground that its 
“incidental” effect on speech exceeded constitutional bounds.1629 
With regard to laws that do relate directly to expression, the 
public demonstrations during the 1960s and 1970s led the Court to 
enunciate a series of principles that have defined the modern 
approach to free expression.  Most importantly, the Court refined 
and greatly limited the types of public interests that justified 
limiting speech on the grounds that its content presented an evil 
that overrode individual expression.  One of the many questions 
addressed in these cases was the longstanding matter of defining 
 1629. Justice Antonin Scalia has questioned whether the test even makes sense 
when the law at issue is general in nature and does not target speech in any way.  
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Justice Scalia pointed out that “virtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually 
any prohibited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose—if only 
expressive of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohibition.”  Id.  Why 
should the government need an “important” interest, or be obligated to use a 
means “no greater than essential” merely because someone employs prohibited 
conduct as a way to convey a message?  Id. at 577.  Support for Justice Scalia’s 
point, even if it were accepted, would now be inconsequential in practice.  Many 
cases have accepted essentially any legitimate government purpose as “important,” 
and the “no greater than essential” prong has been watered down to the vanishing 
point by deferring to government authorities on the necessity for a measure 
targeting conduct that is not inherently expressive.  See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (“We do not believe, however, 
that either United States v. O'Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign 
to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the 
Nation's parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much 
protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be 
attained.”). 
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the respective obligation of demonstrators to be orderly and the 
corresponding power of the police to break up a protest because 
opponents to it threatened violence.  That would take the Court 
back to old questions, such as the limits of incitement to violence, 
and newer variations, as in flag burning and the public use of 
profanity. 
The question of the police’s duty to protect protesters from 
attack could have been answered in Gregory v. City of Chicago,1630 
decided in 1969.  Dick Gregory, the black comedian and civil rights 
activist, led a march in 1965 of upwards of eighty-five protesters 
from the city hall in Chicago to Mayor Richard Daley’s home, five 
miles away.1631  Their purpose was to protest the slow pace of 
integration in the city’s schools and to demand the removal of the 
school system’s superintendent.1632  Dozens of police accompanied 
the march and scores more joined the scene at Mayor Daley’s 
house, where Gregory’s group paraded around, singing and 
chanting.1633  A crowd of angry whites grew larger as the evening 
wore on, eventually reaching more than a thousand.1634  They 
hurled rocks, eggs and vile epithets at the demonstrators: “‘God 
damned nigger, get the hell out of here;’ ‘Get out of here 
niggers—go back where you belong or we will get you out of here’ 
and ‘Get the hell out of here or we will break your blankety-blank 
head open.’”1635  Gregory patrolled the lines of his marchers, 
admonishing them to keep moving, ignore the insults, and “above 
all means, do not hit them back.”1636  Throughout the tense 
evening, Gregory’s people stuck to communicating their message.  
Eventually, the police commander on the scene advised Gregory 
that the situation was approaching a riot and asked him to allow 
the police to escort his marchers to safety.1637  Gregory refused, 
along with most of the protesters, who were then arrested for 
disorderly conduct.1638 
Gregory presented a perfect opportunity for the Court to set 
some boundary between the rights of otherwise law-abiding 
 1630. 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
 1631. Id. at 126. 
 1632. Id. at 115. 
 1633. Id. at 126–27. 
 1634. Id. at 127–28. 
 1635. Id. at 128–29. 
 1636. Id. at 127. 
 1637. Id. at 129. 
 1638. Id. at 112. 
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protesters and their violence-prone opponents.  Chief Justice 
Warren instead chose to take the “no evidence” route to reversal.  
“This is a simple case,” Chief Justice Warren began his opinion.1639  
Gregory’s group had been arrested for disorderly conduct, but 
there was absolutely no evidence that they were disorderly.1640  
Whereas Justice Goldberg in Cox had found the statute there both 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied, Warren stopped short 
of doing the same, which might have clarified the respective duties 
of police and besieged demonstrators.  There was a “crying” need 
for a “narrowly drawn line,” Justice Black lamented in his Gregory 
concurrence, but the Court has yet to provide one.1641  It is a 
complex problem, and an answer that is consistent with the 
remainder of constitutional law is illusive.  One solution, proposed 
by the Illinois Supreme Court in this case, was that the police must 
have exhausted “all reasonable efforts to protect the 
demonstrators” before arresting them.1642  But what is a reasonable 
effort?  Must the police risk their lives to guard a demonstration 
from a howling mob?  Should the Chicago police have turned their 
tear gas and riot clubs against the counter-demonstrators?  Did it 
matter that only some in the crowd were violent, while others were 
exercising their constitutional right to rebuke what they saw as an 
unjustified attack on the mayor?  Did it matter that trying to break 
up the mob might unleash a deadly riot? 
At a minimum, in protecting demonstrators from hostile 
opponents equal protection principles oblige the police to act 
consistently and without regard to the message of the protesters.  
As between rock-hurling rowdies and peaceful marchers, the prima 
facie responsibility of the police surely must be to nab the former, 
since the First Amendment does not allow the state to criminalize 
“the peaceful expression of unpopular views.”1643  Yet that only nicks 
the veneer of the problem, as it ignores the damage that can befall 
innocent bystanders and property owners near the scene of a 
violent clash.  On the other hand, insisting that the peaceful folks 
accept “protective custody” violates the principle that a person may 
refuse life-saving intervention from the government.  Furthermore, 
 1639. Id. at 111. 
 1640. Id. at 112. 
 1641. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 118. 
 1642. Id. at 121 (quoting City of Chicago v. Gregory, 223 N.E.2d 422, 429 (Ill. 
1968)). 
 1643. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963). 
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in practice, it may provide authorities with a ready excuse for 
prematurely breaking up demonstrations they dislike.  All of these 
permutations suggest why Chief Justice Warren took the easier road 
of simply invalidating the statute without determining whether 
Gregory and his colleagues could have been convicted under an 
appropriately narrow statute. 
If the Court did not exactly answer the questions just posed, in 
other cases it stressed that “clear and present danger” meant that a 
speaker could not be convicted of inciting others to violence unless 
there was an immediate threat to public order.  One case dominates 
the First Amendment landscape on this point.  Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,1644 decided by an unsigned per curiam decision on June 9, 
1969, was the culmination of decades of rulings and commentaries 
that had started with the World War I seditious speech cases.  As in 
the early cases, the core issue was the extent to which a speaker was 
entitled, under the First Amendment, to advocate breaking the law. 
In June 1964, a Cincinnati television station was invited by a 
nearby KKK group to film for broadcast a cross burning on private 
a farm in a rural area.1645  Clarence Brandenburg had made the call, 
and he would speak in full hooded regalia at the ensuing 
convocation of twelve similarly adorned Klan members.1646  As the 
cameras whirred to capture their flaming cross on film, some of 
them could be seen carrying firearms, and voices in the crowd were 
recorded muttering: 
‘How far is the nigger going to—yeah.’ 
‘This is what we are going to do to the niggers.’ 
‘A dirty nigger.’ 
‘Send the Jews back to Israel.’ 
‘Let’s give them back to the dark garden.’ 
‘Save America.’ 
‘Let’s go back to constitutional betterment.’ 
‘Bury the niggers.’ 
‘We intend to do our part.’ 
‘Give us our state rights.’ 
‘Freedom for the whites.’ 
‘Nigger will have to fight for every inch he gets from now 
on.’1647 
 1644. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 1645. Id. at 445. 
 1646. Id. 
 1647. Id. at 445, n.1. 
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Brandenburg then gave a short speech, seemingly addressing 
his television audience more than the robed assembly.1648  
Apparently he understood the concept of using the media for free 
publicity, as the tape would be broadcast locally and nationally: 
‘This is an organizers’ meeting.  We have had quite a few 
members here today which are—we have hundreds, 
hundreds of members throughout the State of Ohio.  I 
can quote from a newspaper clipping from the Columbus, 
Ohio Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday morning.  The Klan 
has more members in the State of Ohio than does any 
other organization.  We’re not a revengent [sic] 
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our 
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, 
Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be 
some revengeance [sic] taken.  ‘We are marching on 
Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong.  
From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to 
march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to 
march into Mississippi.  Thank you.’1649 
The remaining portion of the film was shot indoors, and 
showed Brandenburg repeating the same remarks, minus the 
reference to “revengeance.”1650  Adding his own perspective for the 
benefit of the viewing audience, Brandenburg declared, 
“‘Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the 
Jew returned to Israel.’”1651  Fortunately for him, that did not 
happen, as it would have deported much of his ACLU defense team 
that helped him prevail before the Court against a conviction for 
violating the Ohio criminal syndicalism act. 
Ohio passed its statute during the first Red Scare, and the law 
was “quite similar” to the one upheld in Whitney v. California.1652  
Among other things, it proscribed advocating “the duty, necessity, 
or propriety” of violence to achieve political change, or assembling 
with others for that purpose.1653  Convicted, Brandenburg received a 
sentence of one to ten years in prison.1654  A unanimous Court 
reversed his conviction.1655  Originally the case was assigned to 
 1648. Id. at 445–46. 
 1649. Id. at 446. 
 1650. Id. at 447. 
 1651. Id. 
 1652. Id. at 447 (referring to Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)). 
 1653. Id. at 444–45. 
 1654. Id. at 445. 
 1655. Id. 
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Justice Fortas, who produced a draft opinion that was pending 
when he resigned suddenly on May 14, 1969 in the midst of a 
scandal that arose over a questionable financial arrangement he 
had with a figure under indictment for stock manipulation.1656  
Justice Brennan apparently revised Justice Fortas’ opinion, 
strengthening its free-speech rhetoric.1657  It then was issued as a per 
curiam decision, thereby obscuring the authorship.1658 
Brandenburg began by reminding the Ohio courts that Whitney 
had been effectively overruled as long ago as Dennis.1659  Lest there 
be any lingering doubt, the Court now did so explicitly.1660  Taking 
pains to spell out what this meant, the opinion drew together 
several First Amendment strains that had originated with the 
seminal Holmes and Brandeis concurrence in Whitney: 
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free 
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.1661 
Noto was invoked for the proposition that merely teaching in 
the abstract the “‘moral propriety’” of violence was “‘not the same 
as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such 
action.’”1662  Since Ohio’s statute did not make that distinction, it 
was unconstitutionally overbroad: “It sweeps within its 
condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from 
governmental control.”1663 
What Brandenburg did not do was to determine whether the 
KKK’s actions and speeches that night could have been punished 
 1656. Laura Krugman Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme 
Court’s Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 517, 541–43 (2000). 
 1657. Id. at 542–43. 
 1658. Id. at 544. 
 1659. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (referring to Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951)). 
 1660. Id. at 449. 
 1661. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).  See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.) (emphasizing that free 
speech should only be suppressed when there is a reasonable belief that “serious 
evil” will result if the speech is allowed). 
 1662. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 
297–98 (1961)). 
 1663. Id. at 448. 
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under a sufficiently narrow law.  Resolving those thorny questions 
would take another thirty years and more.  That does not diminish 
Brandenburg’s pivotal place in the history of First Amendment law.  
According to the succinct analysis of Professor Gerald Gunther, 
Brandenburg melded “the most protective ingredients of the Masses 
incitement emphasis with the most useful elements of the clear and 
present danger heritage.”1664  As with Hand’s formulation in Masses, 
which had been picked up in Yates, the Brandenburg per curiam 
stressed that the words spoken must be directed to incitement, as 
opposed to conveying moral approbation or teaching the need for 
lawless behavior.1665  From the clear and present danger line of 
cases, the requirements of imminence and likelihood were added 
to complete the standard.  Principles and rules thus had been 
synthesized from prior rulings and restated in a single formula. 
Brandenburg has proved to be a durable and adaptable 
platform for constructing the major elements of First Amendment 
law that emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century.  It 
became the standard model for analyzing two very different kinds 
of speech situations.  One occurs, as in the facts of Brandenburg 
itself, when the speaker is accused of encouraging an audience to 
break the law.1666  A second happens when the speaker’s message 
causes some immediate harm, whether it is driving counter-
demonstrators to a riotous frenzy (as in Gregory), causing a panic in 
a crowded theatre, or threatening others or offending their 
sensibilities (to mention a few).  The televised broadcast of a 
blazing cross and hooded armed Klansmen making thinly-veiled 
threats surely would unnerve if not terrify at least some Ohio 
viewers, a state with a long Klan history.1667 
The Court next confronted the immediacy issue when it 
reviewed a conviction in Hess v. Indiana,1668 arising from a 1970 anti-
war protest at the University of Indiana.1669  Several hundred 
demonstrators were blocking the entrance to a university building 
when the police arrived and began arresting them.1670  While the 
police were trying to clear the street, Gregory Hess shouted either 
that “‘We’ll take the fucking street later’” or ‘“We’ll take the 
 1664. Gunther, supra note 580, at 754. 
 1665. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48. 
 1666. See id. at 444–46. 
 1667. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445–46. 
 1668. 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 1669. Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 428 (Ind. 1973). 
 1670. Hess, 414 U.S. at 106. 
227
Jay: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: Fro
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
1000 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
fucking street again.’”1671  For this display of verbal defiance, Hess 
was found guilty of disorderly conduct.1672  He was fined one 
dollar.1673  In a per curiam reversal, the Court decided that even this 
token penalty was unconstitutional.1674  Responding to Indiana’s 
argument that Hess had been trying to incite further lawlessness, 
the Court replied that there was no such evidence: “At best, 
however, the statement could be taken as counsel for present 
moderation; at worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy 
of illegal action at some indefinite future time.”1675  Ultimately, no 
advocacy on Hess’ part had been shown.  “Since the 
uncontroverted evidence showed that Hess’ statement was not 
directed to any person or group of persons, it cannot be said that 
he was advocating, in the normal sense, any action.”1676 
Fast-forward a moment to 1982, for a decision even more 
instructive than Hess regarding the immediacy requirement.  The 
case, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,1677 originated in 1966 when black 
residents of Port Gibson, Mississippi organized a boycott of white 
merchants to promote their campaign for racial justice.  Lead by 
the local chapter of the NAACP, the boycott employed “watchers” 
who kept track of any blacks entering white stores.1678  Those 
identified by the watchers had their names publicly identified in a 
newsletter, with the result that they were subjected to community 
ostracism, and in some cases violence.1679  Boycott participants also 
held meetings, gave speeches, and picketed targeted businesses.1680  
Retaliating, seventeen local merchants sued the NAACP and over 
140 individuals who had participated in the boycott, alleging that 
the action was an illegal conspiracy designed to harm their 
businesses.1681  Plaintiffs won a nearly complete victory at trial, 
receiving over a million dollars in damages and gaining a 
permanent injunction against the boycott.1682  Every defendant was 
held personally liable for the entire judgment, which was calculated 
 1671. Id. at 107. 
 1672. Id. at 105. 
 1673. Hess, 297 N.E.2d at 428. 
 1674. Hess, 414 U.S. at 109. 
 1675. Id. at 108. 
 1676. Id. at 108–09. 
 1677. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 1678. Id. at 887. 
 1679. Id. at 903–04. 
 1680. Id. at 886. 
 1681. Id. at 889–90. 
 1682. See id. at 893. 
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to award the stores every penny of lost profits over a seven-year 
period.  The trial court agreed that between 1966 and 1970 the 
boycott had created an “atmosphere of fear” in the black 
community, although no acts of violence were recorded after the 
first year.1683  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rested on statements made 
at meetings by Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP in 
Mississippi.  Evers had warned blacks in the community that they 
would face “discipline” if they patronized white stores.1684  “If we 
catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna 
break your damn neck.”1685 
A unanimous Court reversed the judgment.1686  Much was at 
stake—the boycott had been an effective weapon against 
segregation since the Montgomery bus boycott inspired by Rosa 
Parks’ arrest in 1955.  Justice Stevens’ opinion steered down a tight 
path to reach this result, constrained as he was by two rather 
different lines of precedent.  To start, there was an inviolable rule: 
“The First Amendment does not protect violence.”1687  That is, one 
cannot engage in violence and claim that it is a form of expression 
immunized from punishment by the First Amendment.  There was 
no denying that acts of violence, including gunfire, had been 
directed against some blacks who ignored the boycott.1688  Evers’ 
speeches, which were full of pleas for solidarity and innuendos of 
social ostracism for those who broke their pledge to avoid white 
stores, “implicitly conveyed a sterner message” than the Court 
could countenance.1689  The other constraint came from the 
traditional reluctance to extend First Amendment protection to 
secondary boycotts, which the Port Gibson action amounted to, as 
some blacks otherwise willing to shop at the white stores were 
admonished not to do so.1690  Many of the NAACP’s demands were 
unrelated to the businesses themselves, as in the call for school 
integration, improvements to public services in black residential 
areas, an end to segregated bus stations, a stop to verbal abuse by 
police, and so on.1691  In labor disputes, a union cannot even picket 
 1683. Id. at 904. 
 1684. Id. at 902. 
 1685. Id. 
 1686. Id. at 934 (Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result). 
 1687. Id. at 916. 
 1688. See id. 
 1689. Id. at 927. 
 1690. Id. at 892. 
 1691. See id. at 899. 
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a business with which it does not have a primary grievance.1692  
Moreover, businesses are not allowed by antitrust laws, which are 
unquestionably constitutional, to engage in conspiracies to 
suppress competition.1693 
Before Stevens could deal with Evers’ speech and the various 
violent acts tied to the boycott, he first needed to sustain the 
collective refusal to deal with local businesses as a form of 
expression and association secured by the First Amendment.  He 
gave a straightforward answer: there was a difference between 
engaging in a boycott as an “economic activity”—a labor strike 
being the paradigm example—and doing so as “political activity.”1694  
“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues ‘has 
always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values.’”1695  Stevens invoked an earlier case to explain 
why: “Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.”1696  States could 
not penalize “a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed 
to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.”1697  Associating with 
others for that purpose was protected behavior, as were the 
speeches and marches in support of the boycott.1698  As for coercing 
people to obey the boycott through social disapproval, that was 
fully covered by the First Amendment.1699  It was a form of 
persuasion, “constitutionally protected and beyond the reach of a 
damages award.”1700  “Speech does not lose its protected character, 
however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them 
into action.”1701  Also protected was the effort to influence the 
businesses.1702  This was not “fundamentally different from the 
function of a newspaper.”1703 
 1692. Id. at 912. 
 1693. Id. 
 1694. Id. at 913. 
 1695. Id. (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). 
 1696. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). 
 1697. Id. at 914. 
 1698. Id. at 909. 
 1699. Id. at 909–10. 
 1700. Id. at 926. 
 1701. Id. at 910. 
 1702. See id. at 914. 
 1703. Id. at 911 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 
(1971)). 
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But what about the violence?  And Evers’ threat to break 
necks?  On the former, Stevens put the incidents in context.  They 
were “isolated acts” that took place in the first year of the boycott, 
whereas the Mississippi courts had ordered the defendants to pay 
damages equal to “all business losses sustained over a [seven]-year 
span.”1704  Regarding Evers’ speeches, Stevens emphasized the big 
picture—that his “lengthy addresses generally contained an 
impassioned plea for black citizens to unify, to support and respect 
each other, and to realize the political and economic power 
available to them.”1705  While “strong language” had been used, this 
was unexceptional: “Strong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric 
cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases.  An advocate 
must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and 
emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.”1706  
Whatever acts of violence occurred, with one possible exception, 
they took place weeks or months after the speeches given at the 
start of the boycott in 1966.1707  Considering that the boycott’s 
“ultimate objectives were unquestionably legitimate,” and that most 
of the means used likewise were protected by the First Amendment, 
liability for the few acts of violence depended on proving a specific 
link between them and the plaintiffs’ economic losses.1708  “A 
massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and 
economic structure of a local environment cannot be characterized 
as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral 
consequences of relatively few violent acts.”1709 
Regarding Evers’ regrettable neck-breaking reference, which 
took place in 1969, no violence had erupted as a result.1710  Drawing 
on cases dealing with Communist organizations, Stevens ruled out 
imposing liability on those who participated in the NAACP’s effort, 
even assuming that Evers’ warning was outside the First 
Amendment’s shield: “For liability to be imposed by reason of 
association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself 
possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific 
intent to further those illegal aims.”1711  Evers’ “threat,” however, fell 
 1704. Id. at 924 (emphasis added). 
 1705. Id. at 928. 
 1706. Id. 
 1707. Id. 
 1708. Id. at 933. 
 1709. Id. 
 1710. Id. at 928. 
 1711. Id. at 920. 
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within the First Amendment’s ambit, as they had to be taken in 
context of a lengthy campaign to encourage Port Gibson blacks to 
remain united.1712  So long as the “appeals do not incite lawless 
action, they must be regarded as protected speech.”1713 
That last line was extraordinarily important to the evolution of 
the First Amendment.  To punish a speaker for inciting a crowd, 
there must not only be an imminent danger, but also the failure of 
any harm to materialize; it conclusively established that there had 
been no immediate harm threatened by the speech.1714  Combined 
with that, earlier speech decisions had refused to uphold 
convictions based on predictions of violence by authorities.  When 
the aim of the speaker is legitimate (e.g., political change), rather 
than being part of a scheme to accomplish illicit ends (e.g., a bank 
robbery), the burden on authorities to impose penalties for 
nonviolent expression is nearly insurmountable. 
Justice Fortas’ draft opinion in Brandenburg was circulated to 
the other Justices on April 21, 1969, the same day the Court 
decided Watts v. United States1715 and Street v. New York.1716  Both of 
these decisions were issued a little more than a month after Gregory.  
In late February, the Court had issued its judgment in another First 
Amendment case, Tinker v. Des Moines School District.1717  These cases 
showed that the Court was already dealing with the implications of 
Brandenburg, even before the opinion in the case was handed down. 
Tinker started in December 1965, when the principals of the 
Des Moines, Iowa schools adopted a new rule outlawing the 
wearing of armbands at school, on penalty of suspension.1718  Anti-
gang measure?  No, it was in response to information they had 
received about plans by some students to wear black armbands to 
school for the remainder of the calendar year in protest of the 
Vietnam War and in support of a truce.1719  Kids from junior-high 
age to high school deliberately defied the ban and were suspended 
accordingly.1720  Theirs was but one small protest in a year-long 
escalation of both the war and demonstrations both for and against 
 1712. Id. at 928. 
 1713. Id. 
 1714. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 1715. 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
 1716. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
 1717. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 1718. Id. at 504. 
 1719. Id. 
 1720. Id. 
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American involvement.  The year was a turning point in America’s 
commitment to prevent South Vietnam from being absorbed by its 
Communist twin to the north.  American combat troops had 
entered Vietnam in March of that year for the first time, 
supplementing over 20,000 U.S. “advisors” already in the country 
and ongoing air strikes by American forces; in July, President 
Johnson ordered the number of troops increased to 125,000.  
American soldiers and airmen became involved in fierce fights with 
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army.  Hundreds of U.S. 
soldiers had by then died or been seriously wounded in combat.  
On November 27, tens of thousands of anti-war marchers circled 
the White House in protest.  Ten days earlier, 155 American 
soldiers from the First Cavalry Division were killed in a firefight; the 
next day the Cavalry killed 869 of the enemy.  By the end of 
December, troop levels had climbed above 180,000.1721  A few days 
later, the Des Moines students returned to class without 
armbands.1722  Three years then would pass before their suspensions 
were held by the Court to violate the First Amendment. 
Justice Fortas was assigned the task of writing the Court’s 
opinion in Tinker, which would be one of his very last and the most 
influential he wrote as a Justice.  Fortas was an intriguing choice for 
the assignment.  It was widely known that he had continued to 
advise President Johnson after taking his seat on the Court, and 
that the Justice was a vigorous supporter of the war.  Personally, he 
held no fond feelings for war opponents, nor was he supportive of 
demonstrations that broke laws.  Here, however, there were no 
group demonstrations, no “aggressive” behavior, and no “disruptive 
action” by anyone.1723  “It was closely akin to ‘pure speech,’ which, 
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection 
under the First Amendment,” Fortas wrote.1724  “Pure speech” was a 
term that Justice Goldberg had introduced in Cox.  It meant any 
form of expression that did not involve conduct, although 
“conduct” might be stretched to include acts such as handbilling 
that involve distributing papers.1725  According to Cox, pure speech 
does not include “patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets 
 1721. See STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 435–484 (1983).  
 1722. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 1723. Id. at 508. 
 1724. Id. at 505–06. 
 1725. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). 
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and highways.”1726  Armbands were sort of quasi-pure, somewhere 
between picketing and the spoken or written word.  As Goldberg 
had done, Fortas afforded greater protection to pure speech than 
expression that involved conduct.  Neither explained why, and 
there is no good reason to rely on the distinction—pure speech can 
have deadly results, whereas communicative actions may be 
harmless.  The Court itself has not stuck to a rigid formula for 
defining pure speech.  A 1980 decision, for example, referred to 
“[p]ublic-issue picketing” as “expressive conduct,” while going on 
to characterize it as “an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in 
their most pristine and classic form,” placing it “on the highest 
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”1727  Pure speech 
in the sense of spoken or written words can produce violent 
upheavals or infamous libels, which is why incitement to immediate 
violence is unprotected and defamation suits are common.  Sexual 
harassment in the workplace violates federal civil right laws, and is 
outside the First Amendment even if carried out purely by words.1728  
If there is any point to the distinction between pure speech and 
speech involving actions, it is that expressive conduct tends to 
provoke more reasons for public regulation than pure speech, 
though not always.  When certain forms of action are involved, 
typically with public demonstrations, the authorities may impose 
restrictions, such as parade permits, that could not apply to pure 
speech in the sense that Cox used the term.1729 
If Tinker had arisen because the City of Des Moines banned the 
wearing of black armbands by any person in public, the law 
certainly would have been unconstitutional.  As this was a rule for 
students only, the First Amendment had to be “applied in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment.”1730  A 
student’s action need not be tolerated when it “materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights 
of others.”1731  Students (and teachers), nonetheless, do not “shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate,” Fortas wrote, noting that in Barnette the 
Court had invalidated compulsory flag salutes in schools as 
 1726. Id. 
 1727. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980). 
 1728. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 1729. Cox, 379 U.S. at 555. 
 1730. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 1731. Id. at 513. 
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infringing on First Amendment rights.1732  School authorities could 
bar disruptive or harmful behavior, but nothing like the symbolic 
protest in Tinker.  Wearing the armbands was a “silent, passive 
expression of opinion,”1733 which “neither interrupted school 
activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of 
others.  They caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no 
interference with work and no disorder.”1734  By their own 
admission, the principals had imposed the ban out of “fear of a 
disturbance from the wearing of the armbands.”1735  That would not 
do, Justice Fortas admonished, because “in our system, 
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough 
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”1736  Besides, there 
would be no stopping point if officials could ban speech whenever 
they forecast disorder: “Any departure from absolute regimentation 
may cause trouble.  Any variation from the majority’s opinion may 
inspire fear.”1737  Public schools could not be “enclaves of 
totalitarianism,” nor were students to “be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”1738  
One danger of extending unbridled control to school principals 
was the real possibility of discrimination against the ideas being 
communicated by the speech.  In Des Moines schools, for example, 
students were not punished for sporting political buttons 
promoting candidates for public office.1739  Students also were 
known to wear “the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism.”1740  
(Cultural note: wearing an Iron Cross in the 1960s often signaled 
an aspiration to be a Surfer Dude, not a Nazi, and no doubt some 
Iowa kids were California Dreamin’.)1741 
Tinker did not lay the foundation of broad speech rights for 
students.  Justice Fortas may have extolled the classroom as 
“peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’” but there was a limit.1742  
Student expression must be carried out “without ‘materially and 
 1732. Id. at 506–07. 
 1733. Id. at 508. 
 1734. Id. at 514. 
 1735. Id. at 508. 
 1736. Id. 
 1737. Id. 
 1738. Id. at 511. 
 1739. Id. at 510. 
 1740. Id. 
 1741. The cultural note is based on the author’s personal observation and 
youthful aspirations. 
 1742. Id. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
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substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with 
the rights of others.’”1743  Later cases would emphasize the 
substantial discretion that school officials needed in determining 
when these conditions were present.1744  A primary function of 
public schools, Justice Powell wrote in 1969, was “inculcating 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system.”1745  Those values, Chief Justice Burger 
subsequently elaborated, included the “habits and manners of 
civility.”1746  Thus, a speech by a high school student, during an 
assembly, that used sexual innuendos could be punished because 
“it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to 
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public 
discourse.”1747  Undoubtedly principals could order a student to 
remove a sweatshirt inscribed with profanities, or send a kid home 
until he removed a Klan robe.  School newspapers written by 
students were subject to censorship, provided doing so was 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”1748 
In other words, context, along with nature of the 
communication itself, were key considerations in evaluating speech 
rights.  Take the case of Robert Watts.  While attending an anti-war 
rally at the Washington Monument in 1966, he announced to a 
small group that he had been ordered to appear for a military draft 
physical the following Monday.1749  “I am not going,” he told the 
others.1750  Making “a gesture as if sighting down the barrel of a 
rifle,”1751 Watts declared that “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle 
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.  They are not going 
to make me kill my black brothers.”1752  Laughter and applause 
 1743. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 1744. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986). 
 1745. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1968). 
 1746. Fraser, 478 U.S.at 681. 
 1747. Id. at 683. 
 1748. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273. 
 1749. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). 
 1750. Id. 
 1751. Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1968).  Unfortunately 
for Watts, an Army Counter Intelligence Corps agent just happened to be 
listening.  Id. 
 1752. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
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greeted his remarks.1753  Watts was arrested by the Secret Service 
and convicted of knowingly threatening the President—a felony—
for which he was placed on four years’ probation.1754  In a per 
curiam opinion, the Court reversed without hearing oral 
argument,1755 overturning an appellate ruling by Judge (and soon to 
be Chief Justice) Warren E. Burger, who thought that Watt’s 
“words, considered in context, reasonably permit an inference that 
he was uttering a threat.”1756 
Judge Burger was right in one respect, the Court agreed in 
reviewing the conviction, context was critical.1757  But the majority 
perceived the context far differently than Burger had.  On its face, 
the statute was unobjectionable—the nation had an overwhelming 
interest in protecting its chief executive from threats of violence.1758  
Regardless, the statute had to be “interpreted with the commands 
of the First Amendment clearly in mind.”1759  Doing so, the Court 
characterized Watts’ utterance as “political hyperbole” that 
Congress could not have meant to punish since presumably it knew 
that the First Amendment allowed “uninhibited, robust, and wide 
open” debate that included “unpleasantly sharp attacks” on 
officials.1760  Watts was exercising pure political speech, not 
announcing a true assassination plan.1761 
We agree with [Watts] that his only offense here was ‘a 
kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political 
opposition to the President.’  Taken in context, and 
regarding the expressly conditional nature of the 
statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see 
how it could be interpreted otherwise.1762  Within a few 
years, people might call it performance art.  Watts was 
ordered acquitted.1763 
Street v. New York1764 presented the Court with its first 
opportunity to consider whether burning the American Flag 
 1753. Watts, 402 F.2d at 681. 
 1754. Id. at 677. 
 1755. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 1756. Watts, 402 F.2d at 681. 
 1757. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 1758. Id. at 707. 
 1759. Id. 
 1760. Id. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 1761. See id. at 708. 
 1762. Id. 
 1763. Id. 
 1764. 394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969). 
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constituted a form of protected speech.  Sidney Street was listening 
to the radio in his Brooklyn apartment on the afternoon in 1966 
that the civil rights leader James Meredith was assassinated in Miss-
issippi.1765  Hearing the news, Street became enraged, grabbed his 
own American flag and proceeded to a street corner nearby, where 
he lit the flag on fire and dropped it to the pavement.1766  Some 
thirty people gathered around him, and a police officer overheard 
Street say, “We don’t need no damn flag.”1767  When asked by the 
officer if he had burned the flag, Street replied that he certainly 
had, explaining, “[i]f they let that happen to Meredith we don’t 
need an American flag.”1768  Street was convicted under a New York 
law that made it a misdemeanor “publicly (to) mutilate, deface, 
defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by 
words or act (any flag of the United States).”1769  Justice Harlan’s 
majority opinion avoided the land mine issue of whether the First 
Amendment protected the burning of the flag in protest.1770  
Instead, he grasped onto the possibility that the trial court had 
convicted Street for using “words” to “cast contempt upon” the 
flag.1771  That, New York could not do.1772  Freedom of speech in an 
“intellectually diverse” country included the right to express 
“opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.”1773  He repeated 
Justice Jackson’s admonition from the flag salute case, that “no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”1774  
Street’s short speech “amounted only to somewhat excited public 
advocacy of the idea that the United States should abandon, at least 
temporarily, one of its national symbols.”1775  It is clear that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from imposing 
 1765. Id. 
 1766. Id. 
 1767. Id. at 578–79. 
 1768. Id. at 579. 
 1769. Id. at 578. 
 1770. See id. at 577–94. 
 1771. Id. at 590. 
 1772. Id. at 591. 
 1773. Id. at 593. 
 1774. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943)). 
 1775. Id. at 591.  See also Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 564–65, 569–71 
(1970) (setting aside defendants’ disorderly conduct convictions for engaging in 
an illegal sit-in at a military recruitment center, because the jury instructions 
allowed a guilty verdict “simply because they advocated unpopular ideas.”). 
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criminal punishment for public advocacy of peaceful change in our 
institutions.1776 
It was entirely possible that Street’s speech, when combined 
with the flag burning, caused offense to some observers at the 
scene.1777  No evidence of that was presented, though at other times 
and places Street might have been in mortal danger.1778  Whether 
true or not, this made no difference, since “[i]t is firmly settled that 
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be 
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to 
some of their hearers.”1779  Harlan had crystallized Cox, Edwards, 
Terminiello, and Cantwell into a firm rule,1780 and in so doing he 
bridged the diverse settings of Gregory and Brandenburg.  Offending 
others could not be punished consistent with the First Amendment, 
no matter how loathsome the remarks that justified the offense 
taken.1781  It would be otherwise if Street had used fighting words.1782  
He had not, Harlan held, since his remarks were not “so inherently 
inflammatory as to come within that small class of ‘fighting words’ 
which are ‘likely to provoke the average person to retaliation.’”1783  
He did not venture why.  Possibly it was because Street had not 
berated or confronted anyone in particular and instead made a 
political statement.  Insults to someone else’s political beliefs are 
not fighting words, all appearances to the contrary.1784 
That the First Amendment grants a person the right to offend 
others may strike some as the last nail in the coffin of Western 
Civilization.  Yet what offends one may be another’s heartfelt 
political or moral conviction.  Consider the illuminating case of 
Cohen v. California,1785 decided in 1971, with Justice Harlan writing a 
sterling defense of the right to public vulgarity.1786  Issued on June 
7, 1971, Cohen was Harlan’s last major opinion and possibly his 
finest.  Harlan retired on September 23, and, suffering from 
 1776. Street, 394 U.S. at 591. 
 1777. See id. at 592. 
 1778. Cf. id. (discussing violent retaliation but surmising Street’s words were not 
so inflammatory as to provoke an average person to retaliate or cause a breach of 
the peace). 
 1779. Id. 
 1780. See id. at 591–94. 
 1781. Id. at 594. 
 1782. See id. at 592. 
 1783. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)). 
 1784. See id. 
 1785.     403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 1786. Id. at 21–26 (1971). 
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cancer, died on December 29 of that year.  He was nearly blind 
while writing the decision. 
The case started quietly in 1968 when Robert Paul Cohen was 
standing in the public corridor outside a courtroom in Los 
Angeles.1787  He wore a jacket bearing the words, “Fuck the Draft,” 
which he later testified was intended to publicize his views about 
the Vietnam War and conscription.1788  No one complained (it was 
LA in 1968!), but Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace and 
sentenced to thirty days in jail.1789  A California appellate court 
affirmed, reasoning that “the defendant deliberately wore a jacket 
emblazoned with language which is clearly offensive and below the 
‘minimum standard of propriety and the accepted norm of public 
behavior’ at least when paraded through a courthouse corridor 
containing women and children.”1790  To make it worse, Cohen had 
meant to be provocative: “He carefully chose the forum for his 
views where his conduct would have an effective shock impact.  The 
defendant’s stated purpose was to force a confrontation with others 
as to his opinion of the draft.”1791  Unquestionably, the court 
concluded, Cohen “must have been aware that his behavior would 
vex and annoy a substantial portion of his unwilling ‘audience.’”1792  
(Keep in mind that the “f-word” had not yet achieved ubiquity in 
American discourse, and no doubt some men as well as women 
might have taken offense, or not have wanted their children to see 
it.) 
Justice Harlan’s methodology in attacking these arguments was 
not entirely new, but it laid out a systematic approach to 
regulations of speech content that would serve as a model for 
future decisions.  Every step in his reasoning flowed from an axiom: 
the “usual rule” was “that governmental bodies may not prescribe 
the form or content of individual expression.”1793  Free expression 
was the default position, the status quo, the baseline of speech 
rights; departure from it required the state to prove a 
 1787. Id. at 16. 
 1788. Id. 
 1789. Id. at 16–17. 
 1790. People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (Ct. App. 1969) (quoting 
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967)), rev’d, 403 U.S. 
15 (1971). 
 1791. Id. 
 1792. Id.   
 1793. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
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“particularized and compelling reason.”1794  A “usual rule” implies 
that there are exceptions, and there were categories of allowable 
state regulations on the content of speech—all of which were long 
regarded as beyond First Amendment protection.1795  Justice Harlan 
methodically dismissed every possibility of such.1796  Here, the state’s 
case was all the more difficult to win since the prosecution 
punished a form of pure speech, and not “any separately 
identifiable conduct.”1797  That greatly lessened the reasons the state 
might validly have had for penalizing the expressive activity.  No 
category of exceptions recognized by the Court allowed regulation 
of speech solely because the state disagreed with “the underlying 
content of the message” conveyed by the jacket’s three words.1798  
However crude, they undeniably conveyed a political view.1799  It 
followed that punishing Cohen could “be justified, if at all, only as a 
valid regulation of the manner in which he exercised that 
freedom.”1800 
Justice Harlan then marched through all of the possible 
exceptions that might apply to validate Cohen’s conviction.1801  
“Fuck the Draft” did not qualify as unprotected obscenity, which 
must at a minimum “be, in some significant way, erotic,” and 
Cohen’s choice of words was unlikely to “conjure up such psychic 
stimulation.”1802  So declared a strait-laced, seventy-two-year-old 
former Wall Street lawyer.  Nor had Cohen used fighting words, 
because “[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could 
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a 
direct personal insult.”1803  That one line limited the exception for 
fighting words to a narrow category of “in-your-face” personal 
insults.  Next, Cohen could not be said to have incited violence by 
“intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction.”1804  This 
was no Feiner, or even the situation in Terminiello.1805  Then Justice 
 1794. Id. at 26. 
 1795. See id. at 24. 
 1796. See id. at 19–21. 
 1797. Id. at 18. 
 1798. Id. 
 1799. See id. 
 1800. Id. at 19. 
 1801. See id. at 19–21. 
 1802. Id. at 20. 
 1803. Id. 
 1804. Id. 
 1805. See supra notes 1090–1105 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 
1027–1043 and accompanying text. 
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Harlan came to the most delicate portion of the opinion: the 
question of offense.1806  California contended that his vulgar 
expression “was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers,”1807 
which it very likely had.  In reply, Justice Harlan drew one of the 
most significant distinctions to emerge in free speech law: 
Government was entitled to stop “intrusion into the privacy of the 
home of unwelcome views and ideas,” even though such offensive 
messages “cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue.”1808  
Outside the home was totally different.  Justice Harlan quoted 
Chief Justice Burger, who had written the previous year, “‘we are 
often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech.’”1809  (Chief Justice Burger dissented in 
Cohen.)  Cohen’s “crudely defaced jacket”1810 was nothing like a 
blaring sound-truck; anyone spotting the message “could effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting 
their eyes.”1811  Although some might have been “briefly exposed” 
before looking away, that alone could not amount to a “breach of 
the peace.”1812 
That left only one possibility: that California was entitled to 
“excise, as ‘offensive conduct,’ one particular scurrilous epithet 
from the public discourse,” either because the word was “inherently 
likely to cause violent reaction,” or because the state, “acting as [a] 
guardian[] of public morality,” had declared it forbidden.1813  
Government could not proceed on either premise, Cohen 
concluded.1814  Recalling Tinker, Harlan rejected the idea that 
speech could be suppressed out of an “‘undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance.’”1815  Suppressing expression to 
prevent an assault on the speaker was a “self-defeating proposition,” 
as it only substituted the state as a censor in place of the 
“hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless” wishing to silence 
 1806. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18. 
 1807. Id. at 21. 
 1808. Id. 
 1809. Id. at 21 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 
(1970)). 
 1810. Id. at 20. 
 1811. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 1812. Id. at 22. 
 1813. Id. 
 1814. Id. at 23–26. 
 1815. Id. at 23 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 508 (1969)). 
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those who offend them.1816  Embodied in Harlan’s argument was 
the assumption that government must tolerate “verbal tumult, 
discord, and even offensive utterance” as “necessary side effects” of 
free debate.1817  “That the air may at times seem filled with verbal 
cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength,” 
as the discord signified vitality and commitment to self-rule.1818 
Harlan’s line of reasoning struck Justice Blackmun, who was 
completing his first year on the Court, as hot air.1819  “Cohen’s 
absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly conduct and 
little speech,” he wrote testily.1820  In this spirit, one might 
reasonably ask why society cannot insist on civility in public 
discourse, and since any argument can be made without using 
“fuck” or its cognates, why not oblige people to choose a less 
offensive vehicle for expressing their ideas in public?  That line of 
thinking led Harlan to introduce a critical element to First 
Amendment analysis.  Excising “one particular scurrilous epithet” 
from the lexicon of acceptable words for public discourse would 
countenance the suppression of other expressions the government 
deemed beyond the pale of civil discourse.1821  And how would a 
court determine if the suppression was justified in the name of 
community values?  “How is one to distinguish this from any other 
offensive word?”1822  Harlan could discern no principle for deciding, 
short of giving government the authority “to cleanse public debate 
to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most 
squeamish among us.”1823  The state could do nothing of the sort.  
“For, while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is 
perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is 
nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s 
lyric.”1824  Precisely because the government could not “make 
principled distinctions in this area,” Harlan emphasized, “the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style” largely to the 
individual.1825  He might have added that it would be a futile effort 
 1816. Id. 
 1817. Id. at 24–25. 
 1818. Id. at 25. 
 1819. See id. at 27–28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 1820. Id. at 27. 
 1821. Id. at 22. 
 1822. Id. at 25. 
 1823. Id. 
 1824. Id. 
 1825. Id. 
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in any event, since language is malleable enough that people can 
always come up with some new word or phrase just as offensive as 
Cohen’s, especially if they are goaded by a ban on their usual 
epithets. 
Harlan closed his opinion with a trenchant observation that 
“words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their 
cognitive force,” which reflected the “dual communicative 
function” of language: “it conveys not only ideas capable of 
relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible 
emotions as well.”1826  If this seems implausible, try an experiment: 
come up with another expression that would have equally well 
served Cohen’s purpose of publicizing his vehement opposition to 
the war.  Something along the lines of “Down with the Draft” or 
“Heck no, I won’t go” fails to capture the same depth of bitter 
resentment that Cohen’s invective imparted.  If government “can 
forbid particular words,” there was “a substantial risk of suppressing 
ideas in the process,” Harlan warned.1827  Giving the state such 
license could become “a convenient guise for banning the 
expression of unpopular views.”1828 
“The constitutional right of free expression is powerful 
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours,” Harlan 
commented in Cohen, summarizing in one sentence much of the 
nation’s experience during the 1960s.1829  Like a pill, speech could 
help cure social ills.  It also could have nasty side effects, and like 
many a patient swallowing a bitter tonic, Americans needed to keep 
the ultimate benefits in mind while they endured the remedy.  
Freeing the voices of the populace places  
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into 
the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such 
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry 
and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual 
dignity and choice upon which our political system 
rests.1830 
 1826. Id. at 26. 
 1827. Id. 
 1828. Id. 
 1829. Id. at 24. 
 1830. Id. 
244
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/5
1. JAY - ADC 4/30/2008  2:41:26 PM 
2008] CREATING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 1017 
 
VI. THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREE EXPRESSION ESTABLISHED 
Reviewing the entire development of the First Amendment 
from its origin to the early 1970s, the striking fact is that almost 
everything about constitutional protections for free expression and 
association was fundamentally changed in this period.  All of the 
foundational changes took place in the relatively brief period from 
the 1930s to the early 1970s.  Along with crucial fluctuations in the 
specific rules relating to speech and press rights, the Court moved 
from an attitude that was extremely accepting of governmental 
repression to a model of overall tolerance for expression and 
personal association with others.  At the beginning of the last 
century, the Court remained entrenched in Blackstone’s world, in 
which the only limitations on governmental power over speech and 
press related to prior restraints.  A hundred years later, it had 
adopted the view of Holmes’ Abrams dissent, that “[t]he hallmark of 
the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas.’”1831  By 
the 1970s, any governmental impingement on the content of 
political expression was highly suspect.  Relatedly, the Court 
declared that the First Amendment’s right of expression implies “a 
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and 
cultural ends.”1832  Furthermore, whereas a century ago public 
employees could be forced to choose between their jobs and 
speaking their minds on public affairs, today government workers 
enjoy a large measure of freedom to engage in expression.  During 
the same period, the Court went from giving government complete 
discretion over speech activities on public property, thereby 
allowing officials to exclude speakers at their whim, to recognizing 
that people have a right to use the streets, squares and parks and 
other public premises for expressive purposes. 
All of these are qualified rights, subject to various exceptions.  
Nevertheless, it is unmistakable that in the span of less than fifty 
years, First Amendment analysis acquired a distinctively libertarian 
tone.  Not just libertarian in preventing the government from 
suppressing most expression, but more importantly in its premise 
that liberty of speech is the normal or baseline condition of 
American society, and departures from that baseline by the state 
 1831. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 1832. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
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require strong justifications.  Furthermore, the First Amendment is 
understood to guard the interests of both the speaker in 
disseminating information and the listener in receiving it.  Put 
more broadly, there is an “informational purpose of the First 
Amendment,”1833  Justice Powell wrote for the Court, which 
recognized that regardless of its source, “expression may contribute 
to society’s edification.”1834  Government could not discriminate 
against either the source or, except in narrow and specifically-
defined instances, the content of speech.1835  “This right to receive 
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth,” the Court 
held in 1969, “is fundamental to our free society.”1836 
A First Amendment inquiry after the early 1970s begins by 
asking whether a law restricts communication or association in 
some way.  Analytically, there are six basic scenarios in which the 
government may justify such restrictions under the Court’s 
decisions.  First, the law might directly suppress the content of a 
person’s speech or associations—that is, limit what message an 
individual can communicate or dictate with whom the person may 
associate.1837  For example, a statute might outlaw obscene books 
and movies, or require a private club to admit women or minorities 
as members contrary to the wishes of the group.  Second, a statute 
on its face could have nothing to do with speech (such as an 
ordinary criminal law), but enforcement of the law might impinge 
on expression or association.1838  The law against burning a draft 
card that was upheld in United States v. O’Brien was one such general 
 1833. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 n.18 (1978). 
 1834. Id. at 783. 
 1835. Id. at 783–84. 
 1836. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).  See also Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (discussing the right to 
receive information as including public access to criminal trials); Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
at 783 (discussing First Amendment protection for “public access to discussion, 
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas”); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (holding that minors have same rights to 
receive information has adults except “in relatively narrow and well-defined 
circumstances”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–763 (1972) 
(acknowledging that First Amendment protects the right to “receive information 
and ideas”); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305–07 (1965) (recognizing 
right to receive political publications sent from foreign countries). 
 1837. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (subjecting content-
based regulations of speech to strict scrutiny). 
 1838. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
(1984) (upholding regulation against sleeping in park despite its impact on 
speakers’ choice of forum). 
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law that incidentally affected expression.1839  Third, a law could 
regulate speech or association not through banning the content, 
but by restricting the time, place and manner of these activities, 
such as requiring parade permits, limiting the decibel levels of 
sound trucks or obliging political candidates to report the names of 
their contributors.1840  Fourth, the state may be attempting to 
control access to public property, for example by banning 
demonstrations inside of government office buildings.1841  Fifth, it 
may be attempting to curb a government employee’s speech, such 
as when a public school teacher is fired for complaining about how 
the school board is spending education funds.1842  Sixth, as a 
condition for receiving a government grant, the recipient of the 
funds may be obligated to curtail what otherwise would be First 
Amendment rights.1843  An instance of this occurred when 
recipients of federal funds for family planning were required not to 
counsel patients regarding abortions.1844 
Each of these possibilities is tested according to a different 
standard.  For all of them, however, there is a principle “that 
underlies the First Amendment itself,”1845 namely neutrality on the 
part of government toward the viewpoint of speakers.1846  To recall 
again Justice Jackson’s declaration in the 1943 flag salute case, the 
“fixed star in our constitutional constellation” consists of refusing 
to allow officials, whether “high or petty,” from dictating “what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
 1839. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 1840. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (recognizing 
legitimacy of reasonable time, place and manner rules, but striking down a total 
ban of handbilling). 
 1841. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (holding that the 
prohibition of conduct that obstructs or unreasonably interferes with ingress or 
egress to or from courthouse does not abridge free speech rights). 
 1842. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that 
“absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by [a teacher], a 
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not 
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”). 
 1843. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991) (determining that 
regulations do not violate First Amendment free speech rights of federal fund 
recipients, their staffs, or their patients by impermissibly imposing viewpoint-
discriminatory conditions on government subsidies). 
 1844. Id. 
 1845. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984). 
 1846. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 220–21 
(2000).  See also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., plurality opinion). 
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therein.”1847  Over time, the Court restated Jackson’s principle in 
the form of a basic rule, that “government may not regulate use 
based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message 
expressed.”1848  On occasion, the government can restrict the 
content of speech, as when it prohibits a person from threatening 
another with violence.  But while it may limit an entire category of 
speech (such as threatening words) it must do so across the board, 
without regard to the viewpoint of the speaker.  A ban on all true 
threats would be constitutional, but not a law that forbids 
threatening someone who supports the President’s national 
security policies.  The only nuance that must be added to Jackson’s 
statement occurs with regard to the sixth scenario just outlined—
conditions on funding.  To a great extent, government can 
distribute government funds in a manner that prefers certain 
viewpoints to others, as the abortion limitation proves. 
The principle of government neutrality regarding expression 
did not blow in from the desert.  Rather, it encapsulates an attitude 
about the relationship between citizen and state that grew out of 
the specific historical events covered in this essay.  Not 
uncommonly, the Court’s endorsement of First Amendment rights 
arose in tandem with, or was preceded by, other constitutional 
developments.  From the 1930s to the 1960s, for instance, the 
Court was presented with an assortment of cases in which 
individuals were arrested for literally doing nothing other than 
expressing an unpopular view, or sometimes for simply being in a 
place that authorities deemed off limits to those who bucked the 
established order.  To resolve these controversies, the Court relied 
on another libertarian premise—that Americans cannot be 
deprived of their liberty or property unless they violate a law 
applicable to everyone.  Moreover, people are entitled to be in 
public places, move about the country, and associate with whom 
they wish, regardless of whether society disapproves.  All of these 
rights—and many more—assume that for a broad swath of human 
behavior the normal order of affairs is personal autonomy, not 
state control. 
 
 1847. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 1848. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
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